Bay Area Large Special Events Planning Guide and CONOPS Template

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Prepared for the Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative

PREFACE

Introduction

This document was created through the Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) to provide Bay Area stakeholders with a planning guide and a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) template for planning a Large Special Event (LSE). It is intended to serve as a bridge between the high level intent and planning elements of a LSE and the specific technical requirements and documentation required for a LSE CONOPS.

This document provides detailed information on how to conduct the planning effort for a LSE, discusses planning considerations that are unique to a LSE, and offers a number of recommended planning tools. The companion CONOPS Template is an editable Word document intended to serve as the basis for a local jurisdiction's actual LSE CONOPS. This template also prompts the user to incorporate and modify information as needed to ensure the CONOPS is scaled and appropriate for that specific LSE.

Both the Planning Guide and the CONOPS Template are intended for senior public safety and emergency management planners to guide the overall LSE preparedness effort. First responders should reference the tactical plans and procedures that this larger effort will produce.

Acknowledgements

This document is a product of a collaborative planning team and the funding efforts of the Bay Area UASI. The planning team consisted of the following entities:

- Alameda County
- Contra Costa County
- Marin County
- Monterey County
- Napa County
- San Benito County
- Santa Clara County
- City and County of San Francisco
- San Mateo County
- Sonoma County
- City of Belmont
- City of Berkeley
- City of Salinas
- City of San Jose
- City of Oakland
- City of Palo Alto
- City of San Rafael
- City of Santa Clara
- City of Santa Rosa
- City of Sunnyvale
- Union City
- Metropolitan Transportation Commission
- Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority
- San Francisco Bay Area Water Emergency Transportation Authority
- Bay Area Regional Interoperable Communications Systems Authority
- California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
- U.S. Army Reserve, Parks Reserve Forces Training Area
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX
- National Weather Service

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PURPOSE/OVERVIEW

The Bay Area hosts numerous large special events (LSEs) that reflect the region's diverse and rich heritage while contributing to the character and energy in the area. The Bay Area jurisdictions provide essential municipal services in support of LSEs to ensure events occurring on public space within their jurisdiction are conducted in a manner that protects public health and safety. Significant Bay Area resources and planning are required for the success of an LSE.

For the purposes of this document, the definition of an LSE is a planned activity within the Bay Area that brings together a large number of people (usually 500 or more). Emphasis is not placed on the total number of people attending but rather the impact on the host jurisdiction and allied stakeholders' ability to respond to a large-scale emergency or the exceptional demands that the activity places on various support services.

This LSE planning guide was created to provide an overview of the planning elements that a host jurisdiction should address in the very early stages of planning or when considering promoting or sponsoring such an event. This guide includes information on determining the mission and scope of the LSE, how to conduct risk assessments for a LSE, engaging stakeholders, identifying potential impacts to community and response structure, and evaluating the support required (personnel and logistics).

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1.0 Establishing Mission and Objectives

Establishing a clear mission and objectives at the beginning of the planning phase is critical for successful event execution. Carefully planned operations and multi-agency regional planning coordination before, during, and after an LSE are paramount to the host jurisdiction's ability to maintain a safe LSE environment. In planning an LSE, the host jurisdiction should develop an overall strategic vision and define the specific tactics and strategies that will be used to support each LSE.

At the outset of the planning effort, the host jurisdiction should develop its mission, objectives and determine the necessary components of the LSE Concept of Operations (CONOPS). All LSE stakeholders should have an understanding of the LSE mission and objectives. Therefore, it is important for the host jurisdiction to actively engage in strategic and collaborative planning, which involves the following four steps:

1. Develop a strategic vision centered on establishing a friendly and safe environment
2. Create a core planning committee to oversee major decision-making and planning
3. Conduct formal and informal meetings with stakeholders to develop relationships and coordinate activities and tasks
4. Develop flexible and scalable plans that can accommodate changes in needed resources should intelligence indicate that differing resources may be required

1.1 Mission

Establishing a clear mission statement at the beginning of the planning phase enables unity of effort and consistency for the LSE purpose and execution between the host jurisdiction and the allied stakeholders. Every other planning element is designed and evaluated according to its contribution to accomplishing the mission. The mission statement should be concise, clearly articulate the type of event, and convey the goal of the LSE CONOPS. The following is an example statement:

> *(Insert name of jurisdiction) and allied stakeholders will develop a unified, coordinated organizational structure, establish communications, pre-position resources, and monitor threats and hazards during the (insert name of LSE) to ensure a prompt and coordinated response structure to restore essential services and provide emergency response services to anyone affected by an emergency leading up to, during, or directly after the event.*

1.2 Objectives

The following are examples of objectives the LSE Planning Committee may set:

- Maintain situational awareness of event activities and monitor potential threats.
- Provide for the safety of all event responders and staff.

- Assure the security of all event participants through a coordinated and well-communicated law enforcement plan.
- Assure the rescue, treatment, and transportation of all patients within the response footprint.
- Integrate voice and data interoperable communications to support event operations and potential incident response.
- Identify any event-related events – sanctioned and unsanctioned.
- Engage stakeholders and keep the community informed

Capabilities-based planning allows the LSE Planning Committee to develop event objectives and observe event outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Relevant capabilities to consider from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Core Capabilities List are listed in Exhibit 1-1 below.

Exhibit 1-1: Department of Homeland Security Core Capabilities List

Item	Core Capability	Tested Activities
1	Planning	1. Conduct strategic planning 2. Develop operational plans 3. Validate plans
2	Operational Communications	4. Provide EOC communications support
3	Intelligence and information sharing	5. Incorporate all stakeholders in information flow 6. Vertically flow of information 7. Horizontally flow of information
4	Screening, Search and Detection	8. Detect CBRNE
5	Operational Coordination	9. Direct on-site incident management 10. Establish full on-site incident command 11. Conduct resource management 12. Develop incident action plan (IAP) 13. Execute plan 14. Demobilize on-site incident management 15. Direct emergency operation center's tactical operations 16. Gather and provide information 17. Support and coordinate response 18. Demobilize emergency operations center management
6	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	19. Direct critical resource logistics and distribution operations 20. Activate critical resource logistics and distribution 21. Acquire resources 22. Transport, track, and manage resources

		23. Maintain and recover resources
7	On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	24. Plan for public safety and security response during large-scale, all-hazards events 25. Determine appropriate training and exercises necessary to address gaps 26. Command and control public safety and security response operations 27. Activate public safety and security response 28. Maintain public order 29. Demobilize public safety and security response operations
8	Access Control and Identity Verification	30. Assess the incident scene and secure the area 31. Control traffic, crowd, and scene
9	Public Information and Warning	32. Manage emergency public information and warnings 33. Establish joint information center 34. Conduct joint information center operations 35. Issue public information, alerts/warnings, and notifications

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2.0 Establishing the Planning Committee

One of the first steps in planning a LSE is to bring together those who are hosting the event with those who are responsible for functional activities related to the event within the community. A multi-disciplinary planning committee should be composed of the event promoter or sponsor and any agency that holds a functional stake in the event. All involved agencies need to participate on this planning committee from the outset to ensure a successful and safe LSE.

Major national and regional events will involve multiple federal, state, and local agencies. Additional key partners include fire, EMS, transportation, public works, health, and other public agencies and the private sector (such as businesses affected by the event) as well as private security organizations. Consideration should also be given to identifying and integrating key private sector partners in the planning and communication process. Such private sector partners may include business associations, visitor bureaus, chambers of commerce, hotel managers, building managers associations, and other networks such as the California Resiliency Alliance.

2.1 Planning Committee Structure

The LSE Planning Committee structure should include an Executive Steering Committee, led by a Public Safety Director, and be comprised of multiple subcommittees. For this guide, the agencies, groups, and entities that have responsibilities prior to, during, and after the LSE are referred to as "allied stakeholders." The host jurisdiction and allied stakeholders should consider beginning to meet at least 12-18 months in advance of a LSE in order to form/approve Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), approve the planning framework, and initiate planning and training for the event. Depending on the complexity or significance of the LSE, this planning effort could begin even earlier. One of the main goals in forming the LSE Planning Committee is to facilitate key stakeholders getting to know each other and learning how to communicate and work together in order to set the stage for the day-of-event activities.

One of the foundational elements of the LSE Planning Committee structure is that each agency operates in a manner that is consistent with its own goals, operational concepts and procedures, and authorities. The members of the LSE Planning Committee consider those goals, operational concepts and procedures, and authorities while planning for the LSE. Developing a CONOPS that incorporates both the regional components and the local agency level elements is an important initiative of this committee. A template CONOPS is provided as a companion document to this guidance.

2.2 Roles and Responsibilities

Early in the planning stages, the host jurisdiction should develop a detailed organization chart for planning and managing the large special event. This will help clarify assignments, roles, and responsibilities for the event within the lead agency. This organization chart will also list the chain of command for each assignment. The organization chart used for planning breaks the event into areas of responsibility and may be similar, but not exact, as the defined core functional areas for LSE management.

The core functional areas that should be designated for LSE planning purposes will vary by event. Larger events will generally have more functional areas and resources. Smaller events condense many of the functions together. See Appendix A (Pre-Event Planning Matrix) for a tool that can be used to summarize agency assignments and responsibilities.

2.3 Executive Steering Committee

The LSE Planning Committee should create an Executive Steering Committee headed by the overall Event Security or Public Safety Director who represents the lead law enforcement agency. Note: depending on the nature of the LSE, the Executive Steering Committee could be established prior to the Planning Committee. The Executive Steering Committee should involve top command level personnel from all partners responsible for securing the event and is responsible for resolving conflicts between agencies/functional areas. See Exhibit 2-1 for a suggested LSE Planning Committee organization.

2.3.1 Intelligence / Investigation Function

Depending on the nature and scope of the LSE, the Planning Committee could direct the use of the Intelligence/Investigation (I/I) Function in both planning for and managing LSE operations. This function, as suggested by DHS, provides a focused capability to develop and share criminal and threat intelligence prior to and during a LSE. Should a criminal incident occur, this function coordinates the multi-jurisdictional investigation. The I/I Function can be integrated into the standard ICS organization by adding a sixth function – moving criminal intelligence responsibilities from Planning and investigative responsibilities from Operations. Some non-law enforcement functions related to a LSE could include epidemiology, mass fatality management, fire/explosion cause investigation, critical infrastructure analysis, and transportation accidents.

The mission of the I/I Function is to ensure that all intelligence/investigations operations and activities are properly managed, coordinated, and directed in order to:

- Prevent/Deter potential unlawful activity, incidents, and/or attacks
- Collect, process, analyze, secure, and appropriately disseminate information and intelligence
- Identify, document, process, collect, create a chain of custody for, safeguard, examine, analyze, and store probative evidence
- Conduct a thorough and comprehensive investigation that leads to the identification, apprehension, and prosecution of the perpetrators
- Serve as a conduit to provide situational awareness (local and national) pertaining to an incident
- Inform and support life safety operations, including the safety/security of all personnel.

See References for detailed guidance on the I/I Function.

2.3.2 Role of the Executive Steering Committee

The Executive Steering Committee guides and oversees the development of the CONOPS. Some of the tasks that the executive steering committee performs include:

- Identify all agencies including law enforcement, fire, EMS, state, federal, and private sector, if applicable, that should be part of the large special event security operation.
- Determine each of the major functional components and areas of responsibility that need to be planned and assign appropriate agencies to manage each function or responsibility. These functional components may create subcommittees or working groups (and select chairs or co-chairs) that report to the chair of the functional component, to include objectives, strategy and timelines.
- Review subcommittee operational plans to ensure that they are comprehensive and consistent, and realistic, and that contingency plans are in place for each major function.
- Determine any changes needed in routine policies, practices, or laws.
- Determine the need for additional or enhanced training and exercise events. See Appendix D (Training and Exercises).

Exhibit 2-1: Sample LSE Planning Committee/Subcommittee Organization Chart



2.4 LSE Public Safety Director

The first action for the lead LSE law enforcement agency is to appoint the LSE Public Safety Director who may act as the head of the Executive Steering Committee. Ideally, this position will be a dedicated assignment until the LSE is completed. Depending on the size of the LSE, the LSE Public Safety Director may choose to appoint a second chair from the organizational structure. A local Lead Planner for the host jurisdiction helps to ensure that commitments and CONOPS elements are appropriately vetted and coordinated across various subcommittees. The Lead Planner:

- Has decision-making authority and is a command-level officer.
- Serves as the Incident Commander for the planning phase, ensuring coordination among each of the various planning functions.
- Reports directly to the Chief of Police of the host jurisdiction to ensure buy-in and concurrence on all aspects of the CONOPS.
- Has the authority to negotiate and sign MOUs for assistance provided by other agencies.
- Reviews the status of all planning and coordination activities. See Appendix C (LSE Planning Checklist).
- Establishes the format and process for documenting the planning process (See Appendix G).

2.5 Planning Subcommittees

The LSE Planning Committee will assign host jurisdiction personnel as co-chairs on the LSE subcommittees. Each planning subcommittee should identify a lead agency and support agencies are identified. The chair of each subcommittee should have decision-making authority within their agency.

The first order of business for a new planning subcommittee is to meet and develop task statements and meeting schedules. Members should designate an alternate(s) in case they are unable to attend a meeting. Each subcommittee should also take minutes of the meetings. The meeting minutes should include who attended, what was discussed, and the decisions the group made during the meeting. These minutes provide a historical record of the CONOPS and agency agreements.

- Each planning subcommittee should meet as often as necessary to develop their functional area procedures. Each subcommittee has a specific area of functional responsibility, is empowered to made decisions, and is responsible for developing objectives and tasking to support the LSE CONOPS.

2.5.1 Key Tasks for Planning Subcommittees

- Develop the operational components for each functional area of responsibility.
- Detail available resources.
- Identify gaps in planning and resources and identify ways to secure needed resources.

Subcommittees will vary depending on the LSE, but most LSE's require multiple subcommittees. Some of the key functional areas and corresponding subcommittees for a LSE could include:

- Determining and Acquiring the Workforce (Personnel Resources)
- Access Control: Screening and Physical Security
- Transportation/Traffic
- Intelligence
- Credentialing
- Administrative and Logistics Support
- Field Operations
- Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities
- Fire/EMS/Hospitals/Public Health
- Hazardous Materials/WMD: Detection, Response, Management
- Tactical Support and Crisis Management
- Public Information and Media Relations
- Training (see Appendix D – Training and Exercise)
- Crowd Management and Demonstrations
- Legal Issues
- VIP/Dignitary Protection
- Communications and Communication Technology
- Prisoner Processing
- Non-LSE Law Enforcement
- Finance

2.6 LSE Planning Committee Initial Meeting Agenda

At its initial meeting, the LSE Planning Committee should focus on developing the following information for the LSE:

- Mission and objectives of the LSE, including the LSE purpose and experience. See Section 1 for examples and guidance.
- CONOPS components
  - Specific elements that are the responsibility of the event sponsor
  - Specific elements that are the responsibility the host jurisdiction
- Structure of the LSE Planning Committee including the Executive Steering Committee and subcommittees.
  - Following the NIMS, SEMS, and ICS frameworks
  - Observing existing Bay Area regional collaboration protocols

- Assessment of potential LSE-related risks (including crowd control, staffing, food and shelter, parking, transportation, medical facilities), as well as contingency planning (weather, major crime (related or unrelated to the LSE). Identify appropriate subcommittees and/or approaches to mitigate the risks.
- Identification and integration of stakeholders: Public safety is generally the lead, but should consider what other disciplines should be involved and at what level: public works departments, special districts, airports, hospitals, and so forth. This could include additional stakeholders such as the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) or the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). Also, key private sector organizations that may be impacted or support the LSE should be considered.
- Review of previous LSE issues/challenges and relevant host jurisdiction concerns.
- Identify the planning documentation formats and standards to be used by participating agencies (see Appendix G – LSE Planning Documentation).
- Impact on the community and public information elements.
  Example: The U.S. Secret Service informs the City of Palo Alto that the President of the United States (POTUS) will be landing via helicopter near Stanford Hospital. Palo Alto works with Stanford Hospital and other allied agencies to develop traffic plans and to notify those impacted via a coordinated PIO effort (JIC/JIS).

2.7 Meeting Schedule

LSE Planning Committee meetings should begin as early as possible, preferably at least 12-18 months before the event. Each subcommittee should establish a routine (i.e. monthly) meeting schedule to ensure consistent planning efforts. The frequency of meetings may increase as the LSE date approaches or as the LSE Public Safety Director or subcommittee chair deems necessary in order to meet planning objectives. Subcommittees meet as the chair determines but should be synchronized with the Planning Committee meetings in order to provide timely input or receive guidance and direction as needed.

Subcommittee minutes as well as any issues or information needs should be regularly communicated by the subcommittee chair to the Planning Committee and the chairs of the other subcommittees. As needed, the chairs of each subcommittee may communicate directly with one another or coordinate such communication among their subcommittee members. Significant issues that involve more than one subcommittee may be brought forward for consideration by the Planning Committee.

3.0 Planning Elements

A large portion of the work required for an LSE consists of pre-event planning. Generally, an LSE encompasses all aspects of the host jurisdiction's resources and requires participation and buy-in from senior leadership.

Life Cycle of a LSE

There are four distinct phases that occur during LSE planning. There are (1) pre-event planning, (2) transition to operations, (3) event operations, and (4) post-event activities. Planning will ideally begin at least 12-18 months before the event, while the transition phase may start as much as 6 months, or as little as 30 – 60 days, before the event begins. The post-event recovery phase begins upon the conclusion of the event and typically lasts 30-90 days.

Exhibit 3-1: Four Phases of LSE Planning

Phase	Activity
Phase 1: LSE Pre-Event Planning	This phase involves the lead agency receiving authorization, establishing the organizational planning structure, establishing its mission, reaching out to collaborate with other partners to help secure the event, meeting regularly with committee members and partners, and developing detailed CONOPS and contingency plans.
Phase 2: Transition to Operations	This phase transitions from planning for the event to conducting security operations. This can be a gray area as it can be difficult to distinguish between the two but is easiest when the people that developed the CONOPS are responsible for making it work. For complex events, operations often have to be handed over to multiple agencies and to people who have not been involved intimately with planning. Training, exercises, and the deployment of resources are three activities that signal and facilitate the transition to operations.
Phase 3: LSE Operations Phase	This phase begins just before spectators, officials, crowds, media, and others begin to assemble at the event sites. For some events (e.g., Super Bowl, NASCAR races, conventions), people begin to gather days prior to the actual event or game. This phase includes comprehensive communications, monitoring, and reporting. It involves ensuring that key functional areas are functioning properly, such as the communications command center, credentialing, access control posts, and more. It also involves checking on the readiness of field and support areas such as mobile field forces to deal with crowd control, intelligence support, arrest processing, EMS/medical support, and more. A LSE will have an emphasis on increased staffing. Considerations for staffing for sustained operational periods must be addressed. Demobilization may also take place in this phase.
Phase 4: Post-Event Activities	This phase, which begins when the LSE is over, includes the development of an after action report (AAR) to review the successes and identify areas needing improvement for future LSEs. It also involves accounting for all equipment and other resources used, including paying bills for the LSE. This phase typically lasts approximately 30-90 days after the LSE's formal completion.

3.1 Core Operational Functions of LSE Security/Management

It is recommended that the LSE CONOPS divide planning efforts into core operational functions. Doing so allows the Executive Steering Committee to "pick and choose" the functions that need to be addressed depending upon the nature of the LSE. Also, the core operational function approach helps to drive the organization chart to define roles and responsibilities. Finally, this approach allows the Executive Steering Committee to expand all of the principles of ICS, and the major management functions (finances, logistics, operations, and command and control) but focuses on the operational specifics needed to plan for a LSE.

The key functions should align with those identified by the Executive Steering Committee and will vary by event. Larger events will generally have more functional areas and resources. Smaller events condense many of the functions together.

Exhibit 3-2: LSE Core Operational Functions for Consideration

Personnel Resources	Media Relations/PR
Screening and Physical Security	Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Utilities
Crisis Management	Training
Emergency Evacuation	Prisoner Processing
Transportation/Traffic	Fire/EMS/Hospital Services
Tactical Support/HazMat/WMD	Airspace/Maritime
Communication: Interagency &Technical	Non –Event Patrol
Consequence Management	Legal Issues
Intelligence	Finance and Logistics
Credentialing	Field Operations/Venue Security
Functional Needs	Post-Event AAR

3.1.1 Pre-Event Planning Matrix

The Executive Steering Committee should identify all of the major functions and responsibility required by the event and assign appropriate agencies to manage each function or responsibility. The pre-event planning matrix in Appendix A is designed to choose the risks, hazards and functions that are likely to be required by an event, and assign each to a primary agency (P) or a secondary or support agency (S).

3.1.2 Core Operational Function Planning Checklists

Checklists for each of the functional areas are provided to guide the planning and key discussions for each subcommittee. See Appendix B. (Core Operational Function Planning Checklists.)

3.2 Risk Assessment and Planning

Early in the LSE planning process, the host jurisdiction needs to conduct a comprehensive threat and risk assessment for the LSE in order to plan for possible situations. LSE planning must take into account a multitude of potential threats including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, severe weather, power disruptions, and cyber-attacks.

3.2.1 Threat and Risk Categories

Risk is the combination of the probability of a threat or hazard occurring and its consequence. As a starting point to identify known threats and hazards, the host jurisdiction should review existing documents including:

- Local, regional and neighboring community Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRAs)
- General Plan Safety Element
- Local Hazard Mitigation Plan
- Emergency Operations Plan
- Records from previous incidents

Once identified, each threat or hazard can be evaluated in five primary categories to define its likelihood and potential impact: (1) harm to persons; (2) damage to property; (3) loss of revenue for the event and jurisdiction if incidents prevent people from attending or cause increased expenses; (4) increased liability due to negligence; and (5) loss of reputation - i.e. tourists may not come to the jurisdiction or event again because of problems. In compiling threat and risk data, the critical information collections tasks are:

- Assign responsibility to experienced, qualified assessors.
- Review available information (floor plans, utility layouts, maps, aerial photos, evacuation plans, fire inspection reports, etc.)

3.2.2 Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR)

Each year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI compile a prioritized list of Special Events based on input from federal, state and local law enforcement entities. These events are then evaluated and given a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR). The SEAR incorporates a risk methodology that prioritizes special events submitted to the federal government for their awareness and consideration of support. A LSE SEAR rating will drive the federal assets and resources it will receive to support event operations. The system uses seven factors in its risk assessment process to arrive at five Special Event Assessment Rating levels (e.g., SEAR-I: full U.S. Government support to SEAR-V: requires state and local resources). The seven factors are:

1. General Attendance–number of general public attendees
2. Dignitary Attendance–number of VIPs and high-level heads of state in attendance

3. Significance–historic, political, religious, and/or symbolic significance (that might make the event a more attractive target)
4. Venue Site–dispersion of the site and protective complexity
5. Duration–temporal considerations that may affect resource allocations
6. Location–certain locations may be more inviting for an attack(s)
7. Preparedness–state/local ability to protect an event

However, there are many events that have local- or state-level significance, but do not warrant a SEAR level. Nonetheless, major gatherings of participants and/or spectators within a state, city, or local community can quickly and easily overwhelm the capabilities of a jurisdiction if a natural, accidental, or intentional incident occurs at or near the event. For that reason alone, jurisdictions at all levels of government have a continuing responsibility: (a) to develop and maintain their own situational awareness, from start to finish, of all special events; and (b) to support and fully participate in the planning process well in advance of the start date of such events. What most jurisdictions currently lack, unfortunately, is a formalized and standard methodology to complete the risk assessments needed to manage (and thereby protect) large special events in a meaningful and useful way.

The SEAR System attempts to quantify several threat, vulnerability, and risk factors for each event to determine the event's potential attractiveness as a terrorist target. Each event is assigned a SEAR I through V rating, with SEAR-I having the greatest potential to be targeted and SEAR-V having a lesser potential. See Exhibit 3-3 below for a summary.

Exhibit 3-3: SEAR Rating Criteria

SEAR-I	■ Events of significant national and/or international importance that may require extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness. ■ Pre-deployment of Federal assets as well as consultation, technical advice and support to specific functional areas in which the state and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources may also be warranted. ■ In order to ensure unified Federal support to and appropriate national situational awareness, a Federal Coordinator (FC) will be designated, and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) (Matrix of Responsibilities for all agencies involved) will be developed.	*Example:* *Political Party Convention*
SEAR-II	■ Significant events with national and/or international importance that may require direct national-level Federal support and situational awareness. ■ The magnitude and significance of these events call for close coordination between Fed state and local authorities and may warrant limited pre-deployment of federal assets as well as consultation, tech advice and support to specific functional areas in which the state and local agencies may lack expertise or key resources. ■ In order to ensure unified Federal support to the local authorities as appropriate national situational awareness, a FC will be designated and an Integrated Federal Support Plan (IFSP) will be developed.	*Example:* *Super Bowl*

SEAR-III	■ Events of national and/or international importance that require only limited direct Federal support to augment local capabilities. ■ Generally state and local authorities adequately support these events; however, the significance of these events generally warrants national situational awareness and, depending on the jurisdiction, may require limited direct support from specific federal agencies. In order to endure appropriate national situational awareness, an IFSP may be developed.	*Example:* *NASCAR Race*
SEAR-IV	■ Events that may be nationally recognized but generally have local or state importance. ■ Federal departments and agencies will receive notice of these event for sit awareness purposes, but in most cases, minimal, if any, Federal assets or resources will be expended to assist with management of those events. ■ Federal officials will not normally actively monitor or coordinate support for these events sunless specifically requested.	*Example:* *Oakland A's Baseball Game*
SEAR-V	■ Events that may be nationally recognized but generally have local or state importance. ■ Federal department and agencies will receive notice of these events for situ awareness purposes, but in most cases minimal, if any Federal Assets or resources will be expended to assist with management of these events. ■ Federal officials will not normally actively monitor or coordinate support for these events unless specifically requested.	*Example:* *NCAA Stanford Football Game*

3.2.3 National Special Security Event (NSSE) Planning Considerations

Depending on the nature of the LSE, the number of participants (including dignitaries and VIPs, the associated LSE locations, critical infrastructure and other factors, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security may designate the LSE as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). In addition to those activities triggered by a SEAR rating, a NSSE designation may trigger additional coordination and support by federal agencies including the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):

When an event is designated an NSSE, the goal of the security operations is to "develop and implement a seamless security plan that will create a safe and secure environment for the general public, event participants, Secret Service protectees, and other dignitaries." A NSSE requires significant additional planning coordination and lead time. Additional resources including training may be available via FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness for an NSSE.

3.2.3.1 NSSE Designation

National Security Special Events (NSSEs) are defined as "events of national significance" under the National Response Plan.

An event is designated when the Governor sends a letter of request to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the Secretary of DHS designates the NSSE based on anticipated attendance by official and foreign dignitaries, size of the event and significance of the event. National Special Security Events (NSSEs), include events such as presidential nominating conventions large sporting events, (i.e. the Olympics, some Super Bowls), international summits and presidential inaugurations.

Local law enforcement's primary role in NSSE events is to develop a comprehensive security plan that focuses on: maintaining everyday policing activities, providing event site security, traffic and crowd management, and security of non-official event venues. This role is more distinguishable in NSSE's where local law enforcement must work collaboratively with the U.S Secret Service (USSS) to ensure event security coincides with local law enforcement efforts. In these events, it is important for local law enforcement and federal partners to work closely to ensure the capability of the CONOPS; however, realizing that the local jurisdiction is solely responsible for the development of a comprehensive CONOPS.

3.2.3.2 Federal Lead Agencies and Partners

By Presidential directive, the following federal agencies are designated as NSSE Primary Agencies (PA) and have responsibility for the following areas:

- U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is the lead agency for security design, planning and implementation of the CONOPS for the NSSE.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency for intelligence, counterterrorism, crisis management and hostage rescue.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence management, which includes response and recovery.

Under the U.S. Secret Service NSSE Planning Model, the DHS Special Event Working Group (SEWG) uses the role of a Federal Coordinator (FC) to enable federal support to special events within state and local jurisdictions and to coordinate federal incident management and security assistance activities. FCs are assigned as the primary, but not exclusive, federal point of contact for event planning to locally coordinate Federal activities for SEAR Level 1 and 2 events

A Principal Federal Officer (PFO) will be appointed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to NSSE's to facilitate interagency incident management coordination during the planning and execution of an NSSE. The PFO is responsible for overseeing, coordinating, and executing the Secretary's incident management responsibilities for incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

The Protective Security Advisor (PSA) Program, under the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection, is tasked with the mission for the protection of nationally significant critical infrastructure. For NSSEs, PSAs provide support including planning, coordination and conducting security surveys and assessments.

3.2.3.3 Timelines

At the federal level, pre-event planning may begin two to three years prior to a NSSE. Upon designation of a regional NSSE, Bay Area law enforcement agencies should undertake planning as early as possible. Early local planning, in advance of Federal involvement, gives local entities the ability to develop its internal planning first to make sure everyone is on the same page before beginning to jointly plan with federal partners.

As part of the initial planning process, the Executive Steering Committee should develop and adhere to a strict timeline for all activities and deliverables based upon the event needs and the life span of the event.

Upon beginning the initial planning phase for operational security, regional priorities should be to:

- Identify key stakeholders roles and responsibilities
- Establish a LSE Planning Committee
- Develop an understanding of the National Special Security Event (NSSE) grant process
- Determine and implement a methodology for a threat assessment on facility and key critical infrastructure in the impacted region
- Establish relationships and regular communication with DHS Protective Security Advisors in the Bay Area

3.2.3.4 Special Planning Considerations for NSSEs

(A) Funding Support

Local jurisdictions will incur certain costs for designated NSSEs. Whenever possible, jurisdictions should look to leverage existing grant funds for these events. Collaboration with federal grant partners will allow jurisdictions to become familiar with federal financial processes and protocols to ensure that they are compliant with grant guidelines and requirements when procuring equipment or making logistics purchases.

Congress may appropriate funds for an NSSE to reimburse security costs incurred by host jurisdictions. Each year FEMA releases a funding opportunity announcement (FOA) for the National Special Security Event Grant Program to cover costs. The mission of the NSSE Grant Program is to provide supplemental Federal assistance to reimburse State and local governments for certain actual costs associated with providing emergency management, public safety, and security during the preparation and conduct of an NSSE.

It is important to understand the potential amount of planning and preparations costs prior to applying to host an NSSE, as some early-pre-event planning costs will arise in advance of the grant-funding approval and will remain solely in the responsibility of the jurisdiction. A jurisdiction must keep in mind that the grant process for these kinds of large scale awards is lengthy. (Resource See: *BJA Special Event Funding Guidance* for the requirements and application timeline to request federal funding to support NSSE events).

Additionally, with federal funding, local jurisdictions should be prepared for federal visits and post-event audits prior to and after the event. These visits will include a thorough review of all expenses incurred with grant funds and serve to ensure that grant funds were managed properly.

(B) Integration of Federal Assets (Planning and Operational)

Federal assets and resources for a NSSE will be driven by the event's SEAR rating[1]. USSS as the lead agency is in charge of federal resource requests to support NSSE planning and operations. The USSS will work with the local jurisdiction to identify additional assets which may be brought in to support the NSSE. Federal resources to support special events from FBI or other federal agencies, can include SWAT teams, EOD teams, sharpshooters and tactical support,

[1] Federal assistance including assets and resources to support special event operations is also available for events which are non-designated NSSE but which are received appropriate SEAR designations

Coast Guard Patrols, surveillance, crisis negotiators, CBRNE detection and support, HAZMAT teams, maritime, aviation, intelligence and counterterrorism, crisis management, evidence collection, public information, and technical support. These federal assets integrate into the Unified Command. The security operations plan should anticipate this influx of national support in both operations and command and control.

(C) Credentialing

During a NSSE, locals will be required to abide by USSS credentialing protocols. For NSSE's, the USSS will create federal credentials for access to high-security areas that will require background checks or investigation. Early in the planning process, the host jurisdiction should work with USSS to submit names of local agencies, and/or city officials to control access to specific city locations and delineate security zones access.

(D) Ancillary Events

Regional planning efforts must include planning for any ancillary events. These events may require additional resources and may fall out of the footprint, and jurisdiction, of federal assets. These costs may not be reimbursable under NSSE funding guidelines.

(E) Screening Zones

Security planning should anticipate heightened screening measures for patrons and vehicles within designated security zones. The number of screening points, level of screening, and specific screening tactics may all change at the last minute due to changes in intelligence and threat level of the event.

(F) Airspace and Transportation Restrictions

The USSS may put additional restrictions on airspace over the NSSE or venue. These restrictions may include changes to flight patterns for a specific period of time and are likely to impact all commercial planes, private planes, and helicopters (including news and police helicopters).

Other restrictions on transportation may be placed on maritime or public transportation. With several major airports (Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose) and three major ports (Oakland, Richmond and San Francisco) an extensive waterfront, and a major transportation system (BART), Bay Area jurisdictions must be prepared for restrictions and be accountable for them while planning for the event. These restrictions are likely to impact several areas of planning including transportation, media relations, and business activities.

(G) Coordination

Since NSSEs involve multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions, Unified Command will be established by applying the principles of NIMS and ICS. In this Unified Command (UC) structure, the individuals designated by their jurisdictional authorities jointly determine objectives, plans and priorities and work together to execute them. However, for NSSEs, event security is monitored by USSS through the establishment of a MACC (Multi Agency

Coordination Center), sometimes under a Joint Field Office (JFO[2]), a temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for coordination of response efforts by the private sector, NGOs, and all levels of government. The MACC is generally activated in a safe location, sometimes outside of the host city. Several agencies, including local, state and federal agencies are represented at the MACC to promote integrated communication and coordination, as well as enhanced situational awareness.

The MACC is the primary center for all operational security matters for designated NSSEs. The mission of the MACC is to receive, process and disseminate all communications pertaining to operational security concerns for the NSSE. During an activation, MACCs and staff are responsible for:

- supporting incident management policies and priorities
- facilitating logistics support and resource tracking
- informing resource allocation decisions based on incident management priorities
- coordinating incident related information
- coordinating interagency and intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies.

Direct tactical and operational responsibility for the conduct of incident management activities rests with the Incident Commander as designated by the host jurisdiction.

Depending on relationships and space, local law enforcement operations can be coordinated together at the MACC. Otherwise, local operations can be coordinated at a separate location, such as the department's command center. Local law enforcement can be deployed to the MACC to facilitate coordination of police responses with the USSS. One critical element of planning and training to ensure that roles of the MACC versus EOC versus Joint Operations Center are established and communicated to all staff prior to event operations.

3.3 Additional Critical Considerations

This section lists and describes critical considerations the LSE Planning Committee should address while planning for a LSE.

3.3.1 Considerations

LSEs often create unique planning and operational challenges. The LSE Planning Committee should address the following planning considerations at the management policy level as they develop the CONOPS.

[2] A Joint Field Office (JFO) is a temporary Federal facility that provides a central location for coordination of response efforts by the private sector, NGOs, and all levels of government.

Anticipate Unplanned Activities and Spur of the Moment Gatherings

Ancillary events and venues present a unique problem for law enforcement and other public-safety agencies since they occur outside of the event footprint and over an extended time period. These will require additional efforts to identify and monitor as well as security resources.

Planning for Worst-Case Scenarios

The LSE Planning Committee, through development of the LSE CONOPS, should provide for the capacity to respond to extraordinary crimes, violence by protestors, a possible terrorist attack, and natural disasters in addition to being prepared to deal with ordinary crimes and incidents (fights, drunkenness, etc.).

Security Measures

Consider the security measures that conceivably could be taken (e.g., street closures, searches, highly visible tactical units) in light of the host jurisdiction's desire to produce events that are enjoyable, well attended, and profitable.

Constitutional Rights

Ensure that the event continues safely while respecting Constitutional rights, including freedom of speech and assembly.

Law Enforcement Services

Ensure that the host jurisdiction continues to provide routine and emergency law enforcement services, regardless of the size or importance of the event.

Information Sharing

Throughout the planning process, the LSE Planning Committee should work closely with the public and local businesses to inform them of security plans and requirements in order to minimize disruptions.

Visitor Coordination

LSEs can draw hundreds of thousands of visitors from outside the host jurisdiction and region. Where these visitors will stay and how they expect to move to and from the LSE will dictate much of the transportation and security planning. Polling local and regional hotels, visitor bureaus, and lodging industry associations as well as lodging services such as Airbnb can provide some intelligence as to the timing and geography of visitor movements. The security of visitors at off-site venues may warrant additional security and response planning. For example, a significant number of visitors at a cluster of hotels in a neighboring jurisdiction may warrant up staffing law enforcement, EMS and traffic functions.

Federal Resources

Ensure that appropriate federal officials, such as DHS Protective Security Advisors, are informed in advance about events with national or international significance to guarantee federal awareness and possible support. For LSEs, organizers must know SEAR rating of the event early on as it will drive federal resources and support.

Interoperable Communications

Interoperable communications is traditionally the number one critical point of failure for any LSE. Interoperable communications almost always fail in one of two ways (or both): system failure or user error. This is especially true for a new system where either the bugs have not been worked out in the infrastructure, the gaps in coverage areas are not yet clearly defined and understood, the subscriber units have not been completely programmed accurately (for radio systems), technicians are not adequately trained on maintaining the new system, and the users are not adequately trained on the new subscriber units. Exchanging data among stakeholders can also present challenges - see also Appendix E (Information Sharing).

Absent the ability to conduct all communications face-to-face, interoperable communications systems should continue to be deployed with sufficient redundancies to ensure capabilities in the event of systems failure.

Command and Control (Who Is in Charge)

The larger the event, the greater the chance that command and control will become a point of failure. When an event covers multiple jurisdictions and multiple agencies (both private and public), Unified Command is a way to mitigate this point of failure. However, oftentimes it is not clearly defined ahead of time who is in charge (overlapping jurisdictional authorities), how the command structure will operate, and any transitions to the command organization (specifically if a secondary incident occurs). Establishing new and effective, but temporary, organizational arrangements, management structures, and methods of communication may be necessary to effectively control the LSE.

Transportation/Transit

In addition to local transportation and transit systems, major regional systems (ex. BART, WETA) may be impacted or have a significant influence on the development and security of the LSE. The LSE planning efforts should include regional transit providers and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). See Appendix B (Core Operational Function Planning Checklist) for detailed planning guidance.

Key transportation/transit planning elements to consider include:

- Enhanced Security Measures (vehicle/bag searches, security zones)
- Access and Functional Needs Populations (transit/venue access)
- Road Closures / System Disruptions
- Impacts on Intermodal transit hubs
- Traffic and Pedestrian Detours
- Emergency Vehicle Access Routes
- Venue Emergency Evacuation
- Parking
- Congestion
- Signage (include use of electronic sign networks)

- Interoperable Communications
- Public information
- Traffic control devices (barriers, warning devices, monitoring/cameras)

Traffic/transportation chokepoints can become a critical point of failure during a LSE. The larger the event, the more these natural chokepoints will restrict the flow of critical resources from where they are staged to where they are needed. Alternate routes or alternate transportation methods should be considered throughout the impacted area and the greater region as appropriate.

Public Health

Including public health representatives in the early stages of planning is an important aspect of LSE planning, specifically for enhanced food safety, health surveillance and BioWatch resources. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suggests that public health surveillance be implemented at mass gatherings to facilitate early detection of outbreaks and other health-related events and to enable public health officials to respond in a timely manner.[3] Examples of local and federal public health functions for Super Bowl XLIX are as follows:

- Maricopa County Department of Public Health developed a plan for enhanced surveillance, situational awareness and methods for early detection of public health emergencies and outbreaks in preparation for the large scale public event and related event activities for Super Bowl XLIX. A Public Health and Medical Resource Work Group and an Epidemiology Work Group with local, state and federal partners were organized and conducted monthly meetings to discuss epidemiologic surveillance activities and develop a plan.[4]
- The Department of Homeland Security Office of Health Affairs (OHA) deployed a network of BioWatch detectors to provide warning to public health officials in the event of a biological agent release during Super Bowl XLIX. OHA's National Biosurveillance Integration Center provided state and local officials with information on potential health threats and their indicators, increasing situational awareness and decision support for public health partners prior to the event.[5]

3.4 Nexus to Local/Regional Plans/Procedures

- The LSE CONOPS is intended to augment and not replace existing local and regional plans. The CONOPS brings together just those elements needed for managing the LSE. The LSE Planning Committee should review the regional plans listed below for

[3] Lombardo, Joseph S., Carol A. Sniegoski, Wayne A. Loschen, Matthew Westercamp, Michael Wade, Shandy Dearth, and Guoyan Zhang. "Public health surveillance for mass gatherings." Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 27, no. 4 (2008): 347-355. http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td2704/LombardoMassGatherings.pdf

[4]International Society for Disease Surveillance. Epidemiological Surveillance Efforts for Super Bowl XLIX and Super Bowl Related Events in Maricopa County, Arizona, 2015. http://www.syndromic.org/cop/bpug/960

[5]Department of Homeland Security. Securing the Super Bowl. January 30, 2015. http://www.dhs.gov/blog/2015/01/30/securing-super-bowl

information, as well as the host jurisdiction's Emergency Operations Plan, similar Incident Action Plans, and plans and After Action Reports from prior LSEs held in the host jurisdiction or the Bay Area region as appropriate.

Exhibit 3-4: Document Nexus

Document	Version Date
San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) – Base Plan	March 2008
Bay Area RECP Communications Subsidiary Plan	March 2008
Bay Area RECP Transportation Subsidiary Plan	March 2008
Bay Area RECP Logistics Subsidiary Plan	March 2008
Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation and Evacuation Plan	August 2011
Bay Area Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Logistics Response Plan	February 2014
Bay Area Regional Logistics Center Plan Template	February 2014

These documents may be found at the Bay Area UASI website: http://www.bayareauasi.org/

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4.0 Regional Coordination

It is the responsibility of the local jurisdiction hosting the LSE to reach out to neighboring jurisdictions and/or relevant agencies/organizations outside of the local jurisdictional footprint.

In addition to the LSE Executive Steering Committee efforts outlined in Section 2, regional coordination will become increasingly important as the size and significance of the event grows. The Steering Committee should include additional local, regional, state and federal partners as needed. It is critical to establish meetings with interagency partners regularly (on a weekly or monthly basis) to coordinate planning operations, and to build effective working relationships.

To coordinate their preparedness efforts, the LSE Executive Steering Committee may choose to establish a Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) which could also be used in an emergency.

4.1 Multiagency Coordination System

In many emergencies, agencies have statutory responsibilities at incidents that extend beyond political jurisdictional boundaries. Many larger emergencies will involve two or more political subdivisions. LSEs also may involve agencies with broad statutory authorities or involve two or more political subdivisions or agencies.

NIMS describes MACS as providing “the architecture to support coordination for incident prioritization, critical resource allocation, communications systems integration, and information coordination. The elements of a MACS includes facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications.”

4.1.1 Primary Functions of a MACS

Situation Assessment. This is the collection, processing, and display of all information needed. It may take the form of consolidating agency/jurisdiction situation reports, obtaining supplemental information, and preparing maps and status boards.

Incident Priority Determination. Establishing the priorities among ongoing incidents within the defined area of responsibility is another component of MACS. Typically, a process or procedure is established to coordinate with Area Commands and/or Incident Commands to prioritize the incident demands for critical resources. Additional considerations determining priorities include the following:

- Life threatening situations
- Threat to property
- High damage potential
- Incident complexity
- Environmental impact
- Economic impact; and

- Other criteria established by the multiagency coordination system

Support Relevant Incident Management Policies and Interagency Activities. A primary function of MACS is to coordinate, support, and assist with policy level decisions and interagency activities relevant to incident management activities, policies, priorities, and strategies.

Coordination with Elected and Appointed Officials. Another primary function outlined in MACS is a process or procedure to keep elected and appointed officials at all levels of government informed of incident impacts and resource issues. Maintaining the awareness and political, financial and emotional support of elected and appointed officials of jurisdictions within the affected area is extremely important, as scarce resources may need to move from one agency or jurisdictions' incident(s) to another of higher priority.

Coordination of Summary Information. By virtue of the situation assessment function, personnel implementing the multiagency coordination procedures may provide summary information on incidents within their area of responsibility, and provide agency/jurisdictional contacts for media and other interested agencies.

4.1.2 Multiagency Coordination Group

A Multiagency Coordination Group often serves as the organization that carries out the MACS functions. Per the *California Statewide Multiagency Coordination System Guide* (rev. Feb. 2013):

> "A Multiagency Coordination Group may be convened by an EOC Director ... to establish priorities among multiple competing incidents, provide coordinated decision making for resource allocation among cooperating agencies, harmonize agency polices, and offer strategic guidance and direction to support incident management activities. MAC Groups convened to prioritize incidents for the allocation of scarce resources should consist of administrators or executives, or their designee, who are authorized to commit agency resources and funds."

A MAC Group does not have any direct incident involvement, and will often be located some distance from the incident site(s), or may even function virtually. A MAC Group may require a support organization for its own logistics and documentation needs; to manage incident-related decision support information such as tracking critical resources, situation status, and intelligence or investigative information; and to provide public information to the news media and public.

4.2 Logistics Coordination

It is up to the LSE Planning Committee to identify the appropriate level of activity for the logistics functions. Logistics coordination should identify if a Logistics Center (LC) is needed and what staff are needed to manage the demands of the logistics section for the LSE. To the extent possible, planners should identify what resources will be in demand, the availability of scarce resources in the region, what their current locations are, who owns them and the process needed to get them on-site.

Pre-planning and pre-positioning help with reducing significant delays for resources, especially those needed for emergency response. The Bay Area Logistics Center Plan Template (2014) and the San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan: Base Plan, 2008 are two local resources that provide decision making support, task level guidance and job aids to assist with establishing staffing and managing the demands of regional logistics.

4.2.1 Logistics Management

Most LSEs will exceed the availability, quantity and/or capability of local resources. Logistics management functions will expand and contract in conjunction with the demands of the event. The location chosen to manage these functions should ideally be able to do the same. Depending on other demands of the LSE. It may be possible to manage logistics from an Emergency Operations Center (EOC); however, it may be necessary to establish a Logistics Center (LC) to support the LSE.

The Logistics Center (LC) for a LSE is a flexible and scalable expansion of part of the emergency operations center (EOC) Logistics Section that works jointly with the EOC Administration / Finance Section to support resource management and movement control. If appropriate, local agencies may place representatives in the LC, and the LC can serve as a single point of ordering for the jurisdiction.

The ICS Incident Types should be used to type the Logistics Center based upon the nature of the event – see Exhibit 4-1 (Logistics Center Type).

Exhibit 4-1: Logistics Center Type

LC Type	Event Description	Approximate NSSE / SEAR Rating
Type 3	Usually corresponds with ICS Incident Type 3, when an incident extends into multiple operational periods and a large volume of resource requests causes a need for key agencies to work from a single location. This may be appropriate for a single day, single jurisdiction LSE.	SEAR III
Type 2	Usually corresponds with ICS Incident Type 2, when a complex situation requires maximum coordination and increased demand for movement control, tracking, security issues, and ordering support. Critical resources are scarce, and additional staff are required in order to execute single point of ordering. This may be appropriate for a multi-day, multi-site or multi-jurisdiction LSE.	SEAR II, III
Type 1	Usually corresponds with ICS Incident Type 1, when the EOC has reached its highest level of activation, and all conditions outlined above have been met or exceeded. This may be appropriate for a major, multi-day LSE that requires significant state and federal resources.	NSSE SEAR I

4.2.1.1 Preferred Characteristics of a Logistics Center according to Regional Plans

The physical location of the Logistics Center varies depending on the size and type of LC activated as well as the size and type of the LSE. It may be co-located with the Logistics Section in the emergency operations center (EOC), or be based at a separate facility. If it is located in a separate facility, clear and consistent lines of communication must be established between the LC and the EOC. The following summarizes key characteristics when considering establishing a LC. A jurisdiction may modify or adapt these characteristics depending on the resources available or the proximity to the LSE.

Facility Type

- Emergency Operations Center (EOC), if space allows
- Existing facility owned or operated by the host jurisdiction

Location Accessibility

- Close to major roadways
- Close to public transportation
- Has adequate parking for staff and volunteers
- Meets all Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements

Size/Capacity* [6]***Adequate size and staff accommodations such as:***

- Type 3: requires 200-500 sq. ft. and accommodates 2-6 people
- Type 2: requires 500-1,300 sq. ft. and accommodates 6-20 people.
- Type 1: requires 1,200-6,400 sq. ft. and accommodates 20-70+ people

IT/Utility Support

- Able to accommodate a minimum of six phones
- Should have landline phones or VoIP capabilities
- Access to a T1 line, DSL, cable or wireless internet capabilities
- Must have a reliable power source
- Must have good public safety radio reception
- Should have access to good cell phone/wireless data reception/service

Optional Characteristics

- Break room and restrooms for staff
- Small kitchen or area where food can be served and consumed is desirable

The process for activating an LC is outlined in Exhibit 4-2 below.

[6] Based on guidance provided in FEMA's IS-775 - EOC Management and Operations. General recommendations call for 50 sq. ft. per person. Minimum square footage indicated here accounts for additional equipment and meeting space.

Exhibit 4-2: Logistics Center Activation Process[7]



4.2.1.2 Expansion Criteria

Once the LC is activated and operational, the Logistics Center Coordinator will continually monitor incident needs and associated resource management and movement control requirements to determine whether any of the following expansion criteria have been met:

- LC staff are fully committed to logistical support operations
- Large-scale or multiple operations have depleted available resources
- Cooperating agencies' resources are being used extensively.
- There is an increased demand for movement control, tracking, receiving and distribution center operations, security, and ordering support.

[7] Bay Area Regional logistics: Logistics Center Plan Template, February 2014.

The Logistics Center Coordinator makes a recommendation to the EOC Director to demobilize the Logistics Center when any of the following criteria have been met:

- Operations have ended and/or the need for additional resources for local agencies has declined significantly or been eliminated.
- Operations no longer require the forward staging of resources.
- Agencies are able to obtain necessary resources through regular, internal procurement methods.

4.3 Regional Resource Coordination

An overview of the resource management and coordination relationships is helpful for assigning tasks and explaining the coordination structure. The sample language and chart below are provided as example structures and coordination elements for a LSE.

Exhibits 4-3 and 4-4 illustrate the processes for information flow, coordination and resource requests in the Bay Area. More specific details about the resource request process for a LSE may be found in the Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP).

Additional guidance specific to regional coordination of public information may be found in Appendix F (Regional Public Information Guide).

Exhibit 4-3: Resource Coordination across SEMS Levels



Exhibit 4-4: Regional Mutual Aid Coordination Process



Exhibit 4-5 matches the designated Target Capabilities List for response and recovery functions with the appropriate SEMS section/branch responsible for coordinating that function, as well as the mutual aid system or systems used to provide resources. Exhibit 4-5 also includes a reference to the RECP subsidiary plan that addresses relevant capabilities in more detail.

Exhibit 4-5: Regional Responsibilities for Resource Coordination[8]

Core Capability	SEMS Section	Mutual Aid System	RECP Subsidiary Plan	Comments
On-Site Incident Management	N/A	N/A	N/A	Field-level capability
EOC Management	Management	Emergency Services (EMMA)	RECP	
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	Management, operations, and logistics	Emergency Services	• RECP • Communications	

[8] Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan: Base Plan, 2008.

Core Capability	SEMS Section	Mutual Aid System	RECP Subsidiary Plan	Comments
Volunteer and Donations Management	Logistics	N/A	N/A	Local capability
Responder Health and Safety	N/A	N/A	N/A	Field-level capability
Public Safety and Security Response	Operations: Law Enforcement and Coroner Branch	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement and Coroner	
Animal Health Emergency Support	Operations: Care and Shelter Branch	Emergency Services	Care and Shelter	
Environmental Health	Operations: Medical Health Branch	Medical and Health	• Medical and Health • Hazardous Materials	
Explosive Device Response Operations	Operations: Fire and Rescue Branch	• Law Enforcement and Coroner • Fire and Rescue	• Fire and Rescue • Law Enforcement and Coroner	
Firefighting Operations and Support	Fire and Rescue Branch	Fire and Rescue	Fire and Rescue	Multiagency coordination group for fire makes decisions regarding allocation of fire resources
Weapons of Mass Destruction/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Operations: Hazardous Materials Branch, Fire and Rescue Branch, and Law Enforcement and Coroner Branch	• Fire and Rescue • Law Enforcement and Coroner	• Fire and Rescue • Hazardous Materials	
Citizen Protection, Evacuation, and/or In-Place Protection	Operations: Transportation Branch, Mass Care Branch, and Law Enforcement	• Public Transit • Emergency Services • Law Enforcement	• Transportation • Care and Shelter	Evacuation task force may be convened to coordinate multidisciplinary response activities
Isolation and Quarantine	Operations: Medical Health Branch	Medical and Health	Medical and Health	
Urban Search and Rescue Operations	Operations: Fire and Rescue Branch	Fire and Rescue	Fire and Rescue	
Emergency Public Information and Warning	• Logistics: Communications Unit • Management: Public Information Officer	Emergency Services (EMMA)	• RECP • Communications	

Core Capability	SEMS Section	Mutual Aid System	RECP Subsidiary Plan	Comments
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Operations: Medical Health Branch	• Medical and Health • Fire and Rescue	Medical and Health	
Medical Surge	Operations: Medical Health Branch	Medical and Health	Medical and Health	A regional coordinating group of medical health officials will address regional medical treatment issues
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution	Operations: Medical Health Branch	Medical and Health	Medical and Health	
Mass Prophylaxis	Operations: Medical Health Branch	Medical and Health	Medical and Health	
Mass Care	Operations: Care and Shelter Branch	Medical and Health	Care and Shelter	A task force may be established to coordinate multidisciplinary response activities
Fatality Management	Operations: Law Enforcement Branch, and Mass Fatality Unit	Law Enforcement and Coroner	Law Enforcement and Coroner	
Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment	Operations: Construction and Engineering Branch	Emergency Services	Recovery	
Restoration of Lifelines	• Operations: Construction and Engineering Branch • Operations: Utilities Branch	• Emergency Services • Public Transit • Water Agency Response Network	• Transportation • Recovery	• CUEA and/or regional utilities staff the Utilities Branch; CUEA coordinates utility resources • MTC, Caltrans, and California Highway Patrol staff the Transportation Branch; MTC coordinates public transit mutual aid
Economic and Community Recovery	Management	N/A	Recovery	A task force may be established to coordinate community and economic recovery

4.3.1 Ground Support

Ground support for Logistics Management includes the transportation of resources also referred to in regional plans as ‘movement control’. Movement Control governs the movement of a resource from the point of origin to the point of delivery to the end-user and back again, if applicable. Resources come from a variety of sources, including local warehouses, staging areas, agencies, suppliers, state emergency management agencies (EMAs) and federal agencies like FEMA. Transportation Coordinators in the Logistics Center (LC) will be required to manage all aspects of movement control.

During a LSE, those responsible for the movement of resources will follow six primary steps[9]:

1. Confirm Delivery Location
2. Determine Mode of Transportation
3. Determine Route
4. Determine Security Requirements
5. Source Transportation
6. Confirm Delivery

4.3.2 Communications Support

The Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) places the roles and responsibilities of Information Systems and Communications under the Logistics Section of the EOC. Additionally clear and consistent lines of communication must be established between the Logistics Center (LC) and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The LC layout should also allow for easy communication among all LC staff.

See Exhibit 4-6 below for an example of the detail that a LC communications plan should include. Additional information to assist with identifying systems for communications across disciplines and jurisdictions as well as the process for providing communications resources can be found in the Bay Area RECP Communications Subsidiary Plan.

[9] See pages 29-32 of the Bay Area Regional Logistics Center Plan Template, February 2014 for additional details required for each step.

Exhibit 4-6: Sample Communications Plan Template

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

EVENT NAME:	DATE PREPARED:	TIME PREPARED:

OPERATIONAL PERIOD (DATE/TIME):
00/00/00 0000-0000 hrs.

SYSTEM/ CACHE	CHANNEL	FUNCTION	FREQ./ PHONE #	ASSIGNMENT	REMARKS

PREPARED BY:

4.3.3 Food and Staff Support

During a LSE, the EOC Logistics Section (with support from the LC if activated) will be made aware of all food and staff support needs which are communicated up the SEMS levels during the event. Examples of such needs include personnel, supplies, equipment, personal protective equipment, meals, water, etc. Staff members working in the Logistics Section or LC will receive and fulfill these requests.

4.3.3.1 Food and Personnel Accommodations

Provide an overview of the anticipated needs, plans and/ or provide a point of contact/reference for feeding and accommodating all personnel that will be supporting this event. This may also include plans for lodging if the LSE will span multiple operational periods.

4.3.4 Critical Resource Acquisition and Allocation

The Designated LSE critical resources will be acquired, if possible, from the host or partner agencies or jurisdictions. Agencies or jurisdictions may shift resources internally to match priority needs. Resources available from parts of the LSE in the process of demobilization may be shifted, for example, to higher priority efforts.

Should an incident occur during a LSE, emergency response organizations must work together to optimize the use of available regional resources and to obtain resources from outside of the region. The host jurisdiction makes the resource allocation decisions at every level from triage to the National Response Coordination Center.

Resources may be obtained to support emergency response through the following mechanisms[10]:

- Mutual aid, including discipline-specific mutual aid
- Emergency services mutual aid
- Mission tasking of state agencies
- Direct Federal assistance
- Other states via the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)

Additional methods of attaining resources include:

- Mutual assistance and auto-aid agreements between neighboring jurisdictions (typically not coordinated by the traditional mutual aid systems)
- Contracting with private-sector and nonprofit entities
- Managing volunteer, donated, or spontaneous resources.

In order to support the logistical demands of the LSE, the EOC Logistics or Operations Section at each SEMS level will fill resource requests that do not fall within the discipline-specific mutual aid systems.

[10] San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan: Base Plan, 2008 page 4-8.

Resources provided through emergency services mutual aid may include:

- Communications assets
- Transportation resources
- Care and shelter resources
- Commodities such as food, water, and ice
- Public works resources
- Emergency management personnel to support EOC operations

4.3.5 Mutual Aid Planning

Mutual Aid and Large Special Event (LSE) Contingency Planning. LSE preparedness should include developing basic contingency plans for potential or likely incidents (ex. a major car crash/MCI at a NASCAR race. These contingency plans should contain pre-planning a mutual aid element including identifying the nature and quantity of mutual aid resources potentially needed, the likely provider of such resources, clarifying the process and stakeholders involved in obtaining those resources, and coordinating instructions for maximizing the benefit of the resources once deployed.

Planning should also address the logistics support needed for ensuring the rapid and effective use of mutual aid resources to include identifying:

- Communications methods, systems, equipment, staff support and training
- Special equipment or capabilities requirements
- Emergency access routes through potential LSE traffic congestion
- Mutual Aid staging areas and personnel support

Contingency plans may need be adjusted close to the time of the LSE based on new criminal or threat intelligence. These adjustments should also account for any corresponding changes in the type or quantify of mutual aid resources that could be required.

Pre-staging Mutual Aid assets for LSEs. Pre-staging can ensure the availability of the resource, facilitate the integration of the resource into the incident command structure, allow for the resource to be properly equipped and oriented to the LSE mission, and significantly reduce response times. However, mutual aid is only provided on a no-cost basis to a jurisdiction that has exhausted all available local resources in an actual response to an incident. One best practice strategy is to contract for pre-staged or reserve resources and then, if needed, activate them under mutual aid.

Mutual Aid Coordination. Depending on the nature of the LSE, local, regional and state mutual aid coordinators should be briefed on the LSE and potential mutual aid requests especially specialized responses for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (CBRNE), Hazardous Materials, Law Enforcement Special Response Teams, or aviation. In the exercises leading up to the LSE, as part of the discussion regarding the contingency incidents, the processes for obtaining and deploying mutual aid resources should be walked through with all the stakeholders including incident leadership and the mutual aid coordinators.

Pre-planning mutual aid also allows for organizational and individual relationships to be developed and to develop a common understanding of roles and expectations.

Mutual Aid and LSE Management. Expansion of operations including the use of mutual aid resources may require additional expansion of the incident management organization (ex. Staging Area Manager, Communications Unit Leaders, Field Dispatch). The organization must also be able to incorporate responding mutual aid agency representatives.

Non-public Safety Mutual Aid. The bulk of LSE mutual aid planning may address the EMS, fire and law enforcement mission areas, but consideration should be given to how to properly obtain and employ non-public safety mutual aid resources including emergency management, public works, utilities, and the private sector.

4.4 Sustained Operations Management

The Bay Area's vision is to continue serving the public's day-to-day safety needs during large special events through planning, community partnership, and operational collaboration/coordination, always protecting privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Major areas of focus for maintaining day-to-day operations include:

- *Planning*. The jurisdiction should conduct planning operations to guarantee sufficient resources exist to maintain daily operations of both impacted and non-impacted agencies/departments. Planning should be informed by national and regional intelligence sources, both traditional and non-traditional. Potential intelligence partners include the NCRIC, FBI, Secret Service, National Weather Service, event planners, transit providers, hospitality and business associations and public health surveillance/epidemiology programs.
- *Training*. The jurisdiction should provide training to employees for both their daily operations, and any role they may fill to support the LSE or an emergency incident response. By providing employees with the necessary training, they will be empowered to quickly transition to their LSE role and return to daily operations. Local agency training managers may be able to adjust and provide training efforts to better support LSEs if they are informed of the opportunity well in advance. Coordination among training officers from multiple jurisdictions supporting the same LSE may also provide an opportunity to conduct joint training thereby reducing costs and increasing effectiveness. Depending on the nature of the event, specialized training may be required in the areas of crowd control, interoperable communications, non-confrontational community policing and protection of Constitutional rights.
- *Staffing*. The jurisdiction should review both the LSE operations and daily jurisdictional operations to determine the appropriate levels of staffing that will provide continual operations for both. These efforts should take into account the potential delays in calling back off-duty staff, the reduced number of staff that may be available for call back as well as LSE-related congestion. The key is understanding and deconflicting assignments for staff that may be on special response teams. Day-to-day operations should consider deploying senior executives to the field to facilitate real-time decision-making and establish a solid presence to the public.

- *Community preparedness*. By conducting community preparedness efforts, the jurisdiction can develop a cadre of trained volunteers that can support the LSE and/or day-to-day operations. These efforts can also prepare the community to be self-supporting for the first 48-72 hours after an emergency incident if necessary. Planning with local community groups such as neighborhood associations, Chamber of Commerce, and similar existing organizations can help businesses and individuals plan to have deliveries, shopping, or other day-to-day activities completed prior to, or delayed until after special events. In addition to creating a LSE Adapted Community, these efforts may reduce normal calls for service. LSE planning and considerations for maintaining day-to-day operations should include Public Works, Health and Human Services, Mayor's Office on Disability, Private Sector Providers, etc.
- *Operational and regional coordination*. Successful operations hinge on the ability of jurisdictions to support one another through automatic aid and regional coordination. Prior to any LSE, the impacted jurisdiction should coordinate with surrounding jurisdictions on operational responses, and conduct joint training and exercises to ensure they are prepared to operate cooperatively as needed. As event plans are developing, multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary trust groups within the Bay Area such as County Fire Chiefs, Police Chiefs, and Sheriffs provide platforms to collaborate across traditional boundaries of discipline and jurisdiction. Instead of using new technology systems and equipment, public safety providers should focus on enhancing existing tools and processes that have proven successful within the Bay Area.
- *Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties*. Governments must respect the privacy, civil rights and civil liberties of their citizens in order to effectively provide services. The same consideration for protecting privacy, civil rights and civil liberties should be included when planning for and conducting LSE operations and emergency incident response. These efforts should ensure that special events strengthen rather than weaken the relationship between communities and public safety providers.
- *Transportation*. While conducting a LSE may require the use of local transportation assets, the jurisdiction should ensure that adequate assets exist for providing regular public transportation and accessible transportation. Plans should incorporate the impact of transportation and transportation route alterations before, during, and after large special events. Staff working outside the LSE should be made aware of street closures and projected traffic delays so that they may individually plan and adapt their timing and routes to work stations and calls for service. Dramatic public transportation volume increases can cause an increase in emergency responses to these systems. Neighboring jurisdictions that routinely transit, or respond to mutual aid requests should be made aware of transportation plans so that they may inform their staff and plan accordingly.
- *Public information and warning*. A "whole community" approach to information sharing can make the difference between a community surviving special events and thriving because of special events. Day-to-day public information sharing should be more than just event public information within the context of a Joint Information Center, but a "community policing", "whole of community", "community para-medicine", and "fire adapted" approach to information sharing to achieve a "special event adapted community" that is resilient and thriving. The jurisdiction should utilize standing mechanisms to provide information and warning to the public during daily operations,

LSE operations and emergency incident response. This will enable information to be quickly disseminated to the public and allow them to take the necessary precautionary actions. Consider providing the public with the same information as event staff regarding unclassified threats such as strong winds, public health issues such as flu trends, and criminal threats such as ticket and other fraud. If day-to-day operations is going to result in staffing changes requiring a change in response times for low priority calls, this could be communicated to the impacted public.

- *Communications*. The jurisdiction should ensure that adequate communications resources are reserved to continue daily operations as well as operations of the LSE and any potential emergency incident response. Supplemental or replacement communications resources may need to be planned for and staff trained on their use. See Appendix E (Information Sharing) for guidance on which data communication systems could be used.
- *Public health and medical services*. The jurisdiction should ensure that adequate public health and medical services are reserved to continue daily operations as well as operations of the LSE and any potential emergency incident response. Public health syndromic surveillance/intelligence should be utilized both in planning and day-to-day operations leading up to, and during special events. Whether long term flu trends by season, or current projections based on current surveillance/vaccine efficacy, public health intelligence can guide prevention, protection, response and recovery for day-to-day operations. This could help inform staffing levels for day-to-day operations.
- *Utilities*. If the jurisdiction provides utilities to their community, they should ensure that these operations continue and that the community is not impacted by the LSE or any emergency incident response.

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5.0 Post-Event Activities

This phase, which begins when the event is over, includes the development of the after action report (AAR) to identify a review of the successes and areas needing improvement concerning LSE planning and operations. It also involves accounting for all equipment and other resources used, including paying bills for the security. This phase typically lasts approximately 30-90 days after the LSE's formal completion.

5.1 Demobilization Planning

An LSE Demobilization Plan should include the following sections:

- General information about the demobilization process
- Responsibilities for implementation of the demobilization plan
- General release priorities
- Specific release procedures
- Directories (maps, telephone listings, etc.)

Demobilization planning includes the following information elements:

Exhibit 5-1: Demobilization Planning Information Elements

Information Needed	Responsible Entity/Role
Excess resources and release priorities	All Supervisors and Managers
Plan development, resource information; demobilization process	Planning Section
Continuing needs for tactical resources	Operations Section
Transportation availability and communications maintenance	Logistics Section
Claims, time records, costs, and individual resources that are a factor in release	Finance Section
Agreements regarding other agency resources	Liaison Officer
Physical condition of personnel; physical needs; adequacy of transportation	Safety Officer
Return and reassignment of resources	Agency Dispatch/ Ordering Centers

5.2 Post Event Analysis

Following the LSE, an analysis will be conducted. The purpose of the analysis will be to identify areas for improvement and provide recommendations to improve planning for future events. Within a few days after the LSE, a comprehensive debriefing meeting will be conducted with staff involved in the planning and conduct of the event. The facilitator will be responsible for facilitating a meeting to identify what went well and what could be improved in planning and in executing the event. Questions to consider in the debriefing meeting may include:

- How successful was the event in meeting its key objectives?
- What went well in conducting the event?
- Was the venue suitable for the event?
- Did attendance to the event meet expectations? If not, why not?
- Were revenue targets realized?
- Were costs kept within budget?
- Were there any security concerns or gaps?
- Were there any staffing or vendor issues?
- What issues were encountered in planning and conducting the event?
- What could be done to improve planning for future events?
- The facilitator may also use surveys or other tools to collect information regarding the event from staff or attendees.

5.3 After Action Reporting

Using the information from the debriefing and feedback from other staff and attendees, an after action report (AAR) will be created. The purpose of the AAR is to document the findings from the debriefing and other feedback mechanisms and to develop specific corrective actions to address any deficiencies.

The facilitator or his or her designee will be responsible for developing the after action report. An after action meeting will be conducted to share the AAR and to get feedback regarding the recommended corrective actions and who will be responsible for addressing them.

Appendix A

Pre-Event Planning Matrix

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Host jurisdiction responsibilities vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and event to event. This matrix is designed to assist the host jurisdiction determine the risks and hazards for the LSE as well as the lead entity that will plan for and coordinate the response should that hazard occur during the LSE.

If more than one agency is tasked to respond to the risk or hazard, some overlap of responsibilities may occur. Place a “P in the column for the agency with primary responsibility and an “S” in the column with the agency for the secondary responsibility. The responsibilities of each agency must be discussed and decided in the planning stages, not during the LSE or if an emergency occurs during the LSE.

This Matrix may be expanded to add additional responsibilities or agencies as needed. Some of the categories such as “law enforcement” or “state agencies” may need to be broken down further to detail responsibilities by jurisdiction and or/department.

Exhibit A-1: Planning Information Elements

	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Mgmt.	FAA	FBI	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agencies	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/Sponsor	Private Security	Other
Abandoned Vehicles															
Airspace Encroachment															
Bomb Threat															
Civil Disturbance															
Communications (Technology)															
Communications (Operations)															

	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Mgmt.	FAA	FBI	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agencies	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/Sponsor	Private Security	Other
Community Relations															
Credentials															
Crowd Control															
Demonstrations															
Dignitary Protection															
EMS															
Environmental Hazards															
Evacuation of Facility															
Family Reunification /Lost Child															
First Aid Stations															
Food Handling															
HazMat															

	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Mgmt.	FAA	FBI	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agencies	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/Sponsor	Private Security	Other
Hostage Situation															
Lost & Found															
Media Relations															
Motorcades															
Parking															
Perimeter Security															
Portable Water															
Prisoner Processing															
Power Interruption															
Structural Collapse															
Spectator Security															
Suspicious Package															

	County Agency	EMS	Emergency Mgmt.	FAA	FBI	Fire	Law Enforcement	Public Health	Public Works	State Agencies	U.S. Secret Service	Utilities	Promoter/Sponsor	Private Security	Other
Terrorist Threat															
Ticketing															
Traffic Control															
Visitor Housing & Transportation															
VIP Protection															
WMD															
Weather Hazard															

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security/ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual*, 2005.

Appendix B

Functional Area Planning Checklists

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These checklists are intended to support those individuals selected to lead planning efforts in the core functional areas as listed in Exhibit 3-1 and are grouped here by function. These checklists are not all-inclusive and should be modified depending on the nature of the LSE.

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Public Information and Media Relations

Purpose:

To provide information to the public about the event and its impacts on the community. In case of an emergency incident at the event, to deliver accurate, coordinated, timely and accessible emergency messages. An important aspect of special event security public relations is to involve citizens and the business community in security planning for the event when they will be affected by the event.

Goals:

1. Develop an adequate public information and media relations plan as part of our event security operations plan.
2. Be prepared to deliver credible information regarding during in case of an unplanned emergency event regarding life safety, protective actions, etc.
3. Coordinate consistent messaging among stakeholder agencies.
4. Provide information to a variety of audiences.

Planning for Media Relations should include the following considerations:

- Public information includes:
  - General information about the event— when the entrance doors or gates are open, performance times, parking, road closures, etc.
  - Security information—items allowed (and not allowed) into the event, how to evacuate in an emergency, first aid services, handling of protests, signs of terrorism, etc.
  - Emergency Information-Life safety and protective actions in case of emergency event.
- The public information plan should include:
  - Identification of the lead coordinator for public information and the process for releasing information.
  - The establishment of a social media presence to relay security information.
  - Release a transportation and traffic plan.
  - Media coordination plan including briefing and media opportunities.
  - See also Appendix F (Regional Public Information Guide).

Key Planning Questions:

- Have we developed an adequate public information and media relations plan as part of our event security operations plan?
  - Hold regularly scheduled regional PIO meetings beginning at least 18 months before the event for public safety and other stakeholders.

   - Establish a regional Joint Information Center (JIC) to work as part of the Incident Command (IC) to coordinate public messaging and the release of information.
   - Work with the media before the event to proactively inform the public regarding information about the event and impact to the community.
- Have we identified the event public information specialist who will coordinate all public and media information?
- How will we communicate with internal organization employees and external stakeholders (i.e private sector businesses and organizations)?
- If the event involves planned demonstrations, have event organizers, government officials, and law enforcement developed a consistent message regarding demonstration activities?
- Have we adequately included in our planning a way to release information to attendants and the public information during an emergency?
- Will we be establishing a Joint Information Center (JIC) to coordinate the release of information?
- How will be monitors news coverage to ensure that accurate information is disseminated?
- Does our information plan account for way to utilize and disseminate information to new media (official Web sites, social networking platforms) in addition to traditional media?
- Have we determined how to maximize the use of video and digital imagery to communicate during incidents?
- How will we communicate critical lifesaving information to individuals with disabilities and other with access and functional needs? (I.e. sign language and other interpreters; captioning of audio and visual materials; and accessible Web site communications)?

Legal Issues

Purpose:

To address legal aspects before, during and after the event.

Goals:

1. Ensure that safety and security plans are legal and constitutionally sound.
2. Review and approve contracts for services and resources.
3. Minimize the risks of lawsuits when responding to demonstrations, use of force and making arrests.

Planning for Legal Issues should include the following considerations:

- Ensure outside officers have legal jurisdiction by clarifying the legal authority of assisting agencies.
- Ensure that safety and security plans are legal and constitutionally sound.
- Identify strategies to mitigate litigations including; reviewing existing ordinances and laws, and amend or create new laws to ensure the safety of the event, providing officers with specialized training, managing crowds and their activity based on illegal behaviors and the number of resources available.
- Conduct a legal review of security plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure that tactics are constitutionally sound prior to the event.

Key Planning Questions:

- Will we have legal representation at the command center to answer questions regarding arresting rights?
- Will we videotape all encounters with protestors for future review?
- Do assisting agencies have legal jurisdiction to perform activities?

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Crisis Management and Tactical Response

Purpose:

To prepare public safety agencies to respond to terrorist threats, attacks or other major events.

Goals:

1. Prepare public safety agencies to respond to terrorist threats or attacks, active shooters or other tactical threats.
2. Prepare public safety agencies to be able to respond any tactical threat and to, assess, and render safe any hazardous materials, suspicious items, or improvised explosive devices or during an event.
3. Ensure the ability to evacuate the facility if circumstances deem necessary.

Planning for Crisis Management and Tactical Response should include the following considerations:

- Mobile tactical teams and/or on-call specialized teams tactical teams including explosives ordinance disposal (EOD), HazMat, hostage negotiation, counter assault, counter sniper, counter surveillance, and more.
- Assets that can be deployed proactively during major special events to address crisis management issues such as EOD, tactical teams, and intelligence teams.
- Operational Plan for Explosive Devise Response/HAZMAT
- Active shooter situation protocols
- Locations of high-risk areas, including event venues, hotels, and parking garages.
- Communication protocols for how interagency teams will communicate
- Execution protocols to include information on how local, state, and federal partners will respond to incidents.
- Security sweeps
- Intelligence
- Consequence management plans
- Post-blast responses
- Fire response
- Tactical medical response
- Emergency Evacuation Planning
    - Familiarization with existing emergency evacuation planning
    - Accessible evacuation maps and routes for emergency personnel
    - Broadcasting evacuation messages to the public

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have local specialized tactical resources (SWAT teams)?

- Do the threat and risk levels for the special event require involving the tactical resources?
    - Consider utilizing Hazard Assessment Teams to quickly respond to and clear suspicious packages.
- Have security planners coordinated with the local FBI for crisis management support?
- Have we exercised consequence management plans and
- Do we understand the shifting of authorities during the response cycle?
- Have we determined the lead agencies based upon the nature of the tactical need?
- Have key security planners and event organizers agreed on criteria for designating an evacuation?
- Is the evacuation plan up-to-date, e.g., taking into account any facility redesign?
- Has the evacuation plan been approved by the fire department, fire marshal, or other city or county inspections office?
- Does the plan designate an overall emergency evacuation coordinator?
- Does the plan show floor plans with marked evacuation routes?
- Are exits clearly marked and designated for evacuation?
- Does the plan include assisting the disabled and special needs populations?
- Have emergency traffic routes been planned?
- Have specific evacuation attendants or monitors been identified to stand at key locations to provide directions to the exiting crowd?
- Does the facility post or broadcast evacuation messages to spectators prior to an event?
- Does the facility conduct periodic emergency evacuation drills?
- Has the lead security agency designated a staging area for law enforcement, fire, EMS, and other assistance?
- Have all officers involved in security of the event receive evacuation plans and that those posted in and around the facility have gone through some level of training on implementing the evacuation plan?

Note: If any type of terrorist act occurs during a local special event, the FBI is the lead agency in the nation to handle terrorist responses and investigations. The FBI will bring a variety of resources to deal with terrorist threats or incidents including tactical response teams, expert hostage negotiators, forensic investigators, and others. This contingency of additional assess should be including in planning.

Access Control: Screening and Physical Security

Purpose:

Determine controlled and appropriate access to facility for spectators, vendors, VIP's, event officials.

Goals:

1. Determine processes for access control
2. Establish processes to support credentialing
3. Establish security perimeters/zones and determine security concerns and issues related to each
4. Establish screening procedures for individuals coming into the event zone

Planning for Screening and Physical Security should include the following considerations:

- Access Control Planning and Management
- Screening procedures for people and vehicles
- Processes for each ring of established security perimeters/zone (outer, middle, inner)
- Security Cameras
- Vendors and Deliveries
- Limos and Truck Rentals
- Mail and Deliveries
- Physical Facilities Inspections
- Cash Security

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have clearly specified perimeters: (i.e.: inner, middle, outer)?
- Do we have adequate and appropriate security for each perimeter?
- Do we have enough technical equipment for effective and efficient screening?
- Do we have enough staff for timely screening?
- Do we have staff trained and experienced in screening?
- Do we have proper screening protocols?
- Are screening regulations clearly posted for all participants to read?
- Have we established security checkpoints?
- Will security measures impact transportation or private sector organizations?
- Are all alarms in working order?
- Are security doors and gates alarmed?
- In case of fire or evacuation, do doors automatically unlock?
- How are alarms monitored?

- Are emergency plans up to date?
- Do security planners have a floor plan?
- Are HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), mechanical, gas, and other
- Are critical systems up to date?

Fire/EMS/Public Health

Purpose:

To develop fire and medical response that can respond quickly to address critical life safety and health issues of event participants and attendees.

Goals:

1. Provide fire protection and response.
2. Provide medical assistance to for injuries and other emergencies.
3. Assure local hospitals are prepared to respond to mass casualty medical emergencies.

Planning for Fire/EMS/Public Health should include the following considerations:

Fire/EMS

- Resources, equipment and personnel for fire medical and mobile response teams
- Designated staging areas
- Protected traffic routes
- Medical triage
- Consequence management for major events
- Decontamination
- Excessive heat/cold
- Protocols for medical treatment of excessive alcohol consumption
- Medical response for injured players
- Access to critical infrastructure, e.g., sprinkler connections, fire hydrants, utility panels
- Sprinkler systems

Hospitals

- Medical Surge
- Patient tracking

Public Health

- Food security and safety
- Disease Prevention
- Protection of medical health infrastructure

Key Planning Questions:

- Have we developed adequate plans for fire and EMS services' response if needed at the event?
- What numbers and types of personnel are needed at the event—on standby?
- What types of apparatus, medical vehicles, and equipment are needed at the event?
- Do we have designated staging areas for medical resources?

- Where should vehicles and personnel stage at the event?
- Do we have designated response teams for players on the field?
- Are floors plans (showing electrical, HVAC systems, etc.) available for event facilities?
- Does the fire department have access to critical infrastructure, e.g., sprinkler connections, fire hydrants, utility panels?
- Have ingress and egress routes been designated for emergency vehicles?
- Do event facilities (stadiums, arenas, etc.) have adequate evacuation plans?
- Have primary and secondary response hospitals been designated?
- What is the primary trauma center hospital that will be used during the event?
- Do we give decontamination protocols in place to respond to a radiological, chemical, and biological agents?
- Will the weather necessitate consideration of establishing heating/cooling stations for attendees and staff?
- Are sprinkler systems functioning?
- Do we have plans in place to assist with the medical needs for special needs population?
- Have hospitals been integrated into the overall security plan in order to provide critical information to these primary health care facilities on anticipated threats and attendance to the event?
- Have public health agencies been included in planning sessions to assist them in preparation for potential hazmat/WMD situations?

Training

Purpose:

To train and educate public safety personnel on the overall security plan for the event, as well as expected roles, responsibilities, policies, procedures and to improve specific skills when participating in the event.

Goals:

1. Conduct a training needs assessment to determine what specialized knowledge and skills are needed to effectively implement the security plan.
2. Develop a training implementation plan to support event.
3. Schedule and conduct relevant training during event planning cycle.

Planning for Training should include the following considerations:

Focus training on educating all officers of the overall security plan for the event, as well as departmental policies and procedures for interacting with crowds and demonstrators. In addition, provide specialized training to officers in their assigned duties. Specialized units, such as bomb squads or Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, may not need additional training, as they are typically required to participate routine training to maintain certification.

Types of Training Groups

- Specialized training to enhance the communication and cooperation among agencies working at the event (law enforcement, fire/EMS, others).
- Specialized tactical training for field forces or specialized teams.
- Training for private security forces managing special event.
- Training for public information officers.

Possible Training Topics

- Special Event Management
- Command and control structures/Incident command system (ICS)/Unified command (UC)
- Use of specialized equipment
- Orientation to security plan for the Special Event
- Legal Issues (e.g., search and seizure, use of force, arrests, etc.)
- Rights of protestors
- Active Shooter
- Crowd Control Crowd management (planned non-confrontational tactics, protocols, and strategies)
- Use of personal protective equipment
- Terrorism indicators and tactics
- Use of Force/Use of less-then-lethal weapons,

- Venue security
- Surveillance
- Use of specialized equipment or technologies (e.g., credentialing software or camera systems)
- Demobilization

Exercises

- Consideration of testing capabilities through exercise (tabletop or functional)
- Methods of training may include classroom training, roll call training, on-line or video training or tabletop exercises, functional exercises.

Key Planning Questions:

- Have we conducted a comprehensive training needs assessment to identify all specialized knowledge and skills needed to implement the event security plan?
- What specialized knowledge and skills are needed to effectively implement the security plan?
  - Develop a pocket guide for field officers to provide a quick-reference of important event-related information.
- How many personnel do we need to train?
- What level of training to do we need to consider for each category?
- Have we developed training in key specialized areas for security personnel for this event?
- Do we have sufficient training resources in- house or among our partner agencies?
- What training resources exist specifically to support special events?
- Have we considered either developing a new exercise or leveraging an existing one to test our capability and assess gaps or evaluate training effectiveness?
- Have we developed the most effective and efficient training methods to reach required personnel prior to the event?
- Do we evaluate all training to determine what is effective?

Protecting Critical Infrastructure

Purpose:

To protect event against all risks to major critical infrastructure in connection with the LSE.

Goals:

1. Take all necessary measures to harden the event venue from acts of terrorism or natural disasters. Protecting Critical Infrastructure should include an assessment of cyber security threats as one potential threat is that a group could disrupt a major special event by infiltrating or hacking into on site information systems that control communications, utilities (electricity, water, heating, cooling), or other essential information technology. Or a loss of power or other utilities may also be compromised by accidental failure.
2. Coordinate with other agencies and facility security personnel to review security plans for infrastructure and utilities that could threaten event security.
3. Build risk mitigation strategies, including redundancy in services and contingency plans to protect critical infrastructure. At the local level, security agencies should consider protective measures for cyber systems. In developing contingency plans, security officials should develop plans in case an event is targeted. Efforts should involve mitigating the impact of the cyber-attack and continuing services (back up/alternate plans for essential services).
4. Integrate protection of critical infrastructure into event security plan.

Planning for Protection of Critical Infrastructure should include the following considerations:

- Power supply to facility and communication systems
- Water Contamination
- Sprinkler systems and other protection systems
- Vulnerability Assessments
- Gas Pipelines
- Utilities
- Waterways
- Communication networks
- Mass Transit
- Infrastructure vulnerability assessments
- Cyber risk assessments
- Consider removal of trashcans, newspaper dispensers or other containers which may house IEDs
- Business impact analysis

Key Planning Questions:

- Have we conducted risk assessments on critical infrastructure and utilities that could impact the special event?
- Have we collaborated with infrastructure and utilities managers to develop adequate security plans?
- Have we coordinated with sanitation services for event security support?
- Have we considered protective measures for cyber systems in event of attack?
- Do we have contingency planning for a loss of power to critical systems at the facility either intentional or accidental?
- Is there critical infrastructure facilities in close proximity to the special event which may impact the event or its patrons (ie: chemical releases, explosive materials)?
- Do we have back up/alternate plans for essential services) ?
- What vulnerability/risk assessments have been conducted of site location? Of surrounding site location?

Prisoner Processing

Purpose:

To establish a process to effect legal and efficient arrests for illegal behavior.

Goals:

1. Develop an operational plan for arrest processing.
2. Prepare officers to handle arrests in an efficient manner that does not disrupt event activities or escalate unruly behavior.
3. Plan for the anticipation of mass arrests.

Planning for Prisoner Processing should include the following considerations:

- Deterrence strategies to deter arrests where possible.
- Processes and procedures to effect arrests quickly and efficiently
- Protocols for handling evidence
- Officer education on arrest protocols, tactics, legality, as well as use of force and civil liberties.
- Cooperation with private security
- Mass Arrests
- Joint training with multiple agencies
- Operational Plan for arrest processing to include:
    - Resource/staffing logistics
    - Equipment for arrests
    - Holding/jail space
    - Arresting officer procedures
    - Operational procedures (including specifics on processing arrestees remotely, transportation and tracking of arrestees, searching of arrestees/property, receiving and housing, and booking (e.g., corridor security, fingerprinting, or medial screening)

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have adequate support from police legal advisors?
- Will there be planned demonstrations or protests at the event site?
- Have we worked with attorneys or started negotiating with the ACLU and other groups?
- Have we issued rules of engagement to all field forces involved in event security?
- Do we have adequate numbers of trained staff to make mass arrests in the field?
- Do we have a designated space and staff to use as a processing/booking facility?
- Have we distributed enough equipment (flex cuffs, etc.)?

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Non-Event Patrol

Purpose:

Ensure staffing and resources to maintain daily public safety response requirements and patrol operations for citizens in their jurisdiction outside of event are maintained.

Goals:

1. Maintain daily public safety response requirements and patrol operations outside of event
2. Manage non-security event responses
3. Contingency planning for large emergencies

Planning for Non-Event Patrol should include the following considerations:

- Maintain adequate staffing and resource levels
- Coordination of existing emergency operation plans though local EOCs.
- Collaboration with other city agencies to ensure the maintenance of non-security-related essential services and to prepare for emergency relief.
- Educate and briefings for all non-event patrol on event security plans, protocols, and incidents in case they are required to supplement event response.

Key Planning Questions:

- Will we expect regular patrol officers to support crowd control units when problems connected to the event occur outside of the event footprint?
- Have patrol officers been properly briefed on event dynamics? Do they have existing situational awareness?
- Do we have adequate staffing levels?

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Intelligence

Purpose:

To establish procedures for collecting and sharing law enforcement intelligence regarding special event in order to plan for, prepare and protect event and to anticipate resources.

Goals:

1. Develop pre-event intelligence plan to assist with planning and anticipate resource needs.
2. Establish process for analyzing intelligence during the event to help in managing the event and to adjust resource requirements
3. Interface with NCRIC and FBI to ensure situational awareness with all intelligence agencies assigned to the event.
4. Facilitate the sharing of intelligence among stakeholders.

Planning for Intelligence should include the following considerations:

Pre-event intelligence

- Data collection plan
- Threat assessments
- Collaboration with the NCRIC
- Production and dissemination of intelligence products

Intelligence during the event (ground truth and real time data)

- Intelligence Briefings
- Assessing tips and leads and suspicious activity reports
- Physical location of intelligence analysts

Key Planning Questions:

- Are our law enforcement agencies familiar with legal issues and requirements related to intelligence collection and storage?
- Have we established practices to respond to adjudicate and respond to (potential) threats?
- Do we have adequate intelligence support to conduct threat and risk assessments?
- Who will produce threat assessments in support of special event?
- What intelligence information and to whom will intelligence products be shared
- Does the lead agency have an effective intelligence capability?
- What are out information sharing procedures with the NCRIC?
- Can we receive support from a state agency with an intelligence capability?
- Can we receive support from the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)?
- Do we have adequate intelligence support to conduct threat and risk assessments?
- Do we need to employ intelligence resources in the field during the event?

NOTE: For NSSEs and other federally managed major events, the FBI is the lead federal agency for Intelligence. Representatives from local FBI field offices, which each contain an interagency Field Intelligence Group (FIG), may be integrated into planning and operations for major events.

Credentialing

Purpose:

To design and produce badge identification to ensure the greatest possible level of security for personnel and property, and to enhance the ability of law enforcement to control access to secure areas, facilities, and events.

Goals:

1. Provide adequate information on badges to verify the identity of wearers and their level of access.
2. Make codes easy for security personnel to interpret and ensure that all personnel are familiar with corresponding access.
3. Include enough security features to prevent counterfeiting and assist in credential verification.

Planning for Credentialing should include the following considerations:

During a NSSE, locals will be required to abide by USSS credentialing protocols. For NSSE's, the USSS will create federal credentials for access to high-security area that will require background check or investigation.

The two parts of credentialing that are costly are doing background checks on personnel who are issued badges and badge technology

In addition to designating area access, color-coding might also be used to designate functions of personnel. For example, blue represents law enforcement, green for government staff, orange for VIPs and dignitaries, etc. or badges can also identify who is law enforcement, who is allowed to carry a firearm, who has escort privileges, etc.

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have a plan and process to produce credentials for the special event?
- Do we have adequate technology to produce credentials?
- Do we have the required personnel contact information in a database to produce credentials?
- If we don't have the capacity to produce credentials in-house, what agency can we partner with to help us?
- Who will get credentialed?
- Which credentialed personnel require police background records checks?
- Who will conduct the records checks?
- What criteria will be used to exclude people from receiving badges?
- Who will handle credential production?
- How will credentials be distributed?
- Where will the credentialing center be located (must be open prior to and during event)?

Note: It is important not to confuse "credentialing" and "ticketing" A credential identifies specific individuals who are allowed access to a venue for a purpose. A ticket is issued to spectators or the general public. A ticket to enter an event is not a credential - you cannot assume that someone with a ticket has been vetted for security purposes.

Communication

Purpose:

To ensure communication and communications technologies are well-coordinated and seamless between security personnel and all partner agencies.

Goals:

1. Facilitate communication process among all agencies.
2. Identify communications technology and infrastructure to be used for special event.
3. Ensure radio communication interoperability among multiple agencies.
4. Develop common communication protocols for event.

Planning for Communication Coordination and Communications IT should include the following considerations:

- Coordination of communication among all agencies—including law enforcement, fire, EMS, transportation, and others; and from city, county, state, and federal levels before and during the event
- Establishing interoperability between agencies that have different radio models and frequencies
- Availability of radio chargers/back-up batteries during the course of the event
- Designation of radio frequencies
- Determine whether it is possible to establish a radio cache for use at events for use during special events and emergency situations.
- Account for the use of other mobile computing communication devices, such as laptops, tablets and smart phones for field communications at major special events
- A key decision for the lead agency is assigning radio channels and radio access to multiple agencies in support roles at special events. Some of the options include the following:
    - Assign radios only to team supervisors (e.g., a sergeant overseeing 8-10 officers) at key posts. The supervisor can communicate any news to the officers. This keeps officer access to a minimum. However, if officers ever get separated from the team, they will be without radios.
    - Assign radios to all officers but enable the radios with “monitor only” access on the main channel. Officers can transmit on another channel, keeping the main channel with limited access.
    - Assign a variety of channels for different functions and purposes, thus not overloading any one channel. This requires more dispatchers to monitor the channels.
- Test communication mechanisms prior to the event
- Establish a Central Communications Center with ability for high speed Internet access for e-mail, data transfer, database management

- Designate personnel on-site to handle technology problems
- Contingency plans and back-up technology for system failures

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have a process in place to communicate regularly with all key partners?
  - Lead agency should send a survey form to all assisting agencies requesting information on radios—models, frequencies, contact for technical problems, etc.
  - Check all radios in the field the day of the event before activities begin to ensure all radios are operational and personnel are on the proper frequencies.
- Do we have adequate communications technology and equipment?
- Do we have adequate communications back-up?
- Can we integrate radio communication among many different agencies involved in the event?
- Are communications command center facilities adequate in size and scope?
- Have we created and disseminated clear, consistent and common radio identification codes and terminology for all assignments?
- Have we established a check-in system to ensure that all outside agencies bring in radios to lead agency to enter frequencies into communications network?
- What technology exists in command center to enhance situational awareness (i.e. video walls to show feeds of event venues, traffic and street activities, local and national news, etc)
- Are computers (including outside laptops) networked together?
- An issue that comes up in planning security at major special events is the need to use encryption technology for radio transmissions to protect from outsiders intercepting transmissions?
- How will we test communications IT prior to the event to ensure operability and interoperability?
- How will we communicate if there is a failure of the communication technology or infrastructure?

Personnel Resources: Determining and Acquiring Security Workforce

Purpose:

To determine what personnel resources will be needed both internally and externally to support all event operations.

Goals:

1. Develop a comprehensive event staffing plan.
2. Identify needed contracts and MOU's to bring in staffing from neighboring agencies and private firms.
3. Identify specialized units and expertise needed to support event.

Planning for Determining and Acquiring Security Workforce should include the following considerations:

- Internal Personnel (Sworn and Unsworn)
- External Personnel (Sworn and Unsworn)
- Private Security
- Volunteers
- Hotel Security
- Specialized Units (i.e. EOD, Canine Detection, HazMat, Vice, Bicycle Units, Crisis Management)
- Shift relief and rotation
- Security in parking lots

Key Planning Questions:

- What are all of the security assignments/posts that require staffing (inner, middle, and outer perimeter; transit routes; etc.)?
- How many personnel will be needed at each assignment/post?
- How many supervisors will be needed for each assignment/post?
- How long will shifts last (8hours/12hours)? And for how may days?
- How much relief will be needed?
- Will personnel support of this event require overtime?
- Will our own officers and officers from outside agencies be paid overtime?
- What different types of skills are needed (information technology, administrative support, dispatchers, canine handlers, bike patrol, mounted, etc.)
- What different types of authority are needed (e.g., prosecutors, civil attorneys)?
- Will officers need security clearances if they intend to receive federal intelligence information?
- Do we have a sufficient "show of force" for events with a history of disruptions?

- Should we position crowd control officers on standby at the site of major national sporting events (e.g., the World Series, the Super Bowl)?

Transportation/Traffic Management

Purpose:

To plan for all transportation modes that may have an impact on security of the event venue. In working with transportation officials, traffic engineering, fire/EMS, and others, the decision may be made to close streets, re-route traffic patterns, close transit stops, and the like for security purposes.

Goals:

1. Identification of all transportation/traffic management stakeholders
2. Designate Primary (P) and Secondary (S) Agencies Responsible
3. Develop Operational Plan for Transportation/Traffic Management
4. ID resources needed to implement operational plan

Planning for Transportation/Traffic Management should include the following considerations:

- Vehicle Access
- Entrance and Exit Flow
- Major Road and Intersection Closures
- Motorcades
- Special Traffic Problems
- Emergency Vehicle Access
- Parking
- Aircraft/Helicopter Access and Airspace Protection
- Buses
- BART Access and Security

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have adequate staffing and post assignments?
- Have we identified all stakeholders related to traffic management and transportation?
- Do we have adequate security staffing and assignments for motorcades carrying VIPs?
- Do we have adequate motorcade route plans and contingency route plans?
- Have all personnel involved in motorcade security been briefed on the plans?
- Do we have maps showing anticipated traffic patterns for spectators coming to and leaving the event?
- Have we conducted risk assessments for all transportation modes—vehicle traffic, mass transit (buses, subways, trains), marine traffic, and more?
- How will planned security measures impact transportation or transit systems?
- Will transportation, transit or parking disruptions impact local businesses?

- Do we have adequate signage or other means to direct traffic?
- Is there adequate staffing to patrol parking areas?

Finance and Logistics

Purpose:

To oversee the integration and coordination of all administrative and logistical support in terms of event security and to ensure adequate financial resources.

Goals:

1. Obtain specific resources needed to support security-related needs in the field
2. Determine financial resources to establish budget
3. Help to determine the necessary funding requirements to support security operations.

Planning for Finance and Logistics Support should include the following considerations:

Financial Planning

- Early in the process the admin coordinator should reach out to each subcommittee to distribute a form that requests each committee's needs in terms of equipment, supplies, and other logistical support. This will help in coordinating among planning teams to eliminating duplication of equipment. It will also help to establish a timeline and task chart for managing all administrative and logistical functions.

Operational Logistics

- Involves support for security-related needs in the field such as getting personnel resources to the field, equipping them, housing and feeding them, and attending to their other needs.
  - Transportation of personnel to the field and posts
  - Parking, lodging and food for security personnel
  - Lodging for security personnel
  - Bathrooms
  - Security equipment (i.e.: including security fences, jersey barriers, hazmat clothing, riot gear, magnetometers, etc.).
  - Specialized equipment (i.e. including generators, portable radios, towers, and other large items).
  - Specialized transport equipment (i.e. include bicycles, scooters, golf carts, motorcycles, explosive transport vehicles, and the like).
  - Supplies

Administrative Support

- Involved support related to acquiring and purchasing equipment and other items, tracking costs, etc.
  - Purchasing equipment and supplies
  - Paying overtime to lead agency personnel.
  - Reimbursing personnel expenses to other partner agencies.
  - Tracking costs and equipment

- Acquiring (e.g., renting) space, facilities, storage facilities for security purposes, and more.
- Acquiring and providing communications equipment

Specialized Support Specialized

- Involves support can involve a variety of special services.
    - Video support or other needs.

Key Planning Questions:

- Do we have a designated administrative logistics coordinator?
- Have we developed a task list and timeline to manage the administrative and logistical needs?
- Do we have an adequate inventory of needed equipment, supplies, and other items to provide security at the special event?
- Which other agencies can we work with to borrow or lease needed equipment, vehicles, and other logistical support items?
- Are we prepared to make timely purchases of any equipment or supplies that we need to acquire for the event?
- Do we have an adequate budget to support the security needs of the special event?

Post-Event Activities and Demobilization and AAR

Purpose:

To ensure smooth transition to closing operations to return to normal daily business activity and ensure final wrap up of all administrative needs.

Goals:

1. Demobilization of event operations.
2. Finalize all logistics, financial and accounting functions.
3. Debriefing and preparation of an after-action report.

Planning for Post Event Activities and Demobilization should include the following considerations:

- Demobilization and Logistics wrap-up. Demobilization efforts should be set up before the event closes. The lead agency must be prepared for visiting agencies to leave immediately after the conclusion of the event at the conclusion of formal duty assignments. Plans must include the ability to out-process officers at and the ability to cover duties as they may arise post-event.
  - Release and out processing of officers (e.g. personnel paperwork and timecards)
  - Collection and inventory of equipment and other resources assigned directly to officers (e.g. supplies, vehicles, etc.)
  - Collection of equipment used for event (e.g barricades, fences, mobile command vehicles)
- Completion of Accounting Function
  - Billing
  - Payment of Overtime
- Debriefs
  - “Hotwash” - facilitated discussion held immediately after an event
  - The timeline record - key events, decisions, and resources
  - Debriefings - interviews and/or surveys of supervisors and representatives from other law enforcement agencies and key partners (fire/EMS, city attorney, etc.)
  - Critiques of all operations (field operations, access points, personnel (including supervisory personnel), logistics, equipment, communications, training, etc.)
  - Deviations from the event security plan
- After-Action Report - should begin in the planning phase. Evaluators must participate in the pre- event design discussions to ensure that the post-event analysis accurately captures all phases of the planning and operational processes.
  - Analysis to develop best practices, and lessons learned for post-event improvements.

- Recommendations—what to keep, what to change, how and why changes should be made.

Key Planning Questions:

- Have we determined a logical order to release and out-process officers and to collect resources coming back in from the field?
- Do we have the ability to out-process large groups of officers at one time? If necessary, from multiple locations?
- How will we gain stakeholder feedback for experience and recommendation if they are not on- site for the hotwash?
- How can we best capture experiences and key activities and actions, etc from officers and supervisors in the field?
- Do our evaluators come from both internal and external sources, to ensure a diverse perspective and accurate evaluation?
- How and to whom will we formally brief/present the AAR findings?

Appendix C

Large Special Event Planning Checklists

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This checklist is intended to coordinate tasks throughout the LSE planning effort, serve as a potential tool to track progress and ensure accountability, and may be modified as needed. The checklist is reviewed by the LSE Public Safety Director or lead planner to establish and assign responsibilities and deadlines. This checklist could be used at an early Planning Committee meeting to ensure a common understanding of the scope of work that will be conducted as well as which agency will be responsible for each function.

Start Date	Date Due	Responsible Agency	Action Item
Coordination			
			Coordinate with other jurisdictions that have previously hosted a LSE to learn about what to expect and planning considerations.
			Identify and engage stakeholders/agencies that hold a functional stake in the event to participate in the multidisciplinary LSE Host Committee. Examples of committee members may include but are not limited to: • Emergency Management • Law Enforcement • Fire and Rescue • Emergency Medical Services (EMS) • Emergency Communications Providers (e.g. 9-1-1) • Public Works/Utilities • Public Health • State/Federal Agencies • Promoter/Sponsor of the Event • Private Sector Organizations and Businesses
			Organize an internal kick-off meeting with members of the host jurisdiction to share information and begin setting up internal committees.
			Begin the event plan for all key stakeholders. Use the format most familiar to the stakeholders (Incident Action Plan, EOC Action Plan, CONOPS, Playbook, etc.). Contents could include: • Front Cover • Table of Contents Page • Distribution List • Contact Lists • Event Name and Overview • Date • Venue(s) and Geographic Location(S) • Event Sponsors and Host Jurisdiction/jurisdiction with Authority for LSE • Expected Attendance • Audience/Public Characteristics • Running Order/Event Timeline • Roles and Responsibilities • Site/Venue Plans

Start Date	Date Due	Responsible Agency	Action Item
			• Operational and Safety Components (production, access, and egress, parking, etc.) • Production Schedules • Event Communications • Emergency Protocols (lost persons, medical, evacuations, etc.) • Appendices
			Hold regular coordination meetings among stakeholders in advance of the LSE.
			Establish and maintain effective public safety partnerships early in the planning process to give ample time for staff and leadership to develop trust of each other and understand unique needs.
			Establish formal, institutionalized processes for coordinating and validating plans among partners, including processes for establishing common planning assumptions and identifying interdependencies among plans. Consider including a plan organization chart to help stakeholders understand the various documents and reference materials.
			Identify necessary agreements and permit requirements for the LSE.
Communication			
			Establish communication protocols. Consider what information should be shared and the method for information exchange.
			Identify and select information sharing systems/tools (Email, HSIN, SharePoint. etc.) to share draft plans, information, and updates among planners throughout the planning process.
			Specify agency and interagency contact information. Run regular communication tests to ensure equipment works and contact information is current.
			Evaluate the use of radio channels/frequencies, trunked radio systems, and/or cellular phones.
			Evaluate linkages between venue sites, command post, and emergency operations center (EOC) as applicable.
			Test all wire line and wireless communications and radio frequencies expected to be used.
			Test backup communication channels and methods.
Internal Communication			
			Get early buy-in from senior leadership on the LSE time commitments, planning elements, and resources that will be required to execute the LSE.
			Provide regular briefings to senior leadership to keep them engaged and informed on the LSE planning elements and resource requirements.

Start Date	Date Due	Responsible Agency	Action Item
External Communication (With Partners)			
			Develop contact lists and share with all agencies involved in the LSE. Contact list should include several methods to make contact (e.g., land line phone, cell phone, e-mail address)
			Prepare a well-developed communications plan as part of the CONOPS/IAP. This plan should include the chain of command, communication roles and positions within the organization, and voice/data communication protocols and methods (phone extensions, telecommunications, redundant communication systems, etc.).
			Make sure fire departments, EMS, and local hospitals are well aware of the LSE and of road closures due to the LSE.
Situational Awareness			
			Ensure information collaboration tools such as Cal COP and WebEOC are utilized and staff are trained in its use.
			Develop shared/common maps, geo-mapping, and situational awareness tools to help users identify, track, and manage assets.
			Identify appropriate contact with local National Weather Service office to obtain timely and focused forecasts as well as identify potential mitigation strategies that the NWS can assist with.
Security			
			Develop a credentialing system and plan. Credentialing ensures the appropriate levels of personnel and equipment access exists throughout the LSE. Several levels of credentials may be implemented for the event. The host jurisdictions should work with the event liaison/sponsor to develop and maintain a detailed list of personnel.
			Develop a security plan that includes the check-in, credentialing, and demobilizing procedures for all event personnel, operations personnel, and volunteers.
Transportation Plan			
			Determine if the LSE will impact traffic flow and/or require street closures. If so, coordination with the jurisdiction's Department of Public Works (DPW) and Caltrans is essential in the early planning phases.
			Determine if the LSE will require temporary traffic code or parking restrictions. If so, apply for permits early and incorporate the information into the transportation plan.
			Consider road and transit alternatives that increase pedestrian access, including additional shuttle and transit services.
			Review and build upon existing transportation plans for special events and for emergency operations.
			Review and build upon operations strategies and resource allocations used in previous special events in the region.

Start Date	Date Due	Responsible Agency	Action Item
			Obtain information on contingency transportation scenarios implemented in previous events and use them as planning considerations when building your transportation plan.
			Prepare a traffic control plan to provide route guidance for LSE venue(s) ingress and egress traffic. Indicate in the traffic control plan which law enforcement agency should close which roads during peak period traffic.
			Ensure the transportation plan addresses emergency response routes and access. Security perimeters can affect response time; therefore, the transportation plan will need to include emergency access for emergency services and first responders, directions, secondary route options, and directions/routes to the major medical centers so that they are able to prepare accordingly. DPW/Caltrans can clear routes by closing additional roads, restricting parking on key routes to provide more road space or establishing a more extensive traffic detour program.
			Consider road and transit alternatives that can handle the increase in usage due to the LSE and are accessible to the elderly and persons with disabilities.
			Coordinate all road closure information with local and regional transit and transportation agencies including MTC. Requests for closures of subway, light rail, or commuter rail stops; bus stops; and sidewalks are possible and planning for those closures should be coordinated with the entity that has authority over that transportation element. Depending on the jurisdiction, the DPW/Caltrans or the entity responsible for operating those services may consider requests for closure of certain systems / roads. These requests affect the public transportation network and can add to the logistics required to develop a strong transportation plan for the event.
			Coordinate with public works personnel on the signage that will be needed for traffic routes and road closures. Signage is needed for foot traffic, vehicle traffic, and mass transit. Signage should include a substantial number of “no parking” signs with clear penalties displayed on or near the sign.
			Coordinate traffic detours with local law enforcement agencies. A LSE can impact multiple modes of transit for days prior to, during, and after the event. Coordinating with DPW/Caltrans for traffic management devices is an essential pre-event activity.
			Determine areas for parking for event personnel, response personnel (EMS/Fire/Police), support personnel, and others staffing the LSE as well as for support equipment, such as ambulances. Ensure the security protocols are followed and access control points are identified.
			Determine parking requirements for the general public and the media. This includes adequate resources available to quickly remove illegally parked or disabled vehicles. This may require contracting with one or more towing companies. In the case of contract towing, considerations must include access into certain areas as they are being secured as well as staging areas for tow trucks.

Start Date	Date Due	Responsible Agency	Action Item
Training and Exercise			
			Participate in multiagency training and exercises on a regular basis.
			Ensure Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS)/National Incident Management System (NIMS) adherence.
			Develop a training plan for all staff involved in operations and monitoring of the LSE. This includes training elements such as ICS, EOC position specific training, WebEOC, Cal COP, mutual aid systems and procedures, etc.
Resources			
			Identify potential resource needs and how to request and acquire them as needed.
			Identify resource staging areas to ensure safe and effective set up of equipment.
			Test function of remote communications.
			Use message boards at key intersections and junctions to notify the community of upcoming road closure and detours.
Community Outreach			
			Develop a plan for interaction with the media and identify prescribed locations for media briefings and areas that are "off limits" if applicable. This includes methods for posting information (website, phone numbers for information, etc.) for the public.
			Develop a plan for providing information to the public and the community including private sector organizations.
			Ensure early notification of traffic detours and road closures through dynamic message signs and general outreach to the media.
			Develop targeted contingency public information messaging in key areas including: • Spectator Management/crowd control • Transportation systems and security • Public health • Medical response - single incidents and/or mass casualty • HazMat/explosive device/WMD • Fire safety • Crowd/fan safety • Access and credentialing • Federal asset integration • Dignitary/VIP protection • Physical infrastructure

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Appendix D

Training and Exercises

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Training and exercise efforts should include training on how the host jurisdiction will execute this plan. Leaders must understand how their organizations and agencies contribute to the proper functioning of the LSE. This training should include how those responsibilities can extend into a response related to an emergency occurring during the LSE. In addition, training and exercises based on the LSE Core Operational Functions listed in Section 3.2 should be offered twice monthly on average during the pre-event planning and coordination efforts.

The LSE CONOPS must be clearly articulated, trained, and exercised to reduce the likelihood of a LSE impacting a jurisdiction. The LSE CONOPS includes the details necessary for a coordinated response at all levels of government and by all involved agencies and organizations and should be shared with these critical partners. Conducting planning, training, and exercises with these partners may benefit a jurisdiction during other emergencies.

There are several training program resources available to the Bay Area jurisdictions. These include the UASI Training & Exercise Program, California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), and other nationwide consortiums funded by federal grants (i.e. TEEX). Departments, authorities, agencies, municipalities, and all private response organizations are responsible for ensuring their personnel are sufficiently trained.

Exhibit D-1 provides an example of a 12 month training and exercise schedule that could be modified for the specific LSE. By focusing on one core operational function per month, the host jurisdiction and allied stakeholders can gain different perspectives on the LSE by looking through the "lens" of the core operational function. Conducting trainings and exercises around core operational functions, the host jurisdiction and allied stakeholders can ensure robust procedures that have been tested and validated.

Exhibit D-1: Sample Training and Exercise Schedule

Timeline	Sample Training Activity
January	Core Operational Function – Screening and Physical Security
February	Core Operational Function – Transportation/Traffic
March	Core Operational Function – Tactical Support/HazMat/WMD
April	Core Operational Function – Communication: Interagency &Technical
May	Core Operational Function – Consequence Management
June	Core Operational Function – Media Relations/PR
July	Core Operational Function – Fire/EMS/Hospital Services

Timeline	Sample Training Activity
August	Core Operational Function – Field Operations/Venue Security Incident Management – Core IC/UC Organization Tabletop Exercise
September	Core Operational Function – Emergency Evacuation
October	Core Operational Function – Resources and Personnel Incident Management – Extended Stakeholders Tabletop Exercise
November	Core Operational Function – Airspace/Maritime Incident Management – CONOPS/IAP Briefing
December	Core Operational Function – Finance and Logistics Senior Officials Briefing

Appendix E

Specific Information on Information Sharing

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Depending on the nature of the LSE, jurisdictions may use of a variety of data communications systems to share information. The identification of these systems should occur early in the planning process in order to allow for jurisdictions to properly equip, train and exercise their staff in using these systems. In addition to the primary methods, alternate methods should be identified.

Selection of the appropriate communication method should take into account the need to maintain operational security of key elements of information. For example, use of email may need be limited.

Key information sharing systems within the Bay Area may include:

- WebEOC/CalEOC
- California Common Operating Picture (Cal COP)
- Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)
- Reddinet
- Law Enforcement Online (LEO)
- Situation Report
- Cal OES Coastal Region Coordination Group Call
- Direct Notification
- Email
- Bay Area Joint Information System (JIS) Website (Proposed)

Exhibit E-1 provides a communications matrix suggesting which system may be appropriate for the information shared among LSE stakeholders based on the nature of the information:

Exhibit E-1: LSE Stakeholder Information Communications Systems

	Cal EOC / WebEOC*	Cal COP	HSIN	Reddinet / EMSystems	LEO	Situation Report	Regional Coordination Call	Direct Notification	Email	JIS Website
Location/Attendance	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Timeline/Schedule	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■
Site Plan	■	■	■	■	■	■	■			

	Cal EOC / WebEOC*	Cal COP	HSIN	Reddinet / EMSystems	LEO	Situation Report	Regional Coordination Call	Direct Notification	Email	JIS Website
Planned Road Closures	■	■	■	■	■	■			■	■
CONOPS/IAP	■	■	■	■	■			■		
Organization Chart	■	■	■	■	■			■		
Contact List	■	■	■	■	■				■	■
Control Measures	■	■	■	■	■			■	■	
Situation Summary	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Transportation Plan	■	■	■	■	■			■	■	■
Weather Intelligence	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Threat Intelligence			■		■			■		
Security Plan			■		■			■		
Traffic Mgt Plan	■	■	■	■	■			■		■
Dignitary/VIP Protection			■		■			■		
Mutual Aid Requests & Status	■					■	■	■		
Hazard Intelligence	■	■	■	■				■		■
Venue Safety Plan	■	■	■	■				■	■	■

	Cal EOC / WebEOC*	Cal COP	HSIN	Reddinet / EMSystems	LEO	Situation Report	Regional Coordination Call	Direct Notification	Email	JIS Website
EMS Plan	■	■	■	■				■	■	■
Mutual Aid Requests & Status	■					■	■	■		
MOUs	■	■	■	■				■	■	
Jurisdictional Agreements	■	■	■	■				■	■	
Fiscal / HR Policy	■	■				■				
Media requests	■					■			■	■
Media reports	■					■			■	■
Press Releases	■					■			■	■
Media Briefings	■	■				■			■	■

* For those jurisdictions not using or having access to WebEOC, they should utilize the manual system (usually forms) provide by their Operational Area.

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Appendix F

Regional Public Information Guide

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The public information requirements for a LSE involve more than just the jurisdiction hosting the event. The Bay Area serves as a shared media market and it is important to coordinate public information beyond the host jurisdiction. Coordinating messaging and other public information functions with surrounding jurisdictions enhances the likelihood of reaching as many people as possible prior to and during the event. On event day, information for the public about the LSE should be in place. The media covering the event will need contact with the jurisdiction for the most up-to-date information. This guide serves as an informational source for public information officers in the host jurisdiction to develop the public information elements for a LSE.F

PRE-EVENT PLANNING ELEMENTS

Prior to a LSE, it is important to share information with the public. Effective regional coordination prior to a LSE will increase public trust in local authorities and increase cooperation and compliance with issued guidance and directives. Exhibit A-1: LSE Public Information Planning Checklist contains the pre-event tasks that should be completed by Public Information Officers (PIOs) prior to a LSE in their jurisdiction.

Exhibit F-1: LSE Public Information Planning Checklist

Completed by (Initials)	Action Item
12 Months Prior to LSE	
	Joint Information System (JIS) Facilitator (OA PIO in the jurisdiction that is hosting the LSE) collects the existing information on the LSE and convenes the Regional Public Information Coordination Group.
	Determine the regional public information goals and objectives for the event.
	Prepare a preliminary event timeline and VIP list.
	Establish a regional public information action plan.
	Establish protocols for PIO interaction with hosting jurisdiction, sponsors, and the media.
	Consider creating an event-specific informational website or public inquiry center for the public.
	Consider creating a regular “event” bulletin/newsletter for all PIOs in the region to update them on the LSE essential pieces of information.
	Coordinate with service providers, such as 211, to facilitate sharing the event information and meeting the public’s request for information (pre-event and during the event).
	Consider making use of local or regional mass notification systems to distribute information to the public.

Completed by (Initials)	Action Item
	Prepare a calendar of regional PIO planning meetings, conference calls, or webinars for the LSE.
	Prepare a master schedule of all known printed materials/promotional items with the intended audience for distribution.
	Assign specific areas of responsibility (Media Relations, Research and writing, Broadcast Operations, Liaisons, and Multilingual Operations) for the regional JIC/JIS structure for the LSE.
	Conduct site visits as required.
	Assign follow-up items to specific members of the regional PIO coordination group.
	Produce tentative maps and facility floor plans for public information personnel. This includes potential media staging areas.
6 Months Prior to LSE	
	Follow-up on specific areas of responsibility (Media Relations, Research and writing, Broadcast Operations, Liaisons, and Multilingual Operations) for the regional JIC/JIS structure for the LSE.
	Prepare pre-scripted messages for the LSE.
	Establish media interview times/key media events timeline.
	Update maps and facility floor plans for public information personnel; this includes potential media staging areas (this becomes an ongoing task from this point on).
	Establish protocols for PIO interaction with hosting jurisdiction, sponsors, and the media.
	Establish procedures for developing and communicating with regional transit providers regarding transit system impacts or LSE-related operations.
	Update the LSE timeline and VIP list.
	Update the regional public information action plan.
	Update the calendar of regional PIO planning meetings, conference calls, or webinars for the LSE.
	Update the master schedule of all known printed materials/promotional items with the intended audience for distribution including community and private sector organizations.
	Follow-up on any item from the 12-month checklist that needs refining, updating, or reworking. Inform other PIOs of the updates/changes and public the updated information or document.
1–3 Months Prior to LSE	
	Confirm dates, times, and other LSE information.

Completed by (Initials)	Action Item
	Update maps, floor plans, timelines, printed/promotional materials, and other LSE information.
	Prepare a two-month media schedule and media kits for the event.
	Train new PIOs on the Regional Public Information Coordination Group and procedures for the LSE.
	Coordinate with other LSE elements (command, security, transportation, etc.) to ensure PIOs have the most current information for the LSE.
	Establish media monitoring procedures.
	Lead JIS Facilitator should coordinate with security for the LSE on badging for PIOs (if necessary).
	Create JIC/JIS contingency plan for a secondary event/incident occurring during the LSE.
	Combine all relevant LSE and regional public information policies and specific procedures into manual for on-site use and supporting PIOs.
	Request signage, equipment, or other resources for the public information component of the LSE.
	Prepare messaging for use with local or regional mass notification systems.
	Identify and assign on-site PIO support roles and responsibilities.
	Identify and plan for any specific LSE public information needs (multilingual PIOs, braille, Jumbotrons, VIP visits, etc.).
	Follow-up on any item from the 6-month checklist that needs refining, updating, or reworking. Inform other PIOs of the updates/changes and public the updated information or document.

Public Information Operations during a LSE

Regional Public Information Elements

Joint Information System

During a LSE, the PIOs may coordinate through a Joint Information System (JIS). The JIS complements the existing regional coordination structure by gathering, vetting, processing, and coordinating communication and public information within the Bay Area.

Bay Area stakeholder organizations that contribute to and participate in the JIS do not lose their individual identities or responsibility for their own programs or policies. The Bay Area JIS member list may be accessed through Operational Area Office of Emergency Services managers.. The JIS may be used by jurisdictions in the Bay Area to complete the following functions:

- Conduct integrated public warning messaging.
- Gather and coordinate public information.
- Prepare consistent messages/information prior to dissemination.
- Verify accuracy of information and deconflict inconsistent messaging.
- Coordinate and prioritize public information activities including scheduling media events and information releases, establishing joint or uniform social media programs.
- Monitoring social media and conducting rumor control.
- Release information about the event and/or emergency response elements.
- Identifying and allocating public information resources including staff, technology, facilities, and public information products.
- Support regional situational awareness.

A virtual JIS allows stakeholders to coordinate and collaborate virtually through a common access point. Through a virtual platform, PIOs can contribute materials, fact sheets, graphics, maps, messages, calendars, and other collaborative materials. This level of information sharing expedites the release of coordinated and consistent public information to the public.

Regional Joint Information Center

A regional JIC is a facility or virtual coordination platform established to coordinate all LSE-related public information activities throughout the region. It is the central point of contact for all news media. For LSEs, public information officials from all participating agencies should co-locate at or make use of the regional JIC in order to ensure consistent messaging and timely exchange of information. A regional JIC can provide:

    - A central location that facilitates operation of the JIS
    - A location where personnel with public information responsibilities perform critical emergency information functions, crisis communications, and public affairs functions

- JICs may be established at various levels of government or at incident sites, or can be components of MAC Systems (e.g., MAC Groups or EOCs). A single JIC location or virtual JIC is preferable in order to improve the timeliness of information and reduce the amount of communication needed to exchange information. However, the system is flexible and adaptable enough to accommodate virtual or multiple JIC locations, as required.

Transition from Event Management to Emergency Response

If an incident/emergency occurs during a LSE, the public information resources will be activated and deployed to response entities in compliance with their existing local emergency response plans and authorities and in accordance with ICS, SEMS, and NIMS. These resources may include single or multiple PIOs attached to incident command posts, area commands, Multiagency coordination centers (MACCs), emergency coordination centers, and EOCs within the region. Additional PIOs may be obtained via mutual aid or the Emergency Management

Mutual Aid System (EMMA) system. Public information objectives, key messages, strategies, length of operational periods, and other aspects of the response will be developed as part of each entity's planning cycle. In some cases, response entities at any level of the response may activate and operate local JICs in pursuit of their public information objectives.

Transition to a Regional JIC

A JIC may already be established, depending upon the nature and size of the LSE. Upon recognition of one or more of the following triggers, all Bay Area PIOs may support the activation of a regional JIC by requesting a conference call/strategy meeting (see Tab 3 for a sample agenda). These activation triggers may include but are not limited to the following:

- The incident is already having or is projected to have a regional impact (may occur in one county but heavily impacts the entire media market).
- The impacted jurisdiction requests activation.
- Media demands are overwhelming (or are anticipated to overwhelm) local PIO resources.
- There is a need to standardize messaging on a regional basis.
- Activation of a MACS is planned at the regional level.
- An event of national significance (e.g., pandemic, mass evacuation, etc.) impacts the region.
- Incident commanders/emergency managers in the region request the level of coordination provided by an active, regional JIS.

Key Decisions

The following are the initial key decisions related to regional public information operations prior to a LSE. However, these key decisions may also be helpful should an incident/emergency occur during a LSE:

- Who will establish the regional JIC and serve as Lead Regional JIS Coordinator?
- When will the regional JIC be established?
- Where will the regional JIC be established?
- How will the supporting agencies and jurisdictions link into the regional JIC?
- Who has message approving authority?
- Will the state establish a state JIC?
- When will the state JIC be established?
- Where will the state JIC be established?

Demobilization/Post-Event

The Lead Regional JIS Coordinator in conjunction with incident command/emergency management will determine when to demobilize the virtual or physical regional JIC. The occurrence of one or more of the following could trigger demobilization:

- The level of media activity has subsided to the point where strengthened regional JIC operations are no longer necessary.
- Resource constraints/costs prohibit continued operations.
- The MACS is demobilized.
- The regional JIC scales down as state or federal public information operations scale up.

REGIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Regional JIC Organization

The JIC or regional JIC may be organized and structured to perform each of the four functions to provide emergency information to the public:

- Information Gathering
- Information Dissemination
- Operations Support (including translation)
- Liaison (including field PIOs and VIPs)

Just like the incident command is a scalable organization that is able to expand and contract based on the needs of the incident commander, so is the organization of the regional JIC. It is similarly scalable to expand and contract to meet the needs of the lead PIO. Exhibits A.3-1 and A.3-2 provide examples of how a regional JIC could be organized to support a LSE.

Exhibit F-2: Regional JIC Organizational Chart #1[11]



[11] Emergency Public Information Annex to the Atlanta Regional Evacuation Coordination Plan, March 2014

Exhibit F-3: Regional JIC Organizational Chart #2[12]



[12] Portland Urban Area Regional Emergency Public Information Concept of Operations (ConOps) Plan, January 2009

Roles and Responsibilities

Exhibit F-4 lists the roles and responsibilities for each position in the regional JIC. Depending upon the nature of the LSE, these roles and responsibilities may need to be modified to reflect the specific JIC structure.

Exhibit F-4 Regional JIC Roles and Responsibilities

Role	Responsibility
PIO Lead	• Responsible for collecting, verifying, and disseminating information to the public that will help the public to make decisions about health, safety, and welfare • Provides emergency public information-related advice to the Unified Command and chief elected officials • Obtains message approval
Office Manager	• Supervises the daily operations of the JIC • Ensures all functions are organized and operating efficiently
Special Projects	• Plans, organizes, executes, and provides support for projects that are not usually part of a response to disasters
Photo Documentation	• Documents the incident damage and response • Coordinates with and issues photo documentation to the media and others for release to the public
PIO Liaisons	• Maintains communication and positive working relations within and among key program areas • Supports dissemination of message
Media Relations Section	• Gathers information • Validates information
Rapid Response Team	• Troubleshoots public information operations to ensure that accurate information is disseminated • Responds immediately with facts and figures to any instances of misinformation, incorrect information, or rumors that have been or could be perpetuated by the media
News Desk Team	• Handles incoming calls from the media • Provides routine response, recovery, and mitigation information
News Monitoring & Analysis Team	• Monitors and analyzes daily news reports • Provides an analysis of stories that affect the response and recovery of public safety
Field Operations Team	• Works with media representatives at the incident site • Identifies issues and potential problems
Media List Team	• Develops demographic profiles and media lists for use in disseminating targeted messages

Role	Responsibility
Multilingual Operations Section	• Keeps diverse communities informed about the incident, the response, and personal protective measures • Provides support to all response functions as needed to meet multilingual needs • Gathers information • Validates information • Creates multilingual messages • Supports dissemination of multilingual messages
News Desk Team	• Handles incoming calls from non-English media • Provides routine response, recovery, and mitigation information to diverse communities
News Analysis Team	• Monitors and analyzes daily non-English news reports • Provides an analysis of non-English stories that affect the response and recovery or public safety
Field Operations Team	• Works with the non-English media representatives at the incident site. • Identifies issues and potential problems affecting diverse communities
Translations Team	• Provides translation support to all response functions as needed to meet multilingual needs
Research & Writing Section	• Creates messages
Editorial Production Team	• Prepares news releases, daily summaries, media advisories, feature articles, public service announcements, and other written materials
Broadcast Operations Section	• Supports creating messages • Supports message dissemination
Video Documentation Team	• Provides documentation of incident issues
Field News Link Team	• Provides communications uplink

TAB 1: PRE-SCRIPTED MESSAGES

Through the JIS, PIOs are able to create coordinated and consistent messages by collaborating to:

- Identify key information that needs to be communicated to the public.
- Craft messages that convey key information, and are clear and easily understood.
- Prioritize messages to ensure timely delivery of information without overwhelming the audience.
- Verify accuracy of information through appropriate channels, including Incident Command and relevant agencies and program areas.
- Disseminate messages using the most effective methods and inclusive technologies available. This includes concepts related to “accessible communications” such as multi-lingual demands, those with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs.

Sample Message: Parade and Viewing Information

City of Tampa Announces Public Viewing Areas and Official Parade Route for the RNC

The City of Tampa announced the official parade route and public viewing areas for demonstrations during the Republican National Convention.

The official parade route runs down Washington Street, turning south at Morgan Street, east on Whiting Street and then south along S. Nebraska Avenue.

The goal of the parade route is to minimize disruption to traffic in downtown while providing space for demonstrations. However, groups may hold demonstrations and march in other public areas, such as sidewalks in downtown.

There will be two public viewing areas available that are linked by S. Nebraska Avenue. There is viewing area under the Lee Roy Selmon Expressway along Jefferson Street and one available along S. Nebraska Avenue up to Brorein Street.

In total, the public viewing areas equate to over seven acres. Comparatively, the public viewing area in Denver equaled just over one acre, and the area in Minneapolis equaled to about four acres.

The public viewing area is where protestors can be within sight and sound of the Republican national Convention, which will be at the Tampa Bay Times Forum. Along S. Nebraska Avenue and Walton Street, the City of Tampa will provide a stage as well as a sound system for participants.

In order to provide the space for the public viewing areas, the City of Tampa has leased several parking lots. The lots under the Lee Roy Selmon Expressway along Jefferson

Street have already been leased and approved by Tampa City Council. The leases will cost $57,500, and the City of Tampa expects to be reimbursed by the Department of Justice security grant.

To download maps of the public viewing areas and parade route, please visit tampagov.net/PAO. (Please note this site is for media use only.)

See more at: http://www.tampagov.net/news/city-tampa-announces-public-viewing-areas-and-official-parade-route-rnc#sthash.TBv82JwV.dpuf

Sample Message: Public Transportation and Parking

IMPORTANT TRAFFIC INFORMATION FOR PRO BOWL, SUPER BOWL GAMES IN GLENDALE

Includes Details on Parking, Shuttles and Public Transportation

GLENDALE, Ariz. – Thousands of football fans and visitors will travel to Glendale on game days for both 2015 Pro Bowl and Super Bowl XLIX at the University of Phoenix Stadium, and in and around the Sports and Entertainment District in Glendale. The City of Glendale does not control the parking on game day, but in an effort to create the best possible experience for visitors, would like to share the details of our partners' parking and traffic management plans. Visitors are highly encouraged to plan ahead, know where you are going to park, and know how to navigate through the area.

Parking: Fans and visitors going to the area must pay for parking. Parking passes for NFL controlled lots for either event can be purchased in advance online by visiting the NFL's Super Bowl XLIX Transportation Center website at www.superbowl.clickandpark.com and selecting the appropriate event. On game days, visitors can pay for parking at the lots controlled by the Westgate Entertainment District and Tanger Outlet Mall.

Public Transportation: Valley Metro will offer extended service hours on routes to and from Glendale's Sports & Entertainment District on both game days (Jan. 25 and Feb. 1). For additional information, visit Valley Metro's website.

Tailgating: For the 2015 Pro Bowl, tailgating is only allowed on certain NFL controlled parking lots; refer to the 2015 Pro Bowl Pre-Game Tailgating document or www.superbowl.clickandpark.com/probowl for details. Tailgating is NOT permitted on Westgate or Tanger parking lots during the 2015 Pro Bowl. Tailgating is NOT permitted on ANY properties for Super Bowl XLIX.

Taxi Service: Taxis will be the only option for drop-off near the stadium. Taxis should enter the area from Glendale Avenue, south on 95th Avenue where they will be allowed to drop-off passengers and will be queued for pick-ups.

Shuttles and Private Driver Services: There is NO drop-off or pick-up location for shuttle operators or private driver services near the stadium. All vehicles with passengers (except for licensed taxis) entering the area MUST either have a parking pass or be prepared to pay for parking in one of the cash lots in order to access the area.

Traffic restrictions:

- NFL parking lots open at 10 a.m. (map attached)
- Westgate parking lots open at 7 a.m. (map)
- Road closure: 95th Avenue between Maryland Avenue & Bethany Home Rd
- Road closure: Eastbound Glendale Avenue from 99th to 95th avenues (6 – 10 p.m. following game)

Other traffic tips drivers should know?

- Arrive early and follow the directions on the back of your parking pass, which should hang from your rear view mirror.
- Do not use your GPS for parking routes.
- Follow all traffic signs. In some cases there are multiple turn lanes (dual rights or dual lefts) that will allow traffic to load and unload parking lots faster.
- Vehicles may be subject to search. Please plan accordingly.
- For up to date traffic information, visit www.az511.com or dial 511.
- Glendale provides real-time traffic information via Twitter – follow @GlendaleAZPD

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TAB 2: MEDIA STAGING AREA(S) CONSIDERATIONS

During a LSE, the news media's most basic needs are access to information and images. If the public information officer (PIO) can anticipate what the media will want, the PIO will have a better chance to manage the scene and help guide the story. Prior to establishing the location for this staging area, the PIO should consider the following questions:

- Does the staging area infringe on the LSE?
- Does the news media presence interfere with the work being done (e.g., LSE events, the public, security, cleanup, etc.)?
- Does the location of the staging area place the media in danger or will they be in a position to endanger others? What if an incident occurs subsequent to the LSE?
- Is the staging area convenient for you and the other PIOs?
- Will the reporters be too close? Will they have access to sensitive information?
- Will the staging area give reporters a clear line of sight to satellite or microwave towers?
- Can the media get images they want?
- How can you keep them at the staging area?

Media Access during an emergency incident

California Penal Code Section 409.5 permits access by accredited reporters to areas which are closed to the public during disasters. The California Peace Officers Association suggests that "In general, authorized members of the news media are to be permitted free movement in the area as long as they do not hamper, deter, or interfere with the law enforcement or public safety function."

There are two reasons for denying access to the media:

- Access would <u>clearly</u> interfere with emergency crews or equipment.
- Site is a crime scene.

If the Incident Commander determines that access restrictions for the media are unavoidable, a "pool" system may be established. Reporters already on-scene should be permitted to select one representative from each medium (radio, television, newspaper, wire service) and from each level of coverage (local, regional, national, and international) to be escorted into the area. Reporters will then share information, photos, and video/audio tape with other accredited reporters.

If access is denied or restricted, a complete explanation must be given.

"Safety is not a ground to exclude press members from a disaster site because the statute (409.5) provides a specific exception for members of the media in situations already determined be unsafe." *Leiserson vs. City of San Diego* (1988). However, the Incident Commander should warn the media of potential danger before providing access.

<u>Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR)</u>

Federal Aviation Administration Regulation 91.137 covers temporary flight restrictions during incidents/disasters and sets forth procedures which pilots of media and other aircraft must follow. Permission to fly over incident sites may be denied if such flights will pose a significant threat hazard to the general public.

TAB 3: REGIONAL PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEM COORDINATION CONFERENCE CALL AGENDA

Date: XXXXXX, XX, XXXX

Time: ____________

Conference Call Number: ______________________

Conference Code: ____________

****

Agenda

I. Roll Call of participating Operational Areas (starting with LSE hosting jurisdiction and then moving north to south)
   - Alameda County
   - Contra Costa County
   - Marin County
   - Monterey County
   - Napa County
   - San Benito County
   - City/County San Francisco
   - San Mateo County
   - Santa Clara County
   - Santa Cruz County
   - Solano County
   - Sonoma County
   - Any other jurisdictions impacted by the LSE

II. Regional JIS Coordinator provides the LSE initial information. In case of an incident or emergency at the LSE, the LSE PIO provides the current situation summary.

III. Provide situational awareness overview:
   - What do we know so far?
   - Who is serving in the regional JIC?
   - What is the media strategy?
   - What is the proposed holding statement?
   - What has been released so far?
   - Address rumor control, de-conflicting information, information dissemination mechanisms, message strategies, trending topics, and any media related issues.

IV. Discuss regional public information sharing priorities for current operational period.

V. Discuss planned media briefings in the region. Deconflict schedules as necessary.

VI. Discuss public information mutual aid needs/requests.

VII. Consider other public information needs for items discussed on call.

VIII. Discuss how to update/inform members of the regional JIS that were missing from the call.

IX. Identify time and conference call logistics for the next Regional Public Information Conference Call.

X. Remind PIOs to brief their senior officials/elected officials on the results of this call.

Tab 4: Regional JIC Supplies

The following supplies and equipment are suggested for supporting a physical JIC:

- Pens and pencils
- Note paper
- Telephone message NCR pads
- Sign-in sheets for personnel and media
- Check-in/Check-out log sheets
- Steno books
- Post-it pads
- Stapler and staples
- Staple remover
- Scissors
- Paper clips
- Tape dispenser and tape
- Tables/desks/chairs
- Rubber bands
- Clipboards
- Telephones/phone lines
- Telephone directory
- Cell phones and chargers
- Message boards
- Dry erase boards
- Dry erase markers and erasers
- Flip charts
- Maps
- Batteries (AA, D)
- Power strips with surge protectors
- Computer/laptop/tablets
- Printer/copy machine/fax/scanner
- Printer paper
- Printer cartridges
- Memory stick/flash drive
- Social media log ins
- Wi-Fi password
- Media contact list
- Department head contact list
- Press release templates
- AM/FM Radios
- Two-way radios
- Food and water

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Appendix G

LSE Planning Documentation

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In developing the materials that will support the various LSE management organizations, use of the ICS Incident Action Plan (IAP) forms can provide for an accessible and standardized approach to documenting key planning elements. Those forms are accessible at:

https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/icsforms.htm

However, as LSEs can present challenges and create organizational structures that ICS forms may not easily accommodate, simplified versions of the ICS forms may be useful. The EOC Action Plan on the following pages is one example of some of the approaches available in each jurisdiction. The key to effective documentation will be to agree upon which tools and forms each stakeholder agency will use for the LSE.

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EOC ACTION PLAN

JURISDICTION:

FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD: **FROM:** ***Date*** ***Time***	**TO:** ***Date*** ***Time***	**PREPARED:** ***Date*** ***Time***

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

OBJECTIVES should be stated in measurable terms to allow for evaluation of progress, such as incomplete, XX%, complete.
Each TASK assigned to Sections should address a specific OBJECTIVE.

WEATHER FORECAST FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD

SAFETY MESSAGE

ATTACHMENTS (CHECK IF ATTACHED)

❑ **Current Situation Report**	❑ **Task Assignments**	❑ **Traffic & Staging Area Map**
❑ ________________	❑ ________________	❑ ________________
❑ ________________	❑ ________________	❑ ________________

PREPARED BY (Planning Section Chief):	**Approved by (EOC Director):**

EOC SECTION TASKS	Jurisdiction:	Part A
For Operational Period from: *Date* *Time*	to: *Date* *Time*	

MANAGEMENT SECTION	Assigned To:

OPERATIONS SECTION	Assigned To:

EOC SECTION TASKS	Jurisdiction:	Part B
For Operational Period from: *Date* *Time* to: *Date* *Time*		

PLANNING SECTION	Assigned To:

LOGISTICS SECTION	Assigned To:

FINANCE SECTION	Assigned To:

EOC STAFFING LIST

Jurisdiction:

FOR OPERATIONAL PERIOD:
FROM: ***Date*** ***Time*** **TO:** ***Date*** ***Time***

PREPARED: ***Date*** ***Time***

MANAGEMENT STAFF	PLANNING SECTION
EOC Director	Planning Chief
EOC Coordinator/Liaison	Situation Analysis Unit Coordinator
Public Information Officer	Documentation Unit Coordinator
Safety/Security Officer	Advance Planning Unit Coordinator
Legal Officer	Demobilization Unit Coordinator
OPERATIONS SECTION	**LOGISTICS SECTION**
Operations Chief	Logistics Chief
Law Unit Coordinator	Communications Unit Coordinator
Fire/Rescue Unit Coordinator	RACES Operator
Medical Health Unit Coordinator	Personnel Unit Coordinator
Public Works Unit Coordinator	Supply Unit Coordinator
Care & Shelter Unit Coordinator	Transportation Unit Coordinator
	Facilities Unit Coordinator
	Resource Status Unit Coordinator
Agency Representatives	**FINANCE SECTION**
	Finance Chief
	Payables Unit Coordinator
	Time Keeping Unit Coordinator
	Prepared by:

❑ **If additional space is needed, check box and use reverse side of this sheet**

Appendix H

References/Bibliography, Abbreviations, Definitions

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAR	After Action Report
Cal OES	California Governor's Office of Emergency Services
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
DPW	Department of Public Works
EOD	Explosives Ordinance Disposal
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HazMat	Hazardous Materials
ICS	Incident Command System
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information System
LSE	Large Special Event
MAC	Multiagency Coordination
MACC	Multiagency Coordination Center
MACS	Multiagency Coordination System
NIMS	National Incident Management System
PIO	Public Information Officers
RECP	Regional Emergency Coordination Plan
REOC	Regional Emergency Operations Center
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
SOC	State Operations Center
TICP	Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan
UASI	Urban Areas Security Initiative
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue

DEFINITIONS

Assisting Agency – An agency directly contributing tactical or service resources to another agency.

Cooperating Agency – An agency supplying assistance other than direct tactical or support functions or resources to the incident control effort.

Coordination – The process of systematically analyzing a situation, developing relevant information, and informing appropriate command authority of viable alternatives for selection of the most effective combination of available resources to meet specific objectives. The coordination process (which can be either intra-or interagency) does not involve dispatch actions. However, personnel responsible for coordination may perform command or dispatch functions within the limits established by specific agency delegations, procedures, legal authority, etc. Multiagency or Interagency coordination is found at all SEMS levels.

Complex – Two or more individual incidents located in the same general area, which are assigned to a single Incident Commander or to a Unified Command.

Event – A planned, non-emergency activity. Incident Command System (ICS) can be used as the management system for a wide range of events, e.g., parades, concerts or sporting events.

Multiagency Coordination System (MACS) – The combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, procedures and communications integrated into a common system. When activated, MACS has the responsibility for coordination of assisting agency resources and support in a multiagency or multijurisdictional environment.

Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group. Typically, administrators/executives, or their appointed representatives, who are authorized to commit agency resources and funds, are brought together and form MAC Groups. MAC Groups may also be known as multiagency committees, or emergency management committees. A MAC Group can provide coordinated decision-making and resource allocation and often functions as the most visible element of a MACS.

Multiagency Incident – An incident where one or more agencies assist a jurisdictional agency or agencies. The incident may be managed under single or Unified Command.

Multijurisdictional Incident – An incident requiring action from multiple agencies that have a statutory responsibility for incident mitigation. In ICS these incidents will be managed under Unified Command.

Special Event – A non-routine activity within a community that brings together a large number of people. Emphasis is not placed on the total number of people attending but rather the impact on the community's ability to respond to a large-scale emergency or disaster or the exceptional demands that the activity places on response services. A community's special event requires additional planning, preparedness, and mitigation efforts of local emergency response and public safety agencies.

Unified Area Command – A Unified Area Command is established when incidents under an Area Command are multijurisdictional (See Area Command and Unified Command).

Unified Command – In ICS, Unified Command is a unified team effort which allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident, either geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or abdicating agency authority, responsibility or accountability.

[Insert the name of the LSE]

CONOPS

(Concept of Operations)

Administrative and Handling Instructions

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How to Use This Document

[This section has been provided for instructional guidance. This entire section should be removed prior to finalizing the Large Special Event (LSE) CONOPS.]

The Large Special Event (LSE) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Template provides a standard format for creating and/or customizing an LSE CONOPS. While much of this template is in a fill-in-the-blank format, some of the regional components are static and reflect regional guidelines, procedures, or structure. Please note that not all parts of the template may be relevant for every LSE.

This template is non-technical and should be tailored to the LSE audience(s) and event(s). All text can be edited and each section is formatted in the following manner:

- Text that is *italicized and in blue* contains instructional information and a description of the intent of that section. This text should be removed or modified as appropriate prior to releasing the final LSE CONOPS.
- Text that is introduced by "*Example*" and that is italicized provides examples of LSE language and content. This text should be reviewed carefully and modified as appropriate or removed prior to releasing a final LSE CONOPS.
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Template Instructions

The *blue italicized text* and text that is in blue and **[bold brackets]** throughout this template is provided solely as background information to assist you in creating this document.

- Delete all *italicized* text and fill in any **[bold brackets]** prior to finalizing this document. Only your LSE specific information should appear in the final version of this document.
- Delete the "How to Use this Document" section prior to finalizing the LSE CONOPS.
- Delete all "*Example*" text or modify it for your specific LSE CONOPS prior to finalizing this document.
- Customize the cover page with the host jurisdiction Agency/Organization name, CONOPS title and LSE picture(s). Remove the generic template information. To add the cover page photo:
  - Click on the top-left corner of the template.
  - Choose to upload a photo from your computer or USB.
  - Choose the photo you would like to use for the cover page.
  - Click the photo and drag it up or down to reposition it.
- Customize the headers and footers throughout the document with the specific title and date of the subject of the LSE.
- Exhibit 3-1, the LSE Organization Chart, may be revised and edited using MS Visio.

Formatting Tips

Remove Hidden Formatting

It is very helpful if you turn on the hidden formatting options while applying formatting to your document. From the Home ribbon, select the paragraph symbol (see picture below). This is a toggle button. Simply select it again to return the formatting to invisible. The button will appear in yellow when the feature is turned on.



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After you have made ALL changes to your document, use your cursor to highlight the table of contents, right click your mouse, and select Update Field, and then Update Entire Table. By selecting to update the entire table, your title and page numbers will correspond with the information in your document.



You can move or add headings via the Navigation Pane under View. To add, right click on the heading before where you want the new one and select ‘New Heading After’.

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Foreword

[The foreword should be written from the LSE host jurisdiction. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

Special events can consist of festivals, fairs, awards ceremonies, concerts, major sporting events, political conventions or gatherings, etc. Special events can range in size and scope but typically place a strain on community resources. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines a special event as a non-routine activity within a community that brings together a large number of people.

This Large Special Event (LSE) Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for **[Insert the name of the LSE]** was created by the **[Insert name of the jurisdiction]** at the direction of its Executive Board and through funding from **[Insert the name of the funding mechanism]**.

The intended audience of this document includes: local, State, Federal, and tribal public safety professionals; NGO's and private-sector agencies providing **[Insert the name of the LSE]** support; and any other agencies or organizations supporting, or potentially impacted by this LSE.

References used during the planning process include:

- **[Insert the name of the jurisdiction]** Emergency Operations Plan
- San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and Annexes
- Bay Area Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)
- **[Insert name of the jurisdiction]** Hazard Mitigation Plan
- San Francisco Bay Area Earthquake Concept of Operations Plan
- San Francisco Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation/Evacuation Plan
- San Francisco Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Care and Shelter Plan
- **[Insert appropriate guidance, policy, plan, or procedure reference]**
- **[Insert appropriate guidance, policy, plan, or procedure reference]**

This document is intended to assist the **[Insert name of jurisdiction]** and their partners in planning for and supporting a more feasible and seamless LSE using principles and concepts contained in the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), National Incident Management System (NIMS), FEMA "Whole Community" approach, the Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance 101 (CPG 101), and lessons learned in actual large special events.

Nothing in the document alters or impedes the ability of Bay Area local, State, Federal, territorial, and/or tribal Nation partners to carry out their specific authorities or perform their responsibilities under applicable laws, executive orders, and directives. The **[Insert name of the LSE]** CONOPS is not intended to alter the existing authorities of individual municipal or county agencies and it does not convey new authorities upon anyone, including local, State, or Federal officials.

Record of Distribution

The record of distribution indicates the title and the name of the person receiving the plan, the agency to which the recipient belongs, the date of delivery, and the number of copies delivered. The record of distribution is used to prove that tasked individuals and organizations have acknowledged their receipt, review, and/or acceptance of the plan[1]. Exhibit 1: Record of Distribution lists the stakeholders that have received this document.

Exhibit 1: Record of Distribution

Department	Name of Recipient	Title of Recipient	Format (Electronic or Hard Copy)	Date Received

[1] Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0, November 2010.

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List of Appendices

List of Exhibits

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1.0 Introduction

[This section should explain how and why the document was developed, some key definitions that are used throughout the LSE CONOPS, and how the document is intended to be used. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

The **[insert name of LSE]** CONOPS describes the flow of the operational strategy for accomplishing the mission and objectives of the **[insert name of LSE]** in order to reach the desired end-state. It identifies special coordination structures, specialized response teams or resources needed, and other considerations unique to the **[insert name of LSE]**. The goal of this CONOPS is to ensure that the **[insert name of LSE]** partners adequately understand their roles in providing for the public's safety and response to any threats or hazards during the **[insert name of LSE]**. There are six sections in this CONOPS and each section may be supported by an Appendix:

Section 1:	Introduction
Section 2:	Intent of the Operations
Section 3:	Operational Framework
Section 4:	Essential Elements of Information
Section 5:	Transition to Emergency Response Operations
Section 6:	Demobilization

1.1 Purpose

[The purpose statement explains the rationale for developing the LSE CONOPS. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

The **[insert name of LSE]** CONOPS defines the operational structure and responsibilities and provides procedures designed to document the actions needed during the **[insert name of LSE]** and to quickly and efficiently respond in order to prevent or minimize any loss of life or property.

The purpose of this **[insert name of LSE]** CONOPS is to safeguard the lives and reduce the damage to the property of audience, participants, and local citizens during **[insert name of LSE]** in the event of a major emergency.

1.2 Scope

[The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

This CONOPS outlines key roles, responsibilities, procedures and resources of **[insert name of jurisdiction]** and allied stakeholders that are tasked with providing support to the operational elements for the **[insert LSE name]**. This CONOPS is intended to support, not replace, existing emergency operation plans and does not replace or modify the need for individual agencies to coordinate appropriately with the **[insert name of jurisdiction]**'s operational structure. This CONOPS has been customized to fit this particular LSE. The CONOPS may be expanded and extended to support the LSE if it is named as a National Special Security Event (NSSE).

2.0 Intent of the Operation

[The desired end state] *describes what the situation will look like if all of the objectives are met and the response efforts are successful. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]*

Desired End State: The **[insert name of jurisdiction]** and allied stakeholders successfully provide an enhanced readiness posture for the **[insert name of LSE]** to ensure timely, coordinated response and management of incident consequences, including efforts to protect health and safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to impacted residents, visitors and vulnerable Access and Functional Needs (AFN) populations.

2.1 Mission

[The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

[Insert name of jurisdiction] and allied stakeholders will develop a unified, coordinated organizational structure, establish communications, pre-position resources, and monitor threats and hazards during the **[insert name of LSE]** to ensure a prompt and coordinated response structure to restore essential services and provide emergency response services to anyone affected by an emergency leading up to, during, or directly after the event.

2.2 Objectives

[This section should list the established objectives for the LSE. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

[Insert name of the host jurisdiction] and allied stakeholders have developed the following objectives to support the **[insert name of LSE].** These objectives reflect the anticipated operations during the **[insert name of LSE]** and support the coordinated response by all agencies involved.

Objective 1:	Develop and maintain situational awareness of event activities and monitor potential threats.
Objective 2:	Provide for the safety of all event responders and staff.
Objective 3:	Assure the security of all event participants through a coordinated and well-communicated law enforcement plan.
Objective 4:	Assure the rescue, treatment, and transportation of all patients within the response footprint.
Objective 5:	Integrate voice and data interoperable communications to support event operations and potential incident response.
Objective 6:	Identify any LSE-related events – sanctioned and unsanctioned.
Objective 7:	Keep public informed of LSE-related operations and activities.
Objective 9:	**[insert LSE objective]**

Objective 10: **[insert LSE objective]**
Objective 11: **[insert LSE objective]**

3.0 Operational Framework

*[The proper mix of participants in your organizational structure will depend on the **location** of the LSE, which determines the jurisdictions that must be involved and the **type** of LSE, which dictates the functional agencies of the involved jurisdiction(s), as well as other associated agencies. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]*

This **[insert name of LSE]** will be executed through a unified command model that includes representatives of participating Bay Area local, state, and federal agencies that have responsibilities to support the **[insert name of LSE]**. Initially, the LSE Unified Command may be able to provide all needed multiagency coordination for the LSE. However, as the event grows in size, complexity, duration or importance, offsite support and coordination may be required.

3.1 Organizational Structure

The command structure will follow the Standard Emergency Management System (SEMS) and utilize the Incident Command System (ICS). The **[insert name of LSE]** Unified Command includes a single, integrated incident organization; collocated facilities; a single planning process and IAP; shared planning, logistical, and finance sections; and unified resource ordering.

In ICS Unified Command, after the objectives, strategies, and interagency agreements are decided, the Operations Section Chief is designated to develop tactical action plans and to direct tactical operations. In ICS Unified Command, resources remain under the administrative and policy control of their agencies. However, they respond operationally to mission assignment under the coordination and direction of the Operations Section Chief, depending upon the requirements of the action plan. See Exhibit 3-1 for the **[insert name of LSE]** management organization.

The **[insert name of LSE]** Unified Command (UC) will facilitate the multiagency coordination for planning and execution of the LSE. The **[insert name of LSE]** UC is organized according to the Incident Command System (ICS) and SEMS.

Summary of Key Organization Positions and Responsibilities for [Insert name of LSE]

See Section 3.3 (Roles and Responsibilities) for detailed position responsibilities

[Insert name of LSE] Unified Command

- Approves LSE objectives
- Approves the Incident Action Plan (IAP)
- Convenes briefings and other interagency meetings
- Signs off on mission tasking of participating agencies
- Is responsible for allocation of resources and the response strategy

[Insert name of LSE] **Public Information Officer (PIO):** Coordinates, gathers, verifies and disseminates information regarding the event. The PIO will work with the UC to review and approve messages before they are disseminated to the public.

[Insert name of LSE] **Safety Officer:** Monitors LSE preparedness and response activities and takes steps to maintain a safe work environment.

[Insert name of LSE] **Liaison Officer:** Provides coordination among agency representatives and ensures that adequate support is provided to them.

[Insert name of LSE] **Agency Representatives:** Representatives from federal and state agencies, non-governmental organizations, private companies, and other organizations, who may provide liaisons to facilitate communication between the LSE UC and their respective organizations.

[Insert name of LSE] Planning/Intelligence Section

The LSE Planning/Intelligence Section is responsible for:

- Collecting and analyzing information for potential threats
- Producing and distributing intelligence that informs the planning process and ultimately determines the organizational level's response strategy
- Managing the action planning process.

Units within **[insert name of LSE]** Planning/Intelligence include the following.

- **[Insert name of LSE]** Situation Status and Analysis Unit:
  - Collects, evaluates, and disseminates information
  - Manages the action planning process, develops the action plan in coordination with other functions, and develops the LSE situation report
- **[Insert name of LSE]** Advance Planning Unit:
  - Identifies situations that may affect **[insert name of LSE]** operations beyond the current operational period
  - Develops the advance planning report
- **[Insert name of LSE]** Documentation Unit:
  - Compiles records and data pertaining to an event from all sections of the **[insert name of LSE]** UC
- **[Insert name of LSE]** GIS Unit:
  - Compiles threat and hazard data from various sources, including FEMA's HAZUS loss estimation model, local government, Operational Area EOCs, state agencies such as Caltrans and CAL FIRE, and Federal agencies such as the U.S. Geological Survey and FEMA
  - Compiles incident-specific information, such as location, and quantity of factors, such as road closures
  - Prepares maps and analytical tools for decision making
- Technical Specialists:

- Provide specialized skills and knowledge relevant to a critical aspect of the LSE
- May include specialists in law enforcement; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threat detection, cyber security, trademark infringement, and other areas of expertise May be federal or state agency employees, although they may be from Operational Areas or local governments
- May participate in the action planning process, provide technical assistance to Operational Areas, help make resource allocation decisions, and staff task forces

[Insert name of LSE] Operations Section

The **[insert name of LSE]** Operations Section is responsible for coordinating and supporting all jurisdictional operations in support of the **[insert name of LSE]**. The Section is staffed with the following positions.

- Operations Section Chief: Responsible for coordinating the activities of various functional branches, when activated.
- Branch Directors: Responsible for providing support to their corresponding branch. Also responsible for providing branch reports to the **[insert name of LSE]** Operations Section Chief that detail status, priorities, and resource needs, and for representing the particular discipline in section meetings.
- Mission Coordinators: The **[insert name of LSE]** Operations Section Chief may request additional staff to assist the Branch Directors and unit leaders to coordinate mission tasks. Those staff may be assigned to individual branches or units within the Operations Section, or may report directly to the LSE Operations Chief or Deputy Operations Chief, if one is assigned.
- Fire and Rescue Branch:
  - Monitors fire mutual aid activities
  - Serves as liaison to the Region II Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid Coordinator, CAL FIRE and Operational Area fire branches
  - Provides support to Urban Search and Rescue efforts
  - During LSE events where fire and rescue resources are needed, conveys resource allocation requests and any other information through the Branch Director to the Region II Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid Coordinator, who then makes resource allocation decisions accordingly
  - May activate additional units, depending on the type of event, to include Urban Search and Rescue, hazardous materials, and/or Emergency Medical Services
- Law Enforcement Branch:
  - Coordinates and monitors law enforcement activities
  - Serves as a liaison to state and federal law enforcement agencies.
  - May activate additional units, depending on the type of event, to include coroner, search and rescue, terrorism, and/or waterborne
- Medical and Health Services Branch:
  - Serves as liaison to the Regional Disaster Medical Health Coordinator

  - Convenes medical health operational area coordinators, the Public Health Officer, and other regional decision makers for regional medical health decision-making conference calls
  - During regional multidisciplinary events, the Branch Director works with other disciplines in the LSE Operations Section and/or the Regional Coordination Group to coordinate regional resource allocation decisions
- Construction and Engineering Branch:
  - Provides construction and engineering support to the affected Operational Areas during an emergency event
- Transportation Branch:
  - Coordinates requests for transportation resources
  - Monitors the status of critical transportation infrastructure and provides information to the Section Chief on damage, inaccessible routes and/or inoperable systems, and projected restoration timelines
  - Coordinates with the LSE Operations Section Chief through the Branch Director to mission task state agencies and/or elevate requests to the SOC
- Utilities Branch:
  - Coordinates information and resources for utility providers, including water, wastewater, power, and telecommunications
  - Provides information to the Operations Section Chief on service loss, projected restoration timelines, and resource needs
  - Coordinates with other branch directors to provide utilities access to critical infrastructure
  - Coordinates the provision of assistance through the Water Area Response Network mutual assistance to support restoration of services
- Hazardous Materials Branch/Unit:
  - Coordinates and monitors hazardous materials incidents, as well as the provision of resources for response to such incidents, including CBRNE incidents

[Insert name of LSE] Logistics Section

The Logistics Section coordinates the provision of resources and tracking requests that are not handled by the **[insert name of LSE]** Operations Branches. In addition to the Section Chief, the following branches may be activated (see the RECP Logistics Subsidiary Plan for more information).

- Information Systems and Communications: Coordinates all aspects of telecommunications to include computer systems, telephones, radios, fax, and satellite communications.
- Facilities: Responsible for ensuring that the **[insert name of LSE]** and all supporting facilities are completely operational with required supporting infrastructure.
- Personnel: Coordinates the provision of staff from local, state, and federal agencies and develops a staffing plan and shift assignments (in coordination with the **[insert name of**

LSE] UC). Arranges for travel and lodging for staff from other areas. The Logistics Section Chief may also activate a Check-In Unit to record the position, shift, and the time-in/time-out of all staff assigned to the LSE.

- Procurement: Procures goods and services to support emergency operations.

[Insert name of LSE] Finance/Administration Section

The Finance/Administration Section is responsible for financial activities and EOC administrative functions. Units that may be activated within the Finance/Administration Section include a:

- Time Unit, which ensures that employees maintain and submit accurate records of their time and expenses
- Cost Accounting Unit, which maintains records of costs associated with response activities.
- Finance and administrative functions may be managed from the SOC.

Exhibit 3-1: [Insert name of LSE] Organization Chart



3.2 Regional Coordination

[Regional coordination describes how the Bay Area stakeholders will collaborate at the regional level for the planning and execution of an LSE. Inter-jurisdictional collaboration creates a forum for the Bay Area stakeholders to engage in collaborative decision-making, build rapport, solve problems related to issues of mutual concern, and engage in information and resource sharing. Regional Coordination Reference: San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan, Base Plan, October 2007.]

Due to the complex nature of **[insert name of LSE]**, the additional resource demands that the **[insert name of LSE]** places on **[insert name of host jurisdiction]**, and the impact on the region, engaging in collaborative partnerships within the Bay Area is an essential part of this **[insert name of LSE]** CONOPS. This **[insert name of LSE]** CONOPS does not supersede or exclude any existing plans or procedures; rather, it augments relevant plans in the context of the **[insert name of LSE]** within the region.

Notably, transportation planning and management especially has to be coordinated regionally. The large movement of visitors to/from the **[insert name of LSE]**, the number of transit and transportation systems that span multiple jurisdictions as well as the interrelationship among these systems all require a significant regional focus and partnership. Refer also to the Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan (RECP) and supporting plans (ex. Transportation Subsidiary Plan).

3.3 Roles and Responsibilities

[Roles and responsibilities includes the agencies and personnel that will serve in the organizational structure for the LSE. The organization chart below is only a recommendation of potential positions. The chart should be adjusted to reflect the positions filled to support the LSE and completed to the extent possible to ensure that all participating agencies are aware of the role they will be filling. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

To support the **[insert name of LSE]**, the following roles and responsibilities listed in Exhibit 3-2 are fundamental for maintaining successful operations. These are the baseline roles and should not be considered the only responsibilities of the listed positions.

Exhibit 3-2: Roles and Responsibilities

[Insert name of LSE] Unified Command	
Agency	Roles and Responsibilities
Unified Command	☐ Liaison with event representatives. ☐ Ensure that all appropriate pre-event risk analyses, plans, checklists, and forms are completed and available to event personnel. ☐ Develop the mission, objectives, strategies, and command structure for the event. ☐ Establish immediate priorities.

	☐ Establish an appropriately located event Incident Command Post (ICP). ☐ Develop an effective Operational Period schedule, including the contingency of extended operations. ☐ Ensure that planning meetings are scheduled as required. ☐ Approve and authorize the implementation of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for each Operational Period. ☐ Coordinate activity for all Command and General Staff. ☐ Approve requests for additional resources or for the release of resources. ☐ Approve or disapprove the use of trainees, volunteers, and auxiliary personnel. ☐ Approve the demobilization of the event/incident when appropriate. ☐ Authorize information to be released to the media. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Public Information Officer	☐ Develop public information messages needed for the event. ☐ Coordinate with the Unified Command for approval of messages to the public. ☐ Coordinate release of information to the news media. ☐ Address inquiries from the news media. ☐ Monitor news and social media coverage of the event and make efforts to correct any inaccuracies. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Safety Officer	☐ Identify any hazardous conditions. ☐ Create a safety plan. ☐ Ensure safety messages are developed. ☐ Ensure safety briefings are conducted. ☐ Initiate investigations of accidents. ☐ Stop unsafe operations and practices when necessary. ☐ Ensure that adequate safety measures are in place. ☐ Review the IAP for safety considerations. ☐ Review and approve the medical plan. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Liaison Officer	☐ Be the point of contact for key agencies and organizations. ☐ Maintain a list of key contacts for agencies and organizations involved in planning and execution of the LSE. ☐ Monitor operations for any interagency issues. ☐ Keep agency administrators informed of event status. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]

Planning Section Chief	☐ Collect and process situation information about the event. ☐ Establish information requirements and reporting schedules for Planning Section units (Resources and Situation Units). ☐ Supervise preparation of the IAP. ☐ Provide input to the Incident Commander and Operations Section Chief in preparing the IAP. ☐ Establish special information collection activities (for example, weather, environmental, and toxic substances) as necessary. ☐ Compile and display event status information. ☐ Report any significant changes in the status of the event. ☐ Assemble information on alternative strategies. ☐ Provide periodic predictions on event/incident potential. ☐ Coordinate with local, regional, and state transit and transportation agencies to develop and monitor transit operations that support and accommodate LSE-related missions. ☐ Determine the need for any specialized resources in support of the event. ☐ Reassign out-of-service personnel already onsite to ICS organizational positions, as appropriate. ☐ Oversee preparation of event/incident demobilization plan. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Logistics Section Chief	☐ Manage all event command infrastructure logistics. ☐ Provide logistical input to the Incident Commander in preparing the IAP. ☐ Brief Branch Directors and Unit Leaders, as needed. ☐ Identify anticipated and known event service and support requirements. ☐ Request additional resources, as needed. ☐ Review and provide input to the Communications, Medical and Traffic Plans. ☐ Coordinate with regional transit providers and the MTC. ☐ Supervise requests for additional resources. ☐ Oversee demobilization of Logistics Section. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Finance/Admin Section Chief	☐ Manage all financial aspects of an event's command infrastructure. ☐ Provide financial and cost analysis information, as requested. ☐ Gather pertinent information from briefings with responsible agencies. ☐ Develop an operating plan for the Finance/Administration Section to fill supply and support needs. ☐ Determine the need to set up and operate an event/incident commissary. ☐ Meet with assisting and cooperating agency representatives as needed. ☐ Maintain daily contact with agency administrative headquarters on Financial/Administration matters.

	☐ Ensure that all personnel time records are accurately completed and transmitted to home agencies, according to policy. ☐ Provide financial input to demobilization planning. ☐ Ensure that all obligation documents initiated at the event/incident are properly prepared and completed. ☐ Brief agency administrative personnel on all event/incident-related financial matters needing attention or follow-up. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Operations Section Chief	☐ Develop tactical action plans and direct tactical operations. ☐ Manage tactical operations. ☐ Interact with the next lower level of the Operations Section (Branch, ☐ Division/Group) to develop the operations portions of the IAP. ☐ Request resources needed to implement the Operation's tactics as a part of the IAP development. ☐ Assist in developing the operations portion of the IAP. ☐ Supervise the execution of the IAP for Operations. ☐ Maintain close contact with subordinate positions, and ☐ Ensure safe tactical operations. ☐ Request additional resources to support tactical operations. ☐ Approve release of resources from assigned status (not released from the event/incident). ☐ Make or approve expedient changes to the IAP during the operational period as necessary. ☐ Maintain close communication with the UC. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Operations Section – Emergency Response Branch	☐ Assess the situation. ☐ Determine whether human life is at immediate risk. ☐ Establish the immediate priorities and objectives. ☐ Determine if there are adequate and appropriate resources on-scene or ordered. ☐ Establish an appropriately located on-scene Incident Command Post (ICP), if needed. ☐ Establish an appropriate initial response structure, if needed. ☐ Develop an action plan. ☐ Ensure that adequate safety measures are in place. ☐ Consider whether the span of control is approaching, or will soon approach, practical limits, taking into account the safety of all personnel. ☐ Determine whether there are any environmental concerns that must be considered. ☐ Review and modify objectives and adjust the action plan as necessary. ☐ Approve requests for additional resources or for the release of resources. ☐ Keep the Planning Section Chief informed of incident status.

	☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Operations Section – Law Enforcement Branch	☐ Coordinate crowd management, including measures to prevent crushing. ☐ Control of access to stage or performance areas. ☐ Conduct security control at entrances and exits. ☐ Patrol to minimize risk of fire. ☐ Manage vehicle traffic and marshaling. ☐ Conduct searches for drugs, alcohol, and weapons as needed. ☐ Coordinate security for large sums of money and confiscated goods. ☐ Provide assistance for emergency services, as needed. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]

Supporting Entities	
Agency	Roles and Responsibilities
Example: City of Santa Clara	*Santa Clara is the host jurisdiction for all* ***[insert name of LSE]*** *activities occurring within their city limits. Santa Clara will operate a Unified Command in accordance with the National Incident Management System, including the Secret Service (USSS) as the Federal Agency responsible for security at this National Special Security Event (NSSE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead Federal agency for collecting intelligence.*
Example: City of San Jose	*Example: San Jose Horse Mounted Unit will assist in crowd control, VIP protection, patrol, and public relations at Levi's Stadium.*
Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC)	☐ Provide criminal intelligence to the Unified Command leading up to and during the event. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Operational Area	☐ Coordinate planning for the LSE. ☐ Activate the Operational Area EOC and emergency operations plans as needed. ☐ Establish and maintain communications with the REOC, local EOCs, county Department Operations Centers (DOCs), region, state and federal agencies involved in planning and execution of the LSE. ☐ Coordinate local resources for the LSE. ☐ Maintain situational awareness within the Operational Area by verifying and aggregating local government situation assessments, discipline-specific status updates, and data from sources outside the Operational Area. ☐ Participate in Regional Coordination Group conference calls to provide input to regional resource allocation and other decisions. ☐ Request resources through mutual aid and the state as necessary.

	☐ Coordinate with planning and response partners in the development and dissemination of public information messages regarding the LSE. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Adjacent Operational Area	☐ Participate in Regional Coordination Group conference calls to provide input to regional resource allocation and other decisions. ☐ Request resources through mutual aid and the state as necessary. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Non-Adjacent Operational Area	☐ Participate in Regional Coordination Group conference calls to provide input to regional resource allocation and other decisions. ☐ Request resources through mutual aid and the state as necessary. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
California OES Coastal Region/Mutual Aid Region II	☐ Establish communication with Operational Area EOCs and the SOC ☐ Develop and distribute regional situation reports to Operational Areas within the region and to the SOC ☐ Allocate and track resources in response to requests from Operational Areas. • Forward the requests to discipline-specific Mutual Aid Coordinators • Forward the requests to the SOC if the request cannot be filled quickly within the region • Mission-task state agencies in the region to provide resources • Coordinate the activities of the Operational Areas in situations in which the actions of an individual Operational Area may affect other Operational Areas (for example, an evacuation) • Convene the Regional Coordination Group • Convene task forces to address specific regional emergency response activities (for example, transportation, evacuation or recovery) ☐ Track the progress of resource requests and mission tasks. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
California Office of Emergency Services (OES)	☐ Serve as a link between the Governor, state agencies, and local governments ☐ Coordinate with the Operational Area in managing public information functions, and providing the public with information about the LSE. ☐ Fill requests for resources from the REOC by: • Broker the provision of mutual aid resources from other regions • Request Federal resources • Request National Guard assets. • Manage the allocation of all state airborne resources

	☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
California Highway Patrol (CHP)	☐ In coordination with the LSE Traffic Plan, support traffic management. ☐ Integrate and de-conflict traffic management plans of jurisdictions across the Bay Area ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP)	☐ Scan cargo entering the venue for contraband (e.g. narcotics, explosives, weapons) ☐ Assist in providing airspace security around the venue. ☐ Monitor vendors for counterfeit items. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
DHS FEMA Region IX	☐ Assist in the coordination of DHS assets and personnel deployed to assist in preparing for and conducting the LSE (e.g. bomb detection, biological threat detection, radiological and nuclear threat detection devices) ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
DHS US Secret Service	☐ Conduct threat and risk assessments. ☐ Provide intelligence in regards to threats against public officials. ☐ Monitor social media. ☐ Conduct cyber security assessments. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
DOJ Federal Bureau of Investigation	☐ Conduct threat and risk assessments. ☐ Provide intelligence. ☐ Provide security resources. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
DOJ U.S. Marshal's Office	☐ Assist in coordinating law enforcement resources. ☐ Provide security resources. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Federal Aviation Administration	☐ Organize flights to ensure air control systems are not over-taxed. ☐ Establish temporary flight restrictions as needed for LSE security. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	☐ Monitor vendors for counterfeit merchandise and tickets. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]

National Weather Service	☐ Provide onsite and/or customized weather forecast support for the LSE. ☐ Consult with the NWS Space Weather Prediction Center on the potential for solar flares to interrupt radio transmissions. ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities] ☐ [Insert additional responsibilities]

Exhibit 3-2 provides a form to record details regarding the location, operation and point of contact for any Incident Command Posts (ICPs), Department Operations Centers (DOCs), Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) or Multiagency Coordination Centers (MACCs) that may be used during **[insert name of LSE]**.

Exhibit 3-3: [insert name of LSE] Management Centers

ICPs / DOCs / EOCs / MACCs			
Site	Address	Hours of Operation	Contact Information

4.0 Execution

[The execution section should address the operational periods, essential elements of information, and key decisions that will be made during the event. It should explain the "how" of the LSE operations. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

Regardless of the size or complexity of the **[insert name of LSE]**, the IC/UC is responsible for both mission execution and public perception to achieve a successful event and emergency response (if necessary). Successful mission execution may not equate to a successful response operation if the IC/UC fail to properly manage public perceptions of the response – before, during, and after operations.

This **[insert name of LSE]** will be executed by coordinated operational management during the actual event. This phase begins **[insert date of execution starting point]**, which is just before spectators, officials, crowds, media, and others begin to assemble at the event sites.

4.1 Operational Periods

*[The operational period(s) required to support the **[insert name of LSE]** are determined by the scope and duration of the **[insert name of LSE]** itself. Many events will be able to be handled within a single operational period while others will need to be sustained over multiple operational periods. While the language and schedule below reflect a 24 hour operation, they should be modified to fit the demands of the LSE.]*

At the start of **[insert name of LSE]** operations, the command structure will define the shift start time for the upcoming shift and may make adjustments to the timeline throughout duration of event operations. Generally, the **[insert name of LSE]** operational periods are 12-hour shifts. The schedule below outlines the necessary staff meetings, planning meetings, and operations meetings to support 24-hour functionality and ensure that the jurisdiction is prepared for the upcoming 12 hour operations period. Exhibit 4-1: **[insert name of LSE]** Operational Rhythm provides the activity, time, and outside requirements to maintain the operational rhythm

[Modify times/activities/details as needed.]

Exhibit 4-1: [Insert name of LSE] Operational Rhythm

Day Shift Times	Activity	Night Shift Times
0800	Meal Command & General Staff Meeting	2000
0900		2100
1000		2200
1100		2300

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Day Shift Times</th><th>Activity</th><th colspan="2">Night Shift Times</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">1200</td><td>1200</td><td>Meal</td><td>0000</td><td rowspan="2">0000</td></tr>
<tr><td>1230</td><td></td><td>0030</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1300</td><td></td><td colspan="2">0100</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1400</td><td></td><td colspan="2">0200</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1500</td><td>Planning Meeting</td><td colspan="2">0300</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1600</td><td>Develop Incident Action Plan and Situation Report</td><td colspan="2">0400</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1700</td><td>Approve Incident Action Plan</td><td colspan="2">0500</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">1800</td><td>1800</td><td>Prepare Operations Brief
Meal</td><td>0600</td><td rowspan="2">0600</td></tr>
<tr><td>1830</td><td>Begin Shift Turnover</td><td>0630</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">1900</td><td>Shift Change
Operations Briefing</td><td colspan="2">0700</td></tr>
</table>

Planning Cycle

The purpose of the planning cycle is to establish the objectives and response plan for the upcoming operational period. The product of the planning cycle is, at a minimum, an updated Situation Report and an Incident Command System (ICS) 201 Incident Briefing form. The Incident Commander may elect to develop a more comprehensive Incident Action Plan using additional ICS forms, based on the needs of the **[insert name of LSE]**. The **[insert name of LSE]** CONOPS uses the planning cycle to establish the operational cadence with the various entities supporting the **[insert name of LSE]**. Additionally, by using the planning cycle from the start of the **[insert name of LSE]**, the organizational structure and rhythm is already in place if an emergency occurs during the **[insert name of LSE]**.

At the beginning of the **[insert name of LSE]** and then again at the beginning of each operational period, the Incident Commander will determine which briefings and meetings are necessary and update the **[insert name of LSE]** Operational Rhythm accordingly.

4.2 Key Decisions

[Exhibit 4-2 should be completed during the CONOPS development to outline the key issues that may be experienced during the LSE. Each issue should be addressed and provided with key evaluation points, emergency actions to mitigate the issue, the equipment and resources necessary to address the issue, and what entity/entities should be notified. The chart should consider issues that would bring immediate closure of the event, issues that would bring a temporary stop to the LSE, and issues that could be easily mitigated and not require an impact to

the LSE operations. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

The IC/UC will need to make key decisions in a timely manner if an emergency incident occurs during the LSE. Exhibit 4-2 lists the means of evaluating the situation and provides guidance for making the necessary key decisions. For each issue, if the criteria listed in the 'How to Evaluate' is true, then the IC/UC should consider taking the Emergency Action.

Exhibit 4-2: Key Decisions

Issue	How to Evaluate	Emergency Action	Required Equipment and Resources	Notification
Example: MCI	*Number of injured requiring treatment is greater than 5; cause is known/assumed to be non-criminal*	*Suspend/stop event and/or evacuate immediate area; maintain access points and routes for EMS personnel.*	*Fire, EMS, Law Enforcement, reserve Fire, EMS resources*	*On-site personnel; MHOAC, local trauma centers, Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, EOC*
Availability of first responders is too low	Availability of first responders and resources falls below 80% or personnel have extended past the operational period; Reserve assets have been deployed	Request reserve or mutual aid assets to supplement or replace existing staff and resources.	Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, Traffic Control	On-site personnel, Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, EOC
Current Incident Management capabilities are insufficient	Existing IC/UC organization is not able to adequately manage or support incident-driven operations, planning or logistics functions	Consider augmenting current organization or implementing alternate incident management structure.	Incident management staff, communications, expanded or separate ICP, staging	On-site personnel, Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, EOC, Region II mutual aid coordinators
Status of food, water, shelter, power, and communications is compromised	LSE is impacted by loss or disruption in infrastructure or utility systems; public safety protections including security, warning, evacuation, fire suppression, or public health controls are compromised; Identify potential secondary threats	Completely or partially suspend/stop event; Provide alternate resources/systems; Request reserve or mutual aid assets to supplement existing resources.	Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, Traffic Control, Communications, Public Health	On-site personnel, Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, Fire Marshal, EOC, Region II mutual aid coordinators
Critical resource gaps, unmet	Public safety response is prevented/ disrupted/delayed by lack of resources;	Completely or partially suspend or stop event;	Law Enforcement,	On-site personnel,

Issue	How to Evaluate	Emergency Action	Required Equipment and Resources	Notification
needs, and medical shortfalls	EMS response times fall below host jurisdiction target; Personnel report inability to accomplish assigned missions/tasks.	Request reserve or mutual aid assets to supplement existing resources.	Fire, EMS, Traffic Control, Communications	Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, EOC, Region II mutual aid coordinators
Availability of reserve personnel is too low	Availability of reserve personnel falls below 50% or personnel have extended past the operational period.	Request additional reserve or mutual aid assets to supplement or replace reserve personnel.	Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, Traffic Control	On-site personnel, Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, EOC
Major health concerns and estimates	Public or first responder safety is impacted or endangered by public health threat severity or frequency exceeding hosting jurisdiction acceptable risk levels; Public health controls are compromised or insufficient.	Completely or partially suspend/stop event; Provide alternate resources/systems; Request reserve or mutual aid assets to supplement existing resources.	Public Health, Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, Traffic Control, Communications, Public Information	On-site personnel, Operational Area mutual aid coordinators, Fire Marshal, EOC, Region II mutual aid coordinators
Public information is incomplete or inaccurate	Feedback from public, media, and/or social media monitoring indicates incomplete or inaccurate information being distributed, and/or no information being received, and/or significant rumors.	Re-prioritize public information tasks; Request reserve or mutual aid assets to supplement existing resources; verify information with Planning.	Public Information, Communications	On-site personnel, EOC

In support of the key decisions listed above, the command structure should consider the following key questions during the planning stage and if an emergency incident occurs during the **[insert name of LSE]**:

- Are resources adequate to support event? Are our resources properly positioned? If additional resources are necessary how will they be ordered and arrive to the event? Are mutual aid agreements in place that could be utilized to order resources?
- Have adequate security measures been implemented? Example: Requesting a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) from the FAA, etc.
- Are communications between agencies operating effectively? If not, what strategies should be implemented to support effective communications?
- Is Command and Control functioning effectively? If not, what elements should be added or removed from the structure to support effective operations?

- Do we have additional information requirements from the event operators? How will this information be obtained and utilized?
- Has there been, or could there be, a significant change in the expected duration of the event, due to an emergency or other unforeseen circumstances?
- Is there any intelligence information that changes the threat landscape of this event?
- Do we have adequate reach back capabilities and systems in place in the event of a crisis?
- Is there an operational plan in place for sustained ops in the event of a crisis? How will this plan be implemented if necessary?
- Is our command communication system uncluttered so we are getting critical information in a timely fashion?
- Are the communications channels sufficient to handle information coming in as well as information that needs to go out? If not, what changes should be made?
- Are there identified security needs (including Cyber) that we are not meeting? How will we address these needs?
- Do we have adequate mechanisms that filter out false positives and provide rumor control?
- In the event of a threat or a secondary incident, the following critical information will be delivered to the Command Staff to provide situational awareness:
    - Nature of the threat to the event or the impact of the emergency
    - Expected or assessed impacts to the immediate event area and surrounding jurisdictions
- What county, state, and federal assets are in place in support of the emergency response?
- What is the radio communications plan for mutual aid and other such resources?
- What plan is in place to provide the necessary information to the public if they are in danger at any time during the LSE?

4.2.1 Decisions

As needed, the IC/UC in coordination with the host jurisdiction may need to make decisions and/or clarify policies in the key areas. If not addressed during planning, the IC/UC and host jurisdiction may discuss these issues during operations.

- Issues of legal and jurisdictional authority
- Delegation of problem solving authority
- Potential conflicts with hosting jurisdiction's authority structure (ex. Fire Marshal authority)
- Significantly expanding the existing operational response

4.3 Essential Elements of Information

It will be important to collect the right information to make those decisions in a timely manner. The Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) in Appendix A provide the details needed to inform the IC/UC. **[Insert name of LSE]** and allied stakeholders will use the EEIs to direct and prioritize information gathering, management, and analysis. The EEIs must be reported to the host jurisdiction in order to enable a timely and proper response. In some cases, this information is also passed to state / federal agencies to improve the response support from that level of government.

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5.0 Transition to Emergency Response Operations

[The language below should be adjusted to reflect the actual transition to emergency response operations that the host jurisdiction and allied stakeholders will use during an emergency. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

Should an emergency incident occur during the **[insert name of LSE]**, the Unified Command may decide to stop the **[insert name of LSE]**, or allow it to continue with limited interruption or no interruption at all. In order to make this decision the Unified Command should collect all available intelligence on the incident, evaluate the situation, review potential outcomes and determine which of the below incident management options should be selected:

1. Terminate the **[insert name of LSE]** and utilize all existing resources to address the emergency incident.
2. Establish a new, separate incident management structure dedicated to the emergency incident response. The **[insert name of LSE]** organization continues to manage the LSE and provides support as possible. Detach existing LSE resources, or assign new resources to the incident.
3. Continue with existing **[insert name of LSE]** organization structure. Isolate the incident management by expanding the Emergency Response Branch within the Operations Section to incorporate resources as needed. Delegate incident command for the incident to the Response Branch or Operations Section.
4. Continue with existing **[insert name of LSE]** organization structure but utilize and expand the existing functions and resources. Maintain incident command at the Unified Command.

Once Command has made the decision on how to best address the emergency incident, the selected incident management option should be implemented and communicated to all personnel. Once the emergency incident response has concluded, the resources assigned to it should be demobilized or returned to their original operation supporting the **[insert name of LSE]**.

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6.0 Demobilization

[This section provides examples of demobilization processes and procedures. The language below should be adjusted to reflect the actual demobilization process for the LSE. The following is sample language that should be modified as appropriate before releasing the final LSE CONOPS.]

Demobilization will not be implemented until the Unified Command approves demobilization. The **[insert name of host jurisdiction]** Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Planning Section Demobilization (Demob) Unit will facilitate tracking all external resource releases from each Incident Command Post (ICP). Each IC will be responsible for approving the release of resources and directing the resource to report to staging for the formal process of demobilization.

6.1 Demobilization Process

1. With each incident commander's (IC) approval, ICP chiefs will notify resources external to the **[insert name of host jurisdiction]** that they are being demobilized. ICP chiefs will direct resources being demobilized to the EOC Demob Unit station at the staging area located at **[list location of staging area]**.
2. Demobilized resources will report to EOC Demob Unit at the staging area.
3. EOC Demob Unit will out-process the demobilized resource.
4. Once out-processing is complete, the EOC Demob Unit Leader will formally release the resource from the incident.
5. The demobilized resources will redeploy to their home station.
6. The demobilized resources will call the EOC Demob Unit to report once the demobilized resources have arrived at their home station.

The following general guidelines are to be followed by the Demob Unit at the staging area for resources that are leaving the incident:

1. All personnel assigned to the incident will be briefed prior to leaving the incident. Briefing to include:
   a. Method of Travel
   b. Passengers (if any)
   c. Destination
   d. ETD/ETA at destination
   e. Transportation arrangements
2. If necessary, the Planning Section (Demob Unit) and Logistics Section (Ground Support Unit) Chiefs/Leaders will coordinate to provide ground transportation of released personnel and equipment. Logistics Section will make flight arrangements; with at least twenty-four (24) hours advance notice.

3. All vehicles assigned to the incident must have a vehicle inspection before leaving to document all incident-specific damages to vehicles and equipment. The Demob Unit will photograph all reported damage.
4. The Demob Unit at the staging area will ensure all demobilization forms (see Appendix B) are completed and collected by the demobilizing resources prior to formally releasing the resources for return to their parent organization/jurisdiction.
5. The Demob Unit Leader will provide all the completed demobilization forms to the EOC Logistics Section Chief.
6. The EOC Logistics Section Chief will make copies and maintain a record of all submitted demobilization forms. The EOC Logistics Chief will submit the original forms to the appropriate agency.

6.2 Demobilization Responsibilities

1. Incident Command
   a. Maintain a current list of all deployed resources.
   b. Make the decision when to demobilize a resource.
      i. It is recommended that no resources will be released without having a minimum of eight (8) hours off shift, unless specifically approved by the IC.
      ii. It is recommended that all resources be able to arrive at their home base prior to 2200 (10:00 P.M.), unless specifically approved by the IC.
   c. When the ICP is ready to demobilize a resource, direct the resource to report to the Demob Unit Station located at **[insert location of Demob Unit Station]**.
2. EOC Logistics Section
   a. Take custody of all demobilization forms for each day from the Demob Unit Leader.
   b. Make copies of all demobilization forms for each demobilized resource.
   c. Provide the original demobilization forms for each resource to the appropriate agency.
3. EOC Demob Unit Leader
   a. Establish the Demob Station at the incident staging area.
   b. Operate the Demob Station at the incident staging area until the Demob Station is directed to be demobilized by the **[insert name of host jurisdiction]** Emergency Management Director. The Demob Station will not be demobilized after the last external resource has been formally released.
   c. Staff the Demob Station.

d. Out-process each demobilized resource that reports to the Demob Station. Ensure all demobilization forms (see Appendix B) are completed for each demobilized resource before formally releasing the resource from the incident.

e. Once the demobilization process is complete, formally release demobilized resources from the incident.

f. Call the demobilized resource's home station/jurisdiction to inform them that their resource has been demobilized and when they can expect the resource to arrive at their home station/jurisdiction.

g. Record the date and time each demobilized resource calls in to report they have arrived at their home station/jurisdiction.

h. Daily at 2200, provide the original demobilization forms to the EOC Logistics Chief.

4. Demobilized Resources

   a. Once directed to begin the demobilization process, report to the Demob Unit Station at the incident staging area.

   b. Comply with all instructions and complete all forms required by the Demob Unit at the Demob Unit Station.

   c. Once formally released from the incident by the Demob Unit, return to your home station/jurisdiction.

   d. Call the Demob Unit Station to report once you have arrived at your home station/jurisdiction.

   e. Report to the Demob Unit Station if you have any difficulties returning to your home station/jurisdiction.

   f. Once at your home station/jurisdiction, report in to your home agency that you have returned under their control.

6.3 Safety Advisory Information

The following safety advisory information is recommended for all non-local resources:

1. Any heavy or oversized equipment MUST have appropriate permits and follow any limitations on the movement of their equipment on public highways.
2. All resources will meet any agency specific requirements on hours of travel per day or other restrictions concerned with travel.
3. All resources flying commercial aircraft should be showered and in clean clothes.
4. It is recommended that no resources will be released without having a minimum of eight (8) hours off shift, unless specifically approved by the IC.

5. It is recommended that all resources be able to arrive at their home base prior to 2200 (10:00 P.M.), unless specifically approved by the IC.

6.4 Internal Demobilization Process

Follow the checklist found in Appendix B: Demobilization Forms for each agency that completely demobilizes from the **[insert name of LSE]** and returns to normal activities. The following forms are used for demobilization:

1. Demobilization Check-Out Form (ICS 221)
2. Incident Demobilization Vehicle Inspection Form (ICS 212)

Appendix A

[Insert Name of LSE] Essential Elements of Information

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Exhibit A-1: [Insert name of LSE] Essential Elements of Information

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
GENERAL					
What is the name of the special event and description?	Name of the Event Description of the special event	Incident Command On-scene reports	Operations Section	Situation Report Status briefing	Planning briefings upon establishment of EOC and every operational period
What are the physical boundaries of event area?	Geographic footprint of event Number of people attending event	Map Geographic Information System (GIS) database	Operations Section	GIS impact maps Situation report Status briefing	Planning briefings upon establishment of EOC and every operational period
What are the Jurisdictional boundaries of the event(s)?	Identification of jurisdictions impacted Cities Counties Congressional districts Special districts	Existing maps GIS database	Joint State and Federal ESF-5 NSSE/SEAR	GIS maps Jurisdictional profiles	Initial estimate no later than 12 hours and updated every operational period
What is the incident command organization?	Organization chart IMT?	Incident command On-scene reports	Operations Section Planning Section	Organization Chart	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Who is in command at each location?	Name of person(s) in command and the agency the person(s) belong Method of communicating with person in command	Incident command On-scene reports	Operations Section	Situation Report Status briefing	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What other EOCs are activated to support regional event?	State EOC Regional EOCs DOCs NOC JFO	Local Emergency Management Agencies	Responsible jurisdiction EOC	List of EOCs Incident Action Plans	As soon as possible during the incident planning, or after an emergency incident occurs
What resources are at the incident/event scene?	Status of resources at the incident/event scene	On-scene reports Situation reports	Operations Section Planning Section Logistics Section Liaisons	Same as above	Initial estimate no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What are the incident command's pending resource requests?	Actual or potential resource shortfalls of the affected counties Anticipated requirements for regional resources Anticipated requirements for state resources Anticipated requirements for federal resources Potential or actual federal shortfalls Potential sources for resource shortfalls Resources available and where located	On-scene reports Situation reports EOC reports SEOC reports Rapid needs assessment team reports Community relations field reports ESF reports	Planning Section Logistics Section	Situation briefings Situation reports GIS products	Initial assessment no later than 6 hours following incident and updated every operational period
Where are the staging area(s) for resources?	Area needed to support resources Open areas outside immediate footprint	Agency providing resources GIS database Maps	Operations Section Planning Section Logistics Section Liaisons	Map GIS products	As soon as possible so that resources have a location to report to upon dispatch.
What resources have been dispatched to the incident/event but have not yet arrived?	Status of resources dispatched to the incident/event	On-scene reports Situation reports 911 reports	Same as above	Operations planning worksheet	As soon as possible so that resources can be utilized to support operations.

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What mutual aid agreements need to be leveraged for additional resources, if needed?	EMAA EMAC	Mutual aid agreements Local Emergency Management agencies	Operations Section Logistics Section	Same as above	Initial assessment no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours
What is the greatest potential threats/risks posed to this specific event by secondary incidents? (Hazardous, toxic, and radiological issues; criminal, terrorism, explosive devices, safety hazards, natural disasters, crowd management?)	Hazardous materials in the vicinity Projected size of the attending crowd Threats posed against the event	Assessment Team reports NCRIC On-scene reports Predictive modeling Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)/MDNR/Missouri Division of Fire Safety USCG National Weather Service	Operations Section Safety Officer	Threat Briefing Risk Assessment GIS product depicting actual or potential threats Situation report Status briefing Daily intelligence summary Safety briefings/ messages	Initial estimate no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours
Is there any intelligence information indicating a manmade/terrorist threat to the event or its attendees?	Intelligence collected by law enforcement Threats called into law enforcement agencies	NCRIC NOC	Operations Section	Same as above	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Where are LSE visitors and workers staying?	Numbers of visitors and workers forecasted to come into and stay in the areas	Poll local hotels Poll local chambers of commerce and tourism boards Poll on-line housing services (ex. Airbnb)	Planning Section	Situation reports Status briefings (as warranted)	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What is the current weather report?	Forecast post-incident and implications for impeding operations	National Weather Service (NWS)	Operations Section	Status briefings Situation report Daily intelligence summaries	Same as above
What is the weather report for the next 24-hours?	Same as above	Same as above	Planning Section	Same as above	Same as above
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION					
What is the briefing schedule?	List of all of the briefing schedules for the incident command, JIC, EOC, SOC, and policy groups	On-scene reports Situation reports	Operations Section Planning Section	Same as above	Initial estimate no later than 6 hours and updated every 12 hours
When are the situation reports due?	List of when the situation report is due and to whom	EOC SOC	Planning Section	Same as above	Same as above
What is the incident command organization?	Organization chart	Incident command On-scene reports	Operations Section Planning Section	Same as above	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
How can we communicate with the command and established sections?	Other methods of communication to each section of the general staff, the command staff, the JIC, and supporting EOCs, MACCs and supporting agencies (e.g., hospitals, NGO, private sector, etc.). Reliability of cellular service in affected areas Potential requirement for radio/satellite communications capability Status of emergency broadcast (TV, radio, cable) system and ability to disseminate information	On-scene reports Situation reports TICPs Coastal REOC Report State Liaison/Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT)/Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) State and Federal ESF-2 News media/open sources Telephone companies Internet service provider/telephone companies NCS member agencies	Operations Section Planning Section Logistics Section	Same as above	Same as above
What resources are at the incident/event scene?	Status of resources at the incident/event scene	On-scene reports Situation reports	Operations Section Planning Section Logistics Section Liaisons	Same as above	Initial estimate no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Where is the staging area(s) for incident command?	Location and designation for each staging area Name of each staging area manager Method of communication with each staging area manager	On-scene reports Situation reports	Operations Section Planning Section Logistics Section	Same as above	Initial assessment no later than 2 hours following incident and updated every operational period
What are the completed actions of incident command?	Incident, local, and State priorities	On-scene reports Situation reports Local EOC reports	Operations Section Planning Section	Situation briefings Situation reports	Initial assessment no later than 6 hours following incident and updated every operational period
What are the current actions of incident command?	Incident, local, and State priorities	On-scene reports Situation reports Local EOC reports	Operations Section	Situation briefings Situation reports	Ongoing
Coordination with private security entities?	Is communication effective? What issues do they see Are issues being reported to EOC	Incident Command Local law enforcement agencies	Incident Commander	Situation report	Ongoing
What are the projected actions of incident command?	Incident, local, and State priorities	On-scene reports Situation reports Local EOC reports	Planning Section	Situation briefings Situation reports	Updated every operational period

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
PUBLIC INFORMATION / MEDIA RELATIONS					
Has a joint information center (JIC) been established? If so, where?	Time and location the JIC was established Name of the lead PIO Method of communicating with the JIC	Incident Command Local EOC	Same as above	Same as above	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What are the emergency public information requirements?	Messaging priorities Methods of communicating to the public Timeline to communicating to the public	Incident Command Local EOC SOC JIC Media	PIO JIC	Situation briefings Situation reports Media briefings	Initial assessment no later than 4 hours following incident and updated every operational period
Has safety and security information been distributed prior to the event?	Potential threats Safety hazards	Safety Officer OSHA	JIC Safety Officer	Talking Points Written information Safety Message	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What information needs to be actively communicated to the public?	Threats Safety information Evacuation routes	Safety Officer Local EOC JIC Media	JIC EM	Media Briefing Talking Points	Same as above
SECONDARY EVENT					

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What is the nature of the secondary incident?	CBRNE Extreme Weather Event Natural Event Crowd Violence	Field Reports Local EOC	Operations Section Intelligence	Situation briefings Situation reports Media briefings	Same as above.
Physical boundaries of secondary incident areas	Exact location of event Area(s) impacted	Field Reports Maps GIS database	Planning Section	GIS Maps Displays	Same as above
Access points to impacted areas	Location of access points located Credentials needed to enter Best routes to approach the impacted area	SEOC Reports FEMA State Liaisons CalTrans Reports MSHP and Law Enforcement Reports Operations	Operations Section Planning Section	GIS maps Displays Briefings	Initial estimate no later than 6 hours and updated every 12 hours
Are there confirmed injuries? How many?	What is the extent of the injuries?	Field Reports	Operations Section	Status Briefing Situation Report	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What special teams are needed to respond to the incident?	Hazmat Teams Bomb Squad SWAT Teams Federal resources	Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Is EMS response required? Implement Triage?	Number of injured victims and responders	Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
Should hospitals be notified of incoming patients?	Number of level 1 and level 2 victims	EMS triage of injured	Operation's Section	Same as above	Same as above
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL RELEASE					
What is the hazardous material that was released or is threatening to be released?	Chemical Biological Radiological/Nuclear Toxic	On-site Hazmat	Operations Section	Situation briefing Situation Report	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
When did the release occur?	Field Reporting	On-site Hazmat	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
What is the exact location of the release?	Chemical released	On-site Hazmat Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
What was the method of release?	Accidental v. Weaponized	On-site Hazmat Law Enforcement Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
How much of the hazardous materials were released?	How much of the hazardous material was originally in the container(s) prior to the release?	On-Site HazMat	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
Is hazardous materials still being released?	HazMat Team	On-site Hazmat Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
What are current weather conditions?	Wind Temperature Other weather factors	National Weather Service	Planning Section	Situation report	Same as above
What are the hot, warm and cold zones for the release incident?	Hazmat Team	Incident Command Maps GIS Database Plume Modeling	Operations Section	Plume Map Situation Map	Same as above
What teams are in place?	Hazmat Teams Federal Assets	Operations Chief Incident Command	Operations Section	Situation briefing	Same as above
FACILIITY COMPROMISE (Infrastructure) / UTILITIES					

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What critical infrastructure has been destroyed and damaged?	Status of potable and non-potable water and sewage treatment plants/distribution systems Status of medical facilities (hospitals and nursing homes) Status of schools and other public buildings Status of fire and police facilities Status of levees and dams	Predictive models Remote sensing/aerial reconnaissance (CAP) SEOC Reports ESF-3 ESF-8 ESF-12 GIS	Operations Section	Situation Report Unit Logs	Initial estimate no later than 6 hours and updated every 12 hours
What critical infrastructure is threatened by the hazard?	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above
Has power to the facility/area been impacted?	What systems will the loss of power impact? Communications, Access Controls	Utility providers Private sector power companies	Operations Section Planning Section	Situation Reports Situation Briefings	Same as above
Has water to the facility/area been impacted?	What systems will the loss of water impact? Fire Suppression, public health	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Is the physical security of the facility affected/damaged?	Damage to security systems Damage to building foundation Damage to building structural materials	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above
Is the physical security of CI in the surrounding area impacted? (roads, bridges, public transportation hospitals)	Damage to buildings Damage to roads Damage to bridges	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above	Same as above
EARTHQUAKE					
What time did the earthquake occur?	Geological Reporting	State Warning Center CalTech	Operations Section Planning Section	Situation Report	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What is the earthquake's epicenter?	Jurisdiction Impacted	State Warning Center CalTech	Operations Section Planning Section	Same as above	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What is the magnitude of the earthquake?	Geological Reporting	State Warning Center CalTech	Operations Section Planning Section	Same as above	Same as above
What are the resulting aftershocks?	Geological Reporting	CalTech State EOC	Operations Section Planning Section	Same as above	Same as above
Are physical structures within event footprint damaged?	Observed Damage Field Damage Reports	Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
How many collapsed structures requiring USAR teams?	Observed Damage Field Damage Reports	Field Reports USAR Team reporting	Operations Sections	Same as above	Same as above
What is the impact to the transportation infrastructure?	Observed Damage Field Damage Reports	Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
Does the event area/facility need to be evacuated?	Observed Damage Field Reports Anticipated Crowd Size Estimated Current Crowd Size	Facility Emergency Operations Plan Field Reports	Incident Command	Same as above	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Are other facilities/areas evacuating?	Field Reports Reported evacuations	Local Emergency Management agencies Private Sector Partnerships	Planning Section Incident Command Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES					
What is the nature of the explosive device?	Reported Package Bomb Squad Reports	Bomb Squad	Operations Section	Situation Reports	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What areas have been pre-searched/cleared for explosive devices?	Law Enforcement Searches Canine Searches	US Secret Services Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Canine Squads Local Law Enforcement Canine Squads Law Enforcement Patrols	Operations Section	Situation Reports Maps	Same as above
Are there confirmed injuries?	Number of injured Type of injuries reported	Bomb response protocol EMS Field Reporting	Operations Section	Situation Reports	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Has the area been surveyed for potential secondary devices?	Law Enforcement Searches Canine Searches	US Secret Service TSA Canine Squads Local Law Enforcement Canine Squads Law Enforcement Patrols	Operations Section	Situation Reports	Same as above.
What roads need to be closed?	Road closures related to the LSE Proximity to the package Determined hot and cold zones	Regional EOC CA DOT	Operations Section	Evacuation Plan Maps	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What areas need to be evacuated?	Proximity to the package Determined hot and cold zones	Bomb squad protocols Field Reports	Operations Section	Same as above	Same as above
EVACUATION					
What areas need to be evacuated? Entire area or only partial area?	Location of incident Location needing to be evacuated Severity of incident Potential growth/expansion of incident	Field Reporting Local Emergency Management Agencies	Incident Command Operation Section Planning Section	Map Evacuation Plan	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What is number of people in need of evacuation?	Estimated crowd size Anticipated crowd growth	Stadium/Event Evacuation Plan	Incident Command Operation Section Planning Section	Evacuation Plan	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What public address systems are in use to notify attendees of evacuation routes?	Public Address System Staff Lighting and signage	Stadium/Event Evacuation Plan Media PIO	PIO	Press Release Press Briefing Public Address System	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
How/What information re: evacuation is being communicated to facility staff?	Routes Procedures	Stadium/Event Evacuation Plan PIO	PIO Operations Section	Press Release Press Briefing	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
Functional Needs: How many people will need assistance leaving the area?	Types of assistance necessary (transportation, language, medical)	Field Reporting	Operations Section Planning Section	Evacuation Plan	Same as above

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
What roads need to be closed?	Road closures related to the LSE Location needing to be evacuated	Regional EOC CA DOT	Operations Section	Evacuation Plan Maps	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
Are other locations in the jurisdiction being evacuated simultaneously?	Footprint of the incident causing the evacuation Evacuation routes being used	Regional EOC Local Emergency Management Agencies	Planning Section	Situation Reporting	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
ACCESS CONTROL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY					
Are access credentials being enforced?	Number of credentials issued for the LSE Type of credentials issued for the LSE Location of credential check points	US Secret Service Local Law Enforcement Federal Bureau of Investigation	Operations Section	Situation Reporting Credentialing Plan	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
VIP security	Who is providing VIP Security Number of law enforcement officers assigned	Local Law Enforcement Agencies	Operations Section	Situation Reporting	Same as above
CROWD MANAGEMENT					

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Are there areas for public demonstration?	Reports from Law Enforcement Required public demonstration areas	Field Reports	Operations	Map Situation Report	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
What is the plan for family reunification plan for missing children?	Safe location for holding children Support from Law Enforcement	Field Reports Location of mobile command post	Planning Operations	Map Reunification plan	Developed prior to event if possible. As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
Are there incidents of fan violence within the facility or parking lots?	Reports from Law Enforcement Arrest reports	Field Reports	Operations	Situation Report Situation Briefing	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
TRAFFIC/TRANSPORTATION					
Points of entry and exit	Entry areas to LSE Manned entry and exit points	Mapping Event Footprint	Operations	Map of venue/area	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required

Essential Element of Information	Specific Information	Methodology/Source	Responsible Entity	Product	Timeline
Are parking lots at capacity?	Reports from law enforcement in parking areas	Mapping Event Footprint	Operations	Map of venue/area	Initial estimate no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours
What roads are closed?	Requests for closures supporting LSE	Mapping Event Footprint	Operations	Situation report	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
Are there any problems with public transportation in the area?	Disruption/delays in service Demands on service	Public transit/transportation providers MTC	Operations Logistics	Situation report	Initial estimate no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours
Are there any reported problems with traffic flow on major highways in the area?	Reported accidents Reported disabled vehicles	GPS CHP DOT	Operations	Situation report	As soon as possible post-incident/event and ongoing as required
MEDICAL RESPONSE/EMS					
Do cooling areas needed to be implemented? Location of cooling locations?	Temperatures Anticipated changes in temperatures	National Weather Service GIS database	Planning Section Operations Section	Map of venue with cooling locations outlined.	Initial estimate no later than 4 hours and updated every 12 hours

Appendix B

Demobilization Forms

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DEMOBILIZATION CHECK-OUT (ICS 221)

1. Incident Name:	2. Incident Number:	
3. Planned Release Date/Time: Date: Time:	4. Resource or Personnel Released:	5. Order Request Number:

6. Resource or Personnel:
You and your resources are in the process of being released. Resources are not released until the checked boxes below have been signed off by the appropriate overhead and the Demobilization Unit Leader (or Planning Section representative).

LOGISTICS SECTION

	Unit/Manager	Remarks	Name	Signature
☐	Supply Unit			
☐	Communications Unit			
☐	Facilities Unit			
☐	Ground Support Unit			
☐	Security Manager			
☐				

FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION SECTION

	Unit/Leader	Remarks	Name	Signature
☐	Time Unit			
☐				
☐				

OTHER SECTION/STAFF

	Unit/Other	Remarks	Name	Signature
☐				
☐				

PLANNING SECTION

	Unit/Leader	Remarks	Name	Signature
☐				
☐	Documentation Leader			
☐	Demobilization Leader			

7. Remarks:

8. Travel Information:
Room Overnight: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Estimated Time of Departure: ______
Actual Release Date/Time: ______
Destination: ______
Estimated Time of Arrival: ______
Travel Method: ______
Contact Information While Traveling: ______
Manifest: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Number: ______
Area/Agency/Region Notified: ______

9. Reassignment Information: ☐ Yes ☐ No
Incident Name: ______
Incident Number: ______
Location: ______
Order Request Number: ______

10. Prepared by: Name: ______ Position/Title: ______ Signature: ______

ICS 221 Date/Time: ______

Incident Demobilization Vehicle Safety Inspection

Vehicle Operator: Complete items above double lines prior to inspection

Incident Name		Order No.
Vehicle: License No.	Agency	Reg/Unit
Type (Eng., Bus., Sedan)	Odometer Reading	Veh. ID No.

Inspection Items	Pass	Fail	Comments
1. Gauges and lights. See back*			
2. Seat belts. See back *			
3. Glass and mirrors. See back*			
4. Wipers and horn. See back *			
5. Engine compartment. See back			
6. Fuel system. See back *			
7. Steering. See back *			
8. Brakes. See back *			
9. Drive line U-joints. Check play			
10. Springs and shocks. See back			
11. Exhaust system. See back *			
12. Frame. See back *			
13. Tire and wheels. See back *			
14. Coupling devices. * Emergency exit (Buses)			
15. Pump Operation			
16. Damage on Incident			
17. Other			
* **Safety Item - Do not Release Until Repaired**			
Additional Comments:			

HOLD FOR REPAIRS	RELEASE
Date Time	Dat e Time
Inspector Name (Print)	Operator Name (Print)
Inspector Signature	Operator Signature

This form may be photocopied, but three copies must be completed.
Distribution: Original to Inspector, copy to vehicle operator, copy to Incident Documentation Unit

ICS 212 2/96

INSPECTION ITEMS

(REF: FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS

HOLD FOR REPAIRS IF:

1. Gauges & Lights	-Speedometer inoperative. (Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation (FMCSR 393.82) -All required lighting devices, reflectors and electrical equipment must be properly positioned, colored and working. (FMCSR 393.9)
2. Seat Belts	-Any driver's or right outboard seat belt, missing or inoperative. (FMCSR 393.93) -Passenger carrying have missing or inoperative seat belts in passenger seats, Buses excepted.
3. Glass & Mirrors	-Any windshield crack over 1/4" wide. -Any damage 3/4" or greater in diameter. -Any 2 damaged areas are closer than 3" to each other. -Any crack less than 1/4" wide intersects with any other crack. (FMCSR 393.60) -Any crack or discoloration in the windshield area lying within the sweep of the wiper on either side of the windshield (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B) -Any required mirror missing. One on each side, firmly attached to the outside of the vehicle, and so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway to the rear along both sides of the vehicle. See Exceptions (FMCSR 393.80) -Any required mirror broken.
4. Wipers & Horn	-Wiper blade(s) fail to clean windshield within 1" of windshield sides. (FMCSR 393.78) -Horn, missing, inoperative, or fails to give an adequate and reliable warning signal. (FMCSR 393.81)
5. Engine Compartment	-Low fluid levels -Loose or leaking battery -Excessive leaks -Cracked or deteriorated belts or hoses. -Any condition of impending or probable failure.
6. Fuel System	-Visible leak at any point. -Fuel tank cap missing. -Fuel tank not securely attached to vehicle by reason of loose, broken or missing mounting bolts or brackets. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B)
7. Steering	-Steering wheel does not turn freely, has any spokes cracked, loose spokes or missing parts. -Steering lash not within parameters, see chart, in FMCSR 393.209. -Steering column is not secure -Steering system; any U-joints worn, faulty or repaired by welding. -Steering gear box is loose, cracked or missing mounting bolts. -Pitman arm loose. -Power Steering; any components inoperative. Any loose, broken or missing parts. Belts frayed, cracked or slipping. -Any fluid leaks, fluid reservoir not full. (FMCSR 393.209)
8. Brakes	-Brake system has any missing, loose, broken, out of adjustment or worn out components. -Brake system has any air or fluid leaks. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B) -Brake system has any other deficiencies as described in FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B.
10.Springs & Shocks	-Any U-bolt, spring, spring hanger or any other axle positioning part is cracked, broken, loose or missing resulting in any shifting of an axle from it's normal position. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B)
11. Exhaust	-Any leaks at any point forward of or directly below the driver and/or sleeper compartment. -Bus exhaust leaks or discharge forward of the rearmost part of the bus in excess of 6' for Gasoline powered or 15" for other then Gasoline powered, or forward of any door or window designed to be opened on other then Gasoline powered bus. (Exception: emergency exit) -Any part of the exhaust system so located as would be likely to result in burning, charring, or damaging the wiring, fuel supply or any combustible part of the vehicle. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B)
12.Frame	-Any cracked, broken, loose or sagging frame member. -Any loose or missing fasteners including those attaching engine, transmission, steering gear, suspension, body or frame to contact the tire or wheel assemblies. -Adjustable axle assemblies with locking pins missing or not engaged. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B)
13.Tires & Tread	-Tread depth less than 4/32" on steering axle. -Less than 2/32" on any other axle. -Any body ply or belt material exposed through tread or sidewall. -Any tread or sidewall separation. -Any cut exposing ply or belt material. -Any tire marked "Not for highway use". -A tube-type radial tire without radial tube stem markings. -Any mixing of bias and radial tires on the same axle. -Any tire not properly inflated or overloaded. -Any bus with recapped tires. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B) -Lock or slide rings; any bent, broken, cracked, improperly seated, sprung or mismatched ring(s). -Wheels and rims; any cracked or broken or has elongated bolt holes. -Fasteners (both spoke and disc wheels). Any loose, missing, broken, cracked, stripped or otherwise ineffective fasteners. -Any cracks in welds attaching disc wheel disc to rim. -Any crack in welds attaching tubeless demountable rim to adapter. -Any welded repair on aluminum wheel(s) on a steering axle or any welded repair other then disc to rim attachment on steel disc wheel(s) on steering axle. (FMCSR Appendix G, Sub. B)